young men, he excited and at the same time confirmed the innate notions. This he called his Art of Midwifery, which did not (as others professed) extrinsically confer intelligence upon his auditors; but demonstrated it to be innate, yet imperfect and confused, and in want of a nurse to feed and fortify it.
QUESTION II.
WHY DOES HE CALL THE SUPREME GOD FATHER AND MAKER OF ALL THINGS? (Plato, “Timaeus,” p. 28 C.)
Is it because he is (as Homer calls him) of created gods and men the Father, and of brutes and things that have no soul the maker? If Chrysippus may be believed, he is not properly styled the father of the afterbirth who supplied the seed, although it arose from the seed. Or has Plato figuratively called the maker of the world the father of it? In his Convivium he calls Phaedrus the father of the amatorious discourse which he had commenced; and so in his Phaedrus (“Phaedrus,” p. 261 A.) he calls him “father of noble children,” when he had been the occasion of many pre-eminent discourses about philosophical questions. Or is there any difference between a father and a maker? Or between procreation and making? For as what is procreated is also made, but not the contrary recreated did also make, for the procreation of an animal is the making of it. Now the work of a maker–as of a builder, a weaver, a musical- instrument maker, or a statuary–is altogether apart and separate from its author; but the principle and power of the procreator is implanted in the progeny, and contains his nature, the progeny being a piece pulled off the procreator. Since therefore the world is neither like a piece of potter’s work nor joiner’s work, but there is a great share of life and divinity in it, which God from himself communicated to and mixed with matter, God may properly be called Father of the world–since it has life in it–and also the maker of it.
And since these things come very near to Plato’s opinion, consider, I pray, whether there may not be some probability in them. Whereas the world consists of two parts, body and soul, God indeed made not the body; but matter being at hand, he formed and fitted it, binding up and confirming what was infinite within proper limits and figures. But the soul, partaking of mind, reason, and harmony, was not only the work of God, but part of him not only made by him, but begot by him.
QUESTION III.
In the Republic, (“Republic,” vi. pp. 509 D-511 E.) he assumes the universe, as one line to be cut into two unequal parts; again he cuts each of these parts in two after the same manner, and supposes the two sections first made to form the two genera of things sensible and things intelligible. The first stands for the genus of intelligibles, comprehending in the first subdivision the primitive forms, in the second the mathematics. Of sensibles, the first subdivision comprehends solid bodies, the second comprehends the images and representations of them. Moreover, to every one of these four he has assigned its proper criterion;–to the first reason; to the mathematics, the understanding; to sensibles, belief; to images and likenesses, conjecture.
BUT WHAT DOES HE MEAN BY DIVIDING THE UNIVERSE INTO UNEQUAL PARTS? AND WHICH OF THE SECTIONS, THE INTELLIGIBLE OR THE SENSIBLE, IS THE GREATER? FOR IN THIS HE HAS NOT EXPLAINED HIMSELF.
At first glance it will appear that the sensible is the greater portion. For the essence of intelligibles being indivisible, and in the same respect ever the same, is contracted into a little, and pure; but an essence divisible and running through bodies constitutes the sensible part. Now what is immaterial is limited; but body in respect of matter is infinite and unlimited, and it becomes sensible only when it is limited by partaking of the intelligible. Besides, as every sensible has many images, shadows, and representations, and from one and the same original several copies may be taken both by nature and art; so the latter must surpass the former in number, according to Plato, who makes things of the intellect to be patterns or ideas of things sensible, as if the last were images and reflections. Further, Plato derives the knowledge of ideas by abstraction and cutting away of body, leading us by mathematical discipline from arithmetic to geometry, thence to astronomy, and placing harmony above them all. For things become geometrical by the accession of magnitude to quantity; solid, by the accession of profundity to magnitude; astronomical, by the accession of motion to solidity; harmonical, by the accession of sound to motion. Take then sound from moving bodies, motion from solids, profundity from superficies, magnitude from quantity, we then reach pure intelligible ideas, which have no difference among themselves as regards the one single intelligible essence. For unity makes no number unless joined by the infinite binary; then it makes a number. And thence we proceed to points, thence to lines, from them to superficies, and solids, and bodies, and to the qualities of the bodies so and so affected. Now the reason is the only criterion of intelligibles; and the understanding is the reason in the mathematics, where intelligibles appear as if in mirrors. But as to the knowledge of bodies, because of their multitude, Nature has given us five powers or distinctions of senses; nor are all bodies discerned by them, many escaping sense by reason of their smallness. And though every one of us consists of a body and soul, yet the hegemonic and intellectual faculty is small, being hid in the huge mass of flesh. And the case is the same in the universe, as to sensible and intelligible. For intelligibles are the principles of bodily things, but everything is greater than the principle whence it came.
Yet, on the contrary, some will say that, by comparing sensibles with intelligibles, we match things mortal with divine, in some measure; for God is in intelligibles. Besides, the thing contained is ever less than the containing, and the nature of the universe contains the sensible in the intelligible. For God, having placed the soul in the middle, hath extended it through all, and hath covered it all round with bodies. The soul is invisible, and cannot be perceived by any of the senses, as Plato says in his Book of Laws; therefore every man must die, but the world shall never die. For mortality and dissolution surround every one of our vital faculties. The case is quite otherwise in the world; for the corporeal part, contained in the middle by the more noble and unalterable principle, is ever preserved. And a body is said to be without parts and indivisible for its minuteness; but what is incorporeal and intelligible is so, as being simple and sincere, and void of all firmness and difference. Besides, it were folly to think to judge of incorporeal things by corporeal. The present, or now, is said to be without parts and indivisible, since it is everywhere and no part of the world is void of it. But all affections and actions, and all corruptions and generations in the world, are contained by this same now. But the mind is judge only of what is intelligible, as the sight is of light, by reason of its simplicity and similitude. But bodies, having several differences and diversities, are comprehended, some by one judicatory function, others by another, as by several organs. Yet they do not well who despise the discriminative faculty in us; for being great, it comprehends all sensibles, and attains to things divine. The chief thing he himself teaches in his Banquet, where he shows us how we should use amatorious matters, turning our minds from sensible goods to things discernible only by the mind, that we ought not to be enslaved by the beauty of any body, study, or learning, but laying aside such weakness, should turn to the vast ocean of beauty. (See Plato’s “Symposium,” p. 210 D.)
QUESTION IV.
WHAT IS THE REASON THAT, THOUGH PLATO ALWAYS SAYS THAT THE SOUL IS ANCIENTER THAN THE BODY, AND THAT IT IS THE CAUSE AND PRINCIPLE OF ITS RISE, YET HE LIKEWISE SAYS, THAT NEITHER COULD THE SOUL EXIST WITHOUT THE BODY, NOR THE REASON WITHOUT THE SOUL, BUT THE SOUL IN THE BODY AND THE REASON IN THE SOUL? FOR 80 THE BODY WILL SEEM TO BE AND NOT TO BE, BECAUSE IT BOTH EXISTS WITH THE SOUL, AND IS BEGOT BY THE SOUL.
Perhaps what we have often said is true; viz., that the soul without reason and the body without form did mutually ever coexist, and neither of them had generation or beginning. But after the soul did partake of reason and harmony, and being through consent made wise, it wrought a change in matter, and being stronger than the other’s motions, it drew and converted these motions to itself. So the body of the world drew its original from the soul, and became conformable and like to it. For the soul did not make the nature of the body out of itself, or out of nothing; but it wrought an orderly and pliable body out of one disorderly and formless. Just as if a man should say that the virtue of the seed is with the body, and yet that the body of the fig-tree or olive-tree was made of the seed, he would not be much out; for the body, its innate motion and mutation proceeding from the seed, grew up and became what it is. So, when formless and indefinite matter was once formed by the inbeing soul, it received such a form and disposition.
QUESTION V.
WHY, SINCE BODIES AND FIGURES ARE CONTAINED PARTLY BY RECTILINEARS AND PARTLY BY CIRCLES, DOES HE MAKE ISOSCELES TRIANGLES AND TRIANGLES OF UNEQUAL SIDES THE PRINCIPLES OF RECTILINEARS; OF WHICH THE ISOSCELES TRIANGLE CONSTITUTES THE CUBE, THE ELEMENT OF THE EARTH; AND A SCALENE TRIANGLE FORMS THE PYRAMID, THE OCTAHEDRON THE SEED OF FIRE, AIR AND WATER RESPECTIVELY, AND THE ICOSAHEDRON;– WHILE HE PASSES OVER CIRCULARS, THOUGH HE DOES MENTION THE GLOBE, WHERE HE SAYS THAT EACH OF THE AFORE-RECKONED FIGURES DIVIDES A ROUND BODY THAT CIRCUMSCRIBES IT INTO EQUAL PARTS. (See “Timaeus,” pp. 53-56.)
Is their opinion true who think that he ascribed a dodecahedron to the globe, when he says that God made use of it in delineating the universe? For upon account of the multitude of its bases and the obtuseness of its angles, avoiding all rectitude, it is flexible, and by circumtension, like globes made of twelve skins, it becomes circular and comprehensive. For it has twenty solid angles, each of which is contained by three obtuse planes, and each of these contains one and the fifth part of a right angle. Now it is made up of twelve equilateral and equangular quinquangles (or pentagons), each of which consists of thirty of the first scalene triangles. Therefore it seems to resemble both the Zodiac and the year, it being divided into the same number of parts as these.
Or is a right line in Nature prior to circumference; or is circumference but an accident of rectilinear? For a right line is said to bend; and a circle is described by a centre and distance, which is the place of a right line from which a circumference is measured, this being everywhere equally distant from the middle. And a cone and a cylinder are made by rectilinears; a cone by keeping one side of a triangle fixed and carrying another round with the base,–a cylinder, by doing the like with a parallelogram. Further, that is nearest to principle which is less; but a right is the least of all lines, as it is simple; whereas in a circumference one part is convex without, another concave within. Besides, numbers are before figures, as unity is before a point, which is unity in position. But indeed unity is triangular; for every triangular number (Triangular numbers are those of which equilateral triangles can be formed in this way:
.
. . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Such are: 3, 6, 10, 15, 21, 28, 36, 45, etc.; that is, numbers formed by adding the digits in regular order. (G.)) taken eight times, by adding unity, becomes quadrate; and this happens to unity. Therefore a triangle is before a circle, whence a right line is before a circumference. Besides, no element is divided into things compounded of itself; indeed there is a dissolution of all other things into the elements. Now a triangle is divided into no circumference, but two diameters cut a circle into four triangles; therefore a rectilinear figure is before a circular, and has more of the nature of an element. And Plato himself shows that a rectilinear is in the first place, and a circular is only consequential and accidental. For when he says the earth consists of cubes, each of which is contained with rectilinear superficies, he says the earth is spherical and round. Therefore there was no need of making a peculiar element for round things, since rectilinears, fitted after a certain manner among themselves, do make up this figure.
Besides, a right line, whether great or little, preserves the same rectitude; but as to the circumference of a circle, the less it is, the crookeder it is; the larger, the straighter. Therefore if a convex surface stands on a plane, it sometimes touches the under plane in a point, sometimes in a line. So that a man may imagine that a circumference is made up of little right lines.
But observe whether this be not true, that no circle or sphere in this world is exactly drawn; but since by the tension and circumtension of the straight lines, or by the minuteness of the parts, the difference is hidden, the figure seems circular and round. Therefore no corruptible body moves circularly, but altogether in a right line. To be truly spherical is not in a sensible body, but is the element of the soul and mind, to which he has given circular motion, as being agreeable to their nature.
QUESTION VI.
HOW COMES IT TO PASS THAT IN PHAEDRUS IT IS SAID, THAT THE NATURE OF A WING, BY WHICH ANYTHING THAT IS HEAVY IS CARRIED UPWARDS, PARTICIPATES MOST OF THE BODY OF GOD? (See “Phaedrus,” p. 246 D.)
Is it because the discourse is of love, and love is of beauty inherent in a body? Now beauty, by similitude to things divine, moves and reminds the soul. Or it may be (without too much curiosity) he may be understood in plain meaning, to wit, that the several faculties of the soul being employed about bodies, the power of reasoning and understanding partakes most about divine and heavenly things; which he did not improperly call a wing, it raising the soul from mean and mortal things to things above.
QUESTION VII.
IN WHAT SENSE DOES PLATO SAY, THAT THE ANTIPERISTASIS (OR REACTION) OF MOTION–BY REASON THERE IS NO VACUUM–IS THE CAUSE OF THE PHENOMENA IN PHYSICIANS’ CUPPING-GLASSES, IN SWALLOWING, IN CASTING WEIGHTS, IN THE RUNNING OF WATER, IN THUNDER, IN THE ATTRACTION OF THE LOADSTONE, AND IN THE HARMONY OF SOUNDS? (See “Timaeus,” pp. 79-81.)
For it seems unreasonable to ascribe the reason of such different effects to the selfsame cause.
How respiration is made by the reaction of the air, he has sufficiently shown. But the others, he says, seem to be effected miraculously, but really the bodies force each other aside and change places with one another; while he has left for us to discover how each is particularly done.
As to cupping-glasses, the case is thus: the air next to the flesh being comprehended and inflamed by the heat, and being made more rare than the pores of the brass, does not go into a vacuum (for there is no such thing), but into the air that is without the cupping-glass, and has an impulse upon it. This air drives that before it; and each, as it gives way, strives to succeed into the place which was vacuated by the cession of the first. And so the air approaching the flesh comprehended by the cupping-glass, and attracting it, draws the humors into the cupping-glass.
Swallowing takes place in the same way. For the cavities about the mouth and stomach are full of air; when therefore the meat is squeezed down by the tongue and tonsils, the elided air follows what gives way, and also forces down the meat.
Weights also thrown cleave the air and dissipate it, as they fall with force; the air recoiling back, according to its proper tendency to rush in and fill the vacuum, follows the impulse, and accelerates the motion.
The fall also of thunderbolts is like to darting anything. For by the blow in the cloud, the fiery matter exploded breaks into the air; and it being broken gives way, and again being contracted above, by main force it presses the thunderbolt downwards contrary to Nature.
And neither amber nor the loadstone draws anything to it which is near, nor does anything spontaneously approach them. But this stone emits strong exhalations, by which the surrounding air being impelled forceth that which is before it; and this being drawn round in the circle, and returning into the vacuated place, forcibly draws the iron in the same movement. In amber there is a flammeous and spirituous nature, and this by rubbing on the surface is emitted by recluse passages, and does the same that the loadstone does. It also draws the lightest and driest of adjacent bodies, by reason of their tenuity and weakness; for it is not so strong nor so endued with weight and strength as to force much air and to act with violence and to have power over great bodies, as the magnet has. But what is the reason the air never draws a stone, nor wood, but iron only, to the loadstone? This is a common question both by those who think the coition of these bodies is made by the attraction of the loadstone, and by such as think it done by the incitement of the iron. Iron is neither so rare as wood, nor altogether so solid as gold or a stone; but has certain pores and asperities, which as far as inequality is concerned are proportionable to the air; and the air being received in certain positions, and having (as it were) certain stays to hang to, does not slip off; but when it is carried up to the stone and is forced against it, it draws the iron by force along with it to the stone. Such then may be the reason of this.
But the manner of the waters running over the earth is not so evident. But it is observable that the waters of lakes and ponds stand immovable, because the air about them stagnates immovable and admits of no vacuity. For the water on the surface of lakes and seas is troubled and fluctuates as the air is moved, it following the motion of the air, and moving as it is moved. For the force from below causes the hollowness of the wave, and from above the swelling thereof; until the air ambient and containing the water is still. Therefore the flux of such waters as follow the motion of the receding air, and are impelled by that which presses behind, is continued without end. And this is the reason that the stream increases with the waters, and is slow where the water is weak, the air not giving way, and therefore enduring less reaction. So the water of fountains must needs go upwards, the extrinsic air succeeding into the vacuity and throwing the water out. In a close house, that keeps in the air and wind, the floor sprinkled with water causes an air or wind, because, as the sprinkled water falls, the air gives way. For it is so provided by Nature that air and water force one another and give way to one another; because there is no vacuity in which one can be fixed without experiencing the change and alteration in the other.
Concerning symphony, he shows how sounds harmonize. A quick sound is acute, a slow is grave. Therefore acute sounds move the senses the quicker; and these dying and grave sounds supervening, what arises from the contemperation of one with the other causes pleasure to the ear, which we call harmony. And by what has been said, it may easily be understood that air is the instrument of these things. For sound is the stroke upon the sense of the hearer, caused by the air; and the air strikes as it is struck by the thing moving,–if violent, acutely,–if languid, softly. The violent stroke comes quick to the ear; then the circumambient air receiving a slower, it affects and carries the sense along with it.
QUESTION VIII.
WHAT MEANS TIMAEUS (See “Timaeus,” p. 42 D.) WHEN HE SAYS THAT SOULS ARE DISPERSED INTO THE EARTH, THE MOON, AND INTO OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF TIME?
Does the earth move like the sun, moon, and five planets, which for their motions he calls organs or instruments of time? Or is the earth fixed to the axis of the universe; yet not so built as to remain immovable, but to turn and wheel about, as Aristarchus and Seleucus have shown since; Aristarchus only supposing it, Seleucus positively asserting it? Theophrastus writes how that Plato, when he grew old, repented him that he had placed the earth in the middle of the universe, which was not its place.
Or is this contradictory to Plato’s opinion elsewhere, and in the Greek instead of [Greek omitted] should it be written [Greek omitted], taking the dative case instead of the genitive, so that the stars will not be said to be instruments, but the bodies of animals? So Aristotle has defined the soul to be “the actualization of a natural organic body, having the power of life.” The sense then must be this, that souls are dispersed into meet organical bodies in time. But this is far besides his opinion. For it is not once, but several times, that he calls the stars instruments of time; as when he says, the sun was made, as well as other planets, for the distinction and conservation of the numbers of time.
It is therefore most proper to understand the earth to be here an instrument of time; not that the earth is moved, as the stars are; but that, they being carried about it, it standing still makes sunset and sunrising, by which the first measures of time, nights and days, are circumscribed. Wherefore he called it the infallible guard and artificer of night and day. For the gnomons of dials are instruments and measures of time, not in being moved with the shadows, but in standing still; they being like the earth in closing out the light of the sun when it is down,–as Empedocles says that the earth makes night by intercepting light. This therefore may be Plato’s meaning.
And so much the rather might we consider whether the sun is not absurdly and without probability said to be made for the distinction of time, with the moon and the rest of the planets. For as in other respects the dignity of the sun is great; so by Plato in his Republic (Plato, “Republic.” vi. pp. 508, 509.) the sun is called the king and lord of the whole sensible nature, as the Chief Good is of the intelligible. For it is said to be the offspring of Good, it supplying both generation and appearance to things visible; as it is from Good that things intelligible both are and are understood. But that this God, having such a nature and so great power, should be only an instrument of time, and a sure measure of the difference that happens among the eight orbs, as they are slow or swift in motion, seems neither decent nor highly rational. It must therefore be said to such as are startled at these things, that it is their ignorance to think that time is the measure of motion in respect of sooner or later, as Aristotle calls it; or quantity in motion, as Speusippus; or an interval of motion and nothing else, as some of the Stoics define it, by an accident, not comprehending its essence and power, which Pindar has not ineptly expressed in these words: Time, who surpasses all in the seats of the blest. Pythagoras also, when he was asked what time was, answered, it was the soul of the universe. For time is no affection or accident of motion, but the cause, power, and principle of that symmetry and order that confines all created beings, by which the animated nature of the universe is moved. Or rather, this order and symmetry itself–so far as it is motion –is called time. For this,
Walking by still and silent ways,
Mortal things with justice leads. (Euripides, “Troades,” 887.)
According to the ancients, the principle of the soul is a number moving itself. Therefore Plato says that time and heaven were coexistent, but that motion was before heaven had being. But time was not. For then there neither was order, nor measure, nor determination; but indefinite motion, as it were, the formless and rude matter of time. … But when matter was informed with figures, and motion with circuitions, from that came the world, from this time. Both are representations of God; the world, of his essence; time, of his eternity in the sphere of motion, as the world is God in creation. Therefore they say heaven and motion, being bred together, will perish together, if ever they do perish. For nothing is generated without time, nor is anything intelligible without eternity; if this is to endure forever, and that never to die when once bred. Time, therefore, having a necessary connection and affinity with heaven, cannot be called simple motion, but (as it were) motion in order having terms and periods; whereof since the sun is prefect and overseer, to determine, moderate, produce, and observe changes and seasons, which (according to Heraclitus) produce all things, he is coadjutor to the governing and chief God, not in trivial things, but in the greatest and most momentous affairs.
QUESTION IX.
Since Plato in his Commonwealth, discoursing of the faculties of the soul, has very well compared the symphony of reason and of the irascible and the concupiscent faculties to the harmony of the middle, lowest, and highest chord, (See “Republic,” iv. p. 443.) some men may properly inquire:–
DID PLATO PLACE THE RATIONAL OR THE IRASCIBLE FACULTY IN THE MIDDLE? FOR HE IS NOT CLEAR IN THE POINT.
Indeed, according to the natural system of the parts, the place of the irascible faculty must be in the middle, and of the rational in the highest, which the Greeks call hypate. For they of old called the chief and supreme [Greek omitted]. So Xenocrates calls Jove, in respect of immutable things, [Greek omitted] (or HIGHEST), in respect of sublunary things [Greek omitted] (or LOWEST). And long before him, Homer calls the chief God [Greek omitted], HIGHEST OF RULERS. And Nature has of due given the highest place to what is most excellent, having placed reason as a steersman in the head, and the appetitive faculty at a distance, last of all and lowest. And the lowest place they call [Greek omitted], as the names of the dead, [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted], do show. And some say, that the south wind, inasmuch as it blows from a low and obscure place, is called [Greek omitted]. Now since the appetitive faculty stands in the same opposition to reason in which the lowest stands to the highest and the last to the first, it is not possible for the reason to be uppermost and first, and yet for any other part to be the one called [Greek omitted] (or HIGHEST). For they that ascribe the power of the middle to it, as the ruling power, are ignorant how they deprive it of a higher power, namely, of the highest, which is compatible neither to the irascible nor to the concupiscent faculty; since it is the nature of them both to be governed by and obsequious to reason, and the nature of neither of them to govern and lead it. And the most natural place of the irascible faculty seems to be in the middle of the other two. For it is the nature of reason to govern, and of the irascible faculty both to govern and be governed, since it is obsequious to reason, and commands the appetitive faculty when this is disobedient to reason. And as in letters the semi-vowels are middling between mutes and vowels, having something more than those and less than these; so in the soul of man, the irascible faculty is not purely passive, but hath often an imagination of good mixed with the irrational appetite of revenge. Plato himself, after he had compared the soul to a pair of horses and a charioteer, likened (as every one knows) the rational faculty to the charioteer, and the concupiscent to one of the horses, which was resty and unmanageable altogether, bristly about the ears, deaf and disobedient both to whip and spur; and the irascible he makes for the most part very obsequious to the bridle of reason, and assistant to it. As therefore in a chariot, the middling one in virtue and power is not the charioteer, but that one of the horses which is worse than his guider and yet better than his fellow; so in the soul, Plato gives the middle place not to the principal part, but to that faculty which has less of reason than the principal part and more than the third. This order also keeps the analogy of the symphonies, i.e. the proportion of the irascible to the rational (which is placed as hypate) making the diatessaron (or fourth), that of the irascible to the concupiscent (or nete) making the diapente (or fifth), and that of the rational to the concupiscent (as hypate to nete) making an octave or diapason. But should you place the rational in the middle, you would make the irascible farther from the concupiscent; though some of the philosophers have taken the irascible and the concupiscent faculty for the selfsame, by reason of their likeness.
But it may be ridiculous to describe the first, middle, and last by their place; since we see hypate highest in the harp, lowest in the pipe; and wheresoever you place the mese in the harp, provided it is tunable, it sounds more acute than hypate, and more grave than nete. Nor does the eye possess the same place in all animals; but whereever it is placed, it is natural for it to see. So a pedagogue, though he goes not foremost but follows behind, is said to lead ([Greek omitted]), as the general of the Trojan army,
Now in the front, now in the rear was seen, And kept command;
(“Iliad,” xi. 64.)
but wherever he was, he was first and chief in power. So the faculties of the soul are not to be ranged by mere force in order of place or name, but according to their power and analogy. For that in the body of man reason is in the highest place, is accidental. But it holds the chief and highest power, as mese to hypate, in respect of the concupiscent; as mese to nete, in respect of the irascible; insomuch as it depresses and heightens,–and in fine makes a harmony,–by abating what is too much and by not suffering them to flatten and grow dull. For what is moderate and symmetrous is defined by mediocrity. Still more is it the end of the rational faculty to bring the passions to moderation, which is called sacred, as making a harmony of the extremes with reason, and through reason with each other. For in chariots the best of the team is not in the middle; nor is the skill of driving to be placed as an extreme, but it is a mean between the inequality of the swiftness and the slowness of the horses. So the force of reason takes up the passions irrationally moved, and reducing them to measure, constitutes a mean betwixt too much and too little.
QUESTION X.
WHY SAID PLATO, THAT SPEECH WAS COMPOSED OF NOUNS AND VERBS? (Plato’s “Sophist,” p. 262 A.)
For he seems to make no other parts of speech but them. But Homer in a playful humor has comprehended them all in one verse:–
[Greek omitted] (“Iliad”, i. 185.)
For in it there is pronoun, participle, noun, preposition, article, conjunction, adverb, and verb, the particle–[Greek omitted] being put instead of the preposition [Greek omitted]; for [Greek omitted], TO THE TENT, is said in the same sense as [Greek omitted], TO ATHENS. What then shall we say for Plato?
Is it that at first the ancients called that [Greek omitted], or speech, which once was called protasis and now is called axiom or proposition,–which as soon as a man speaks, he speaks either true or false? This consists of a noun and verb, which logicians call the subject and predicate. For when we hear this said, “Socrates philosphizeth” or “Socrates is changed,” requiring nothing more, we say the one is true, the other false. For very likely in the beginning men wanted speech and articulate voice, to enable them to express clearly at once the passions and the patients, the actions and the agents. Now, since actions and affections are adequately expressed by verbs, and they that act and are affected by nouns, as he says, these seem to signify. And one may say, the rest signify not. For instance, the groans and shrieks of stage players, and even their smiles and silence, make their discourse more emphatic. But they have no absolute power to signify anything, as a noun and verb have, but only an ascititious power to vary speech; just as they vary letters who mark spirits and quantities upon letters, these being the accidents and differences of letters. This the ancients have made manifest, whom sixteen letters sufficed to speak and write anything.
Besides, we must not fail to observe, that Plato says that speech is composed OF these, not BY these; nor must we find fault with Plato for omitting conjunctions, prepositions, and the rest, any more than we should criticise a man who should say such a medicine is composed of wax and galbanum, because fire and utensils are omitted, without which it cannot be produced. For speech is not composed of these; yet by their means, and not without them, speech must be composed. As, if a man says BEATS or IS BEATEN, and adds Socrates and Pythagoras to the same, he gives us something to conceive and understand. But if a man pronounce INDEED or FOR or ABOUT and no more, none can conceive any notion of a body or matter; and unless such words as these be uttered with verbs and nouns, they are but empty noise and chattering. For neither alone nor joined one with another do they signify anything. And join and confound together conjunctions, articles, and prepositions, supposing you would make something of them; yet you will be taken to babble, and not to speak sense. But when there is a verb in construction with a noun, the result is speech and sense. Therefore some do with justice make only these two parts of speech; and perhaps Homer is willing to declare himself of this mind, when he says so often,
[Greek omitted]
For by [Greek omitted] he usually means a verb, as in these verses.
[Greek omitted],
and,
[Greek omitted] (“Odyssey,” xxiii. 183; viii. 408.)
For neither conjunction, article, nor preposition could be said to be [Greek omitted] (TERRIBLE) or [Greek omitted] (SOUL GRIEVING), but only a verb signifying a base action or a foolish passion of the mind. Therefore, when we would praise or dispraise poets or writers, we are wont to say, such a man uses Attic nouns and good verbs, or else common nouns and verbs; but none can say that Thucydides or Euripides used Attic or common articles.
What then? May some say, do the rest of the parts conduce nothing to speech? I answer, They conduce, as salt does to victuals; or water to barley cakes. And Euenus calls fire the best sauce. Though sometimes there is neither occasion for fire to boil, nor for salt to season our food, which we have always occasion for. Nor has speech always occasion for articles. I think I may say this of the Latin tongue, which is now the universal language; for it has taken away all prepositions, saving a few, nor does it use any articles, but its nouns are (as it were) without skirts and borders. Nor is it any wonder, since Homer, who in fineness of epic surpasses all men, has put articles only to a few nouns, like handles to cans, or crests to helmets. Therefore these verses are remarkable wherein the articles are suppressed.–
[Greek omitted] (“Iliad,” xiv. 459.)
and,
[Greek omitted] (Ibid. xx. 147.)
and some few besides. But in a thousand others, the omission of the articles hinders neither perspicuity nor elegance of phrase.
Now neither an animal nor an instrument nor arms nor anything else is more fine, efficacious, or pleasanter, for the loss of a part. Yet speech, by taking away conjunctions, often becomes more persuasive, as here:–
One rear’d a dagger at a captive’s breast; One held a living foe, that freshly bled With new-made wounds, another dragg’d a dead. (Ibid. xviii. 536.)
And this of Demosthenes:–
“A bully in an assault may do much which his victim cannot even report to another person,–by his attitude, his look, his voice,– when he insults, when he attacks as an enemy, when he smites with his fist, when he strikes a blow on the face. These rouse a man; these make a man beside himself who is unused to such foul abuse.”
And again:–
“Not so with Midias; but from the very day, he talks, he abuses, he shouts. Is there an election of magistrates? Midias the Anagyrrasian is nominated. He is the advocate of Plutarchus; he knows state secrets; the city cannot contain him.” (“Demosthenes against Midias,” p. 537,25, and p. 578, 29.)
Therefore the figure asyndeton, whereby conjunctions are omitted, is highly commended by writers of rhetoric. But such as keep overstrict to the law, and (according to custom) omit not a conjunction, rhetoricians blame for using a dull, flat, tedious style, without any variety in it. And inasmuch as logicians mightily want conjunctions for the joining together their axioms, as much as charioteers want yokes, and Ulysses wanted withs to tie Cyclop’s sheep; this shows they are not parts of speech, but a conjunctive instrument thereof, as the word conjunction imports. Nor do conjunctions join all, but only such as are not spoken simply; unless you will make a cord part of the burthen, glue a part of a book, or distribution of money part of the government. For Demades says, that money which is given to the people out of the exchequer for public shows is the glue of a democracy. Now what conjunction does so of several propositions make one, by fitting and joining them together, as marble joins iron that is incited with it in the fire? Yet the marble neither is nor is said to be part of the iron; although in this case the substances compose the mixture and are melted together, so as to make a common substance from several and to be mutually affected. But there be some who think that conjunctions do not make anything one, but that this kind of speech is merely an enumeration, as when magistrates or days are reckoned in order.
Moreover, as to the other parts of speech, a pronoun is manifestly a sort of noun; not only because it has cases, but because some pronouns, when they are used of objects already defined, by their mere utterance give the most distinct designation of them. Nor do I know whether he that says SOCRATES or he that says THIS ONE does more by name declare the person.
The thing we call a participle, being a mixture of a verb and noun is nothing of itself, as are not the common names of male and female qualities (i.e, adjectives), but in construction it is put with others, in regard of tenses belonging to verbs, in regard of cases to nouns. Logicians call them [Greek omitted], (i.e., REFLECTED),–as [Greek omitted], comes from [Greek omitted], and from [Greek omitted],–having the force both of nouns and appellatives.
And prepositions are like to the crests of a helmet, or footstools and pedestals, which (one may rather say) do belong to words than are words themselves. See whether they rather be not pieces and scraps of words, as they that are in haste write but dashes and points for letters. For it is plain that [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted] are abbreviations of the whole words [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted]. As undoubtedly for haste and brevity’s sake, instead of [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted] men first said [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted].
Therefore every one of these is of some use in speech; but nothing is a part or element of speech (as has been said) except a noun and a verb, which make the first juncture allowing of truth or falsehood, which some call a proposition or protasis, others an axiom, and which Plato called speech.
END OF ELEVEN———–
LITERARY ESSAYS.
THE LIFE AND POETRY OF HOMER
(Homeric quotations are almost all taken from Lord Derby’s “Iliad” and Butcher and Long’s “Odyssey.” The first is indicated by the letter I, the second by O.)
Homer, who was in time first among most poets and by his power first of all poets, we justly read first, thereby gaining the greatest advantages for our language, for our intellect, and for practical knowledge. Let us speak of his poetry, first having shortly recalled his origin.
Homer, Pindar says, was a Chian and of Smyrnae; Simonides says a Chian; Antimachus and Nicander, a Colophonion; but the philosopher Aristotle says he was of Iete; the historian Ephorus says he was from Kyme. Some do not hesitate to say he was from Salamis in Cyprus; some, an Argive. Aristarchus and Dionysius the Thracian say that he was an Athenian. By some he is spoken of as the son of Maeon and Kritheus; by others, (a son) of the river-god Meles.
Just as there is a difficulty about his origin, so there is about the time in which he flourished. Aristarchus says he lived about the period of the Ionian emigration; this happened sixty years after the return of the Heraclidae. But the affair of the Heraclidae took place eighty years after the destruction of Troy. Crates reports that he lived before the return of the Heraclidae, so he was not altogether eighty years distant from the Trojan War. But by very many it is believed that he was born one hundred years after the Trojan War, not much before the foundation of the Olympic games, from which the time according to the Olympics is reckoned.
There are two poems of his, the “Iliad” and the “Odyssey,” both, of which are arranged according to the number of letters in the alphabet, not by the poet himself, but by Aristarchus, the grammarian. Of these, the “Iliad” records the deeds of the Greeks and Barbarians in Ilium on account of the rape of Helen, and particularly the valor displayed in the war by Achilles. In the “Odyssey” are described the return of Ulysses home after the Trojan War, and his experiences in his wanderings, and how he took vengeance on those who plotted against his house. From this it is evident that Homer sets before us, through the “Iliad,” bodily courage; in the “Odyssey,” nobility of soul.
But the poet is not to be blamed because in his poetry he sets forth not only the virtues but the evils of the soul, its sadness and its joys, its fears and desires; for being a poet, it is necessary for him to imitate not only good but evil characters. For without these the deeds would not get the admiration of the hearer, who must pick out the better characters. And he has made the gods associating with men not only for the sake of interest and entertainment, but that he might declare by this that the gods care for and do not neglect men.
To sum up, an extraordinary and mythical narration of events is employed in order to stir his readers with wonder and to make his hearers strongly impressed. Whence he seems to have said some things contrary to what is likely. For the persuasive always follows where the remarkable and elevated are previously conjoined. Therefore he not only elevates actions, and turns them from their customary course, but words as well. That he always handles novel things and things out of the common sphere, and leads on his hearers, is evident to every one. And indeed in these fabulous narratives, if one reads not unattentively but carefully each element of what is said, Homer appears to have been at home in the whole sphere and art of logic, and to have supplied many incentives, and as it were seeds of all kinds of thought and action to his posterity, not to poets alone, but to the authors of historical and scientific works. Let us first look at his varied form of speech, and afterward at his sound knowledge on matters of fact. All poetry grips the hearer by definite order of coordinated expressions, by rhythm and metre, since the smooth and flowing, by becoming at the same time grave and sweet, forces the attention by its action on the senses. Whence it comes to pass also that it delights not only by the striking and attractive parts, but easily persuades by the parts tending to virtue.
The poems of Homer have the most perfect metre, the hexameter, which is also called heroic. It is called hexameter because each line has six feet: one of these is of two long syllables, called spondee; the other, of three syllables, one long and two short, which is called dactyl. Both are isochronic. These in interchangeable order fill out the hexameter verse. It is called heroic because in it the deeds of the heroes are recounted.
He makes use of a sound diction, combining the characteristics of every Greek dialect, from which it is plain that he travelled over the whole of Greece and among every people in it. He uses the ellipse of the Dorians, due to their practice of shortening their speech, saying for [Greek omitted], as (O. i. 392): “Immediately a beautiful horse ([Greek omitted]) was his,” and for [Greek omitted] he uses [Greek omitted], as (O. xix. 543): “Because ([Greek omitted]) an eagle killed my geese”; and for [Greek omitted], “back,” [Greek omitted], changing the o into a, the [Greek letter omitted] and the [Greek letter omitted] into its related letter. And [Greek omitted] he changes to [Greek omitted](I. xiv. 249): “For before at another time ([Greek omitted]) your precepts made me modest,” and similar cases. Likewise, dropping the middle syllable, he says for [Greek omitted], “of like hair,” and [Greek omitted], “of the same years,” [Greek omitted]; and for [Greek omitted], that is, “of the same father,” [Greek omitted]; for [Greek omitted]; “to tremble,” [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “I honour,” [Greek omitted]. It is a characteristic of the Dorians also to transpose letters, as when they say for [Greek omitted], [Greek omitted].
In composite words he makes use of the syncope of the Aeolians, saying [Greek omitted] instead of [Greek omitted], “they went to sleep,” and [Greek omitted], for [Greek omitted], “to subject.”
Then when the third person of the imperfect among other Greek peoples ends in the diphthong [Greek letter], the Eolians end in [Greek letter], as when they say for [Greek omitted], “he was loving,” [Greek omitted], and for [Greek omitted], “he was thinking,” [Greek omitted]. This custom Homer followed, saying (I. xi. 105): “He bound ([Greek omitted]) in tender twigs,” instead of [Greek omitted], and (O. v. 478): “Which neither any humid power of the wind penetrates” [Greek omitted]. Besides this they change [Greek letter] into [Greek letter], as they say [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “odor,” and [Greek Omitted] for [Greek omitted], “we knew.”
Besides, they use pleonasm in some expressions, as when they put for [Greek omitted], “calm,” [Greek omitted], [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “but,” [Greek omitted] got [Greek omitted], “having cried.” And when to the second person of verbs they add [Greek omitted], for [Greek omitted] “thou speakest,” [Greek omitted], and for [Greek omitted], “thou hast spoken,” [Greek omitted]. Some attribute the doubling of the consonant to the Dorians, some to the Aeolians. Such as we find in I. v. 83: “Black death laid hold on [Greek omitted] him,” [Greek omitted]; for [Greek omitted] as I. iii. 321): “Each did these deeds.”
He preserves the peculiarity of the Ionians for the preterite tenses of verbs the aphaeresis, as where he says [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted]. So in past tenses they are want to begin with the same letter as in present tenses and to leave off the [Greek letter] in the word [Greek omitted], “priest” and [Greek omitted], “hawk.” Besides, they add [Greek letter] to the third persons of the subjunctive mood, as when they say for [Greek omitted] “may have come,” [Greek omitted], and for [Greek omitted], “may have taken,” [Greek omitted]. This participle they add to the dative, [Greek omitted], “to the gates,” “to the woods.” Besides, they say [Greek omitted] for “name”, and [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “disease” and [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “empty,” and [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “black.” And then they change long [Greek letter] into [Greek letter], as[Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “Juno,” and for [Greek omitted], Minerva. And sometimes they change [Greek letter] into [Greek letter], saying for [Greek omitted], “having forgotten.” Moreover, they write in full by diaeresis words which are circumflexed, for [Greek omitted], “intelligent,” [Greek omitted]. In the same way they lengthen genitive singulars in [Greek omitted], as [Greek omitted], and genitive feminines in [Greek omitted], as [Greek omitted], “of gates,” [Greek omitted], “of nymphs,” and finally regular plurals of nouns in the neuter gender ending in [Greek letter] as [Greek omitted], [Greek omitted], “breasts,” “darts,” and their genitives likewise. They say in their way [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted].
But he most largely used the Attic dialect for it was combined with others. For just as in Attic they say [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted], “people,” so he did, as [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted], “debt.” It is a custom with them sometimes to use contractions and to put one syllable for two, as for [Greek omitted], “word,” [Greek omitted], and for [Greek omitted], “clothes,” [Greek omitted]. Related to these is that Homeric expression, “the Trojans in crowds bent over” [Greek omitted], and another case, “fields bearing the lotos” [Greek omitted], instead of [Greek omitted]. Besides they take [Greek letter] from that type of optative, saying for [Greek omitted], “it might seem good to thee,” [Greek omitted], for [Greek omitted], “mightiest thou be honored,” [Greek omitted]. There is also an Atticism [Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted] in his verse (I. iii. 102):–
But you others discerned most quickly.
Likewise this, too, is Attic, “the more were worse [Greek omitted], the few better [Greek omitted], than their fathers;” we say [Greek omitted] or [Greek omitted]. And they do not prolong these by diaeresis, [Greek omitted], as “oxen [Greek omitted] falling down,” and, “fishes [Greek omitted] and birds.” And that, too, is said in the Attic fashion (O. xii. 331):–
Nor flowing do they break ([Greek omitted] for [Greek omitted]) by their violence.
In the same way as [Greek omitted], [Greek omitted].
And the taking away short vowels is Attic: [Greek omitted], “he is washed,” [Greek omitted], “I think,” [Greek omitted]; in the same way for [Greek omitted], “he is loosed,” he says [Greek omitted]. The Attics say [Greek omitted], adding an unnecessary [Greek letter], whence also comes [Greek omitted], “he was pouring out wine.” They contract the iota in words of this sort, as for [Greek omitted], “shores,” [Greek omitted], “shores,” and for [Greek omitted], [Greek omitted]. So also (I. xi. 782):–
You two [Greek omitted] wished it very much.
Finally in datives ending in pure iota with a penultimate of alpha the same is done, as [Greek omitted], “horn,” [Greek omitted], “old age,” [Greek omitted], “ray.” And this, too, is Attic, where it is said [Greek omitted], “let them be,” and [Greek omitted], “let them follow,” for [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted]. The use of the dual which Homer repeatedly employs is of the same type. Also with feminine substantives he joins masculine articles, participles, and adjectives, as [Greek omitted]. This is a practice with Plato, as when he uses [Greek omitted] “pillaging,” and [Greek omitted], “the wise just woman.” So, too, Homer (I. viii. 455), speaking of Here and Athene, says:–
In vain smitten [Greek omitted] with a thunderbolt on our chariots,–
and (I. iv. 22):–
Athene was indeed unwilling [Greek omitted],–
and (I. ii. 742):–
Famous [Greek omitted] Hippodamea.
Moreover the dialects have many peculiarities of construction. When the poet says (I. iv. 100):–
But seek with your javelins of divine Menelaos,–
instead of the accusative, he presents an Attic usage. But when he says (I. ii. 186):–
He took for him the sceptre and he took the cup for fair-cheeked Themis–
instead of “from him” and “from Themis,” he is employing a Dorian usage.
Accordingly it appears how he makes his diction varied by throwing together words of all the Greek dialects, and sometimes he makes use of foreign words as are the aforesaid, sometimes archaic words, as when he says [Greek omitted], “falchion,” and [Greek omitted], “sword,” sometimes common and ordinary words, as when he says [Greek omitted], sword and shield”; one might wonder how well common words in his poetry preserve dignity of speech.
But an artificially wrought style cultivates variation from the customary, by which it becomes clever, more dignified, and altogether more attractive. The turn of expression is called a Trope, and change of construction is called a Schema. The forms of these are described in technical treatises. Let us examine if any of these is omitted by Homer or whether anything else was discovered by his successors which he himself did not use first.
Among Tropes, Onomatopoeia is very common. For he knew the early origin of words. The first who gave names to things called many of them from what had taken place, and therefore introduced inarticulate sounds into writing. As when they said [Greek omitted], “to blow,” [Greek omitted], “to cut,” [Greek omitted], to woo,” [Greek omitted], “to thunder,” and others like these. Whence he himself created certain words not previously existing, copying the things they signified, as [Greek omitted], “sound,” and other things also indicating sounds, [Greek omitted], and others of the same kind. None could be found more significant. And again where some words pertaining to certain things he attributes to others, as when he says (I. xxi. 337):–
Bearing an evil fire,–
which signifies its power in burning, and “fever” he uses for “fire.” Like these is the expression (I. xix. 25):–
Brass striking wounds,–
he writes to express wounds inflicted by brass. And to sum up he uses much novelty of speech, with great freedom, changing some from their customary use, giving distinction to others for the sake of infusing in his language beauty and grandeur.
He has also much fertility in epithets; these being fitted to their objects properly and naturally have the force of proper names, as when he gives to the several gods each some proper designation, so he calls Zeus the “all-wise and high thundering,” and the Sun, Hyperion, “advancing aloft,” and Apollo, Phoebus, that is, shining. But after the Onomatopoeia let us examine other Tropes.
Catechresis, which changes a word from a customary signification to another not recognized. This is to be found in the poet when he says golden chain [Greek omitted], but [Greek omitted] properly means a rope, and when he says a goat helmet [Greek omitted]; now a helmet is [Greek omitted] in Homer, because it used to be made of dog’s skin, not of goat’s skin.
Metaphor, so-called because it transfers a thing from its proper significance to another with an analogous likeness to both, occurs in many and varied forms in verse, as is the line (0. ix. 481):–
He comes, having broken off the crown of a great mountain,–
and (O. x. 195):
An island which the sea laves and crowns.
For the relation a crown has to him whom it encircles, the same the sea has to an island. By making use of related but not usual words he makes his speech not only more beautiful but more picturesque.
There are in Homer various kinds of metaphors; some applied from animate things to animate, as, “the driver of the caerulean ship spoke” instead of the sailor, and “he went to Agamemnon the son of Atreus, the shepherd of the people” instead of king. Some are applied from animate to inanimate, as (I. ii. 824):–
Under the extreme foot of Ida,–
that is, the rising ground. Also (I. ix. 141):–
The breast of the field,–
that is, the fertility. Others, on the contrary, from inanimate to animate, as (I. xxiv. 205):–
The iron breast.
From inanimate to animate, as (O. v. 490):–
Preserving the seed of fire,–
instead of the generating origin. Then he has metaphors of verbs as well as substantives (I. xvii. 265):–
As the shores bellow with the smiting salt and gale,–
instead of “resound.”
Another Trope which is called Metalepsis, signifying a different thing by a synonym (O. xv. 299):–
I beached the ship in the sharp islands,–
for he wishes to signify islands properly called jagged. Both words in Greek are synonyms. For in Greek sharp not only signifies swiftness of motion, but also in a figure that which rises into a slender shape. Such is the quotation (O. ix. 327):–
accompanied him and sharpened my pace.
Another Trope is named Synecdoche, called from this reason; that from what is properly meant, another of the like kind is understood. This Trope has also many varieties. For either we perceive the part from the whole, as (I. xii. 137):–
They advanced straight to the walls the burning bulls,–
for he wishes to indicate by the appellation “bulls” the leather out of which shields are wont to be made. Or from a part the whole (O. i. 343):–
I long for such a head,–
for from the head he signifies the man. And when for beautiful he says “endowed with beautiful cheeks,” and for well armed he says “well greaved.” Or from one the many, as when he speaks of Odysseus (O. i. 2):–
When he wasted the sacred citadel of Troy.
Not he by himself took Troy, but along with the rest of the Greeks. From the many one, as (I. iii. 397), “happy breasts,” i.e. breast. From the species the genus, as (I. xii. 380):–
Casting on the hard marble,–
for marble is a species of rock. From the genus the species (O. ii. 159).–
To know the birds and to say many fitting things.
He wishes to say not all birds, but only the birds of auspices. From the instruments the action, as (I. ii. 827):–
Pandorus to whom he gave the bow of Apollo.
By the bow he indicates the skill in using it. And (O. xii. 172):–
Sitting they made the water white,–
and (O. iii. 486):–
Now others moved the whole day the thong of their sandal.
This comes from an accidental feature; in the first case “they were rowing,” in the next “they were running,” is to be implied. Besides there is the consequent to the precedent, as (O. xi. 245):–
She loosed the virgin zone.
It follows that she defiled it. From the consequent the precedent, as when instead of saying “to kill” he says “to disarm,” that is, to spoil.
There is another Trope called Metonymy, i.e. when an expression applied properly to one thing indicates another related to it, such as (I. ii. 426):–
But the young men proceed to grind Demeter,–
for he means the crop of grain named from its inventor, Demeter. And when he says (O. xix. 28):–
They held the transfixed entrails over Hephaestus.
By the name Hephaestus he signifies fire. Like what has previously been mentioned is this (I. i. 223).–
Whoever shall touch my choenix,–
for what is contained in the choenix is intended.
There is besides another Trope, Autonomasia, when an epithet or co-title is used for a proper name, as in this example (I. viii. 39):–
The son of Peleus again attacked the son of Atreus with petulant words.
By this he indicates Achilles and Agamemnon respectively. And again (I. xxii. 183):–
Be of good cheer, Tritonia, dear daughter,–
and in other places (I. xx. 39):–
Shorn Phoebus.
In the one case he means Athene and in the other Apollo.
There is, too, Antiphrasis, or an expression signifying the opposite from what it appears to do (I. i. 330):–
Seeing these Achilles did not rejoice.
He wishes to say the contrary, that seeing them he was disgusted.
There is also Emphasis, which through reflection adds vigor to what is said (O. xi. 523):–
But descending into the home which Epeus constructed.
In the word “descending” he reveals the great size of the house. Of the same kind is the line (I. xvi. 333):–
The whole sand was hot with blood,–
for in this he furnishes a more intense description, as if the sand was so bathed with blood that it was hot. These kind of Tropes were invented by Homer first of all.
Let us look at the changes of construction which are called figures to see if Homer also first invented these. Figure is a method of expression divergent from ordinary custom for the sake of ornament or utility, altered by a kind of fiction. For beauty is added to narrative by variety and change of expression, and these make the style more impressive. They are also useful because they exalt and intensify innate qualities and powers.
Among the figures Pleonasm is sometimes used for the sake of the metre; as in (I. xix. 247):–
Odysseus adding all ten talents of gold,–
for the word “all” is added without contributing to the sense. It is done for the sake of ornament, cf. (I. xviii. 12).–
Certainly the strenuous son of Menoetius is quite dead,–
for the word “quite” is pleonastic after the Attic fashion.
Sometimes by several forms of speech he unfolds his meaning. This is called Periphrasis. As when he says “Sons of the Achaeans” for Achaeans, and the “Herculean might” for Hercules.
Things are said figuratively by Mutation when the ordinary order is inverted. But he puts in an expression in the midst which is called Hyperbaton, as in this (I. xvii. 542):–
Just as a lion feeds on an eaten bull,–
instead of saying the lion eats up the bull. And so he passes the limits of the sentence (I. ii. 333):–
He said, and loudly cheered the Greeks–and loud From all the hollow ships came back the cheers– In admiration of Ulysses’ speech.
The order is the Argives applauded with a great shout the speech of divine Odysseus.
Of the same kind is the figure called Parembole, or interposition, when something outside having nothing to do with the subject is introduced. If it is removed, the construction is not affected I. i. 234):–
By this I say and with an oath confirm By this my royal staff, which never more Shall put forth leaf nor spray, since first it left Upon the mountain side its parent stem Nor blossom more; since all around the axe Hath lopped both leaf and bark–…
and the rest as much as he has said about the sceptre, then joining what follows with the beginning (I. i. 340):–
The time shall come when all the sons of Greece Shall mourn Achilles’ loss.
He uses also Palillogia–that is the repetition of some part of a sentence, or several parts are repeated. This figure is called Reduplication, such as (I. xx. 371):–
Encounter him well! Though his hands were hands of fire, Of fire, his hands, his strength as burnished steel.
Sometimes certain insertions are made and they are repeated, as in (O. i. 22):–
Howbeit Poseidon had now departed for the distant Ethiopians, the Ethiopians that are sundered in twain, the uttermost of men.
This is a figure revealing the feeling of the speaker and at the same time affecting the hearer.
Of the same kind is Relation; when at the commencement of several members of a sentence the same part is repeated. An example of this from the poet is (I. ii. 671):–
Nireus three well-trimmed ships from Syme brought. Nireus to Charops whom Aglaia bore.
Nireus the goodliest man of all the Greeks.
This figure is likewise adapted to excite the emotions and give sweetness to the expression.
He has also Regression. This is when one puts forward two names of objects. When the sense is not yet complete, the poet returns to both of the names, completing what is lacking in the sense, as (I. v. 518).–
Followed the thronging bands of Troy, by Mars and fierce Bellona led: she by the hand wild uproar held; while Mars a giant spear brandished aloft.
The characteristic of this figure is variety and perspicuity.
He has also the figure called Homoioteleuton in which the parts of the sentence have endings similar in sound and have the same syllables at the end (O. xv. 74):–
Men should love a guest while he is with them, and send him on his way when he would depart,–
and in the following (O. vi. 42):–
And she departed to Olympus, where they say is the seat of the gods that standeth fast forever. Not by the wind is it shaken nor ever wet with rain nor doth the snow come nigh thereto, but most clear air is spread about it cloudless and the white light floats over it.
When periods or their members end in nouns which are of the same declension this is properly called Homoioptolon, as the following (I. ii. 87):–
[Greek omitted]
As swarms of bees, that pour in ceaseless stream From out the crevice of some hollow rock.
The above and others like them add grace and attractiveness to the narrative.
As a proof of his care in composition we often see he employs two figures in the same verses, as Epanaphora and Homoioteleuton (I. ii. 382):–
Each sharpen well his spear, his shield prepare Each to his fiery steeds their forage give.
Belonging to these is the figure called Parison, which is formed out of two or more numbers having an equal number of words (I. vii. 93): –
Shamed to refuse, but fearful to accept.–
and again (I. xvi. 282):–
Had cast away difference, had resumed friendship,–
That this figure gives much ornament of style is very clear.
The like grace comes from Paranomasia, when besides the name in question another similar one is added at a slight interval (I. vi. 130):–
Not long did Dryas’ son, Lycurgus brave,–
and in another (I. ii. 758):–
Swift-footed Protheus led.
But the above examples are arranged either by Pleonasm or by some such like artifice. But there is another due to absence of a word. Of these there is what is called Ellipse, when some word being omitted the sense is plain from what has gone before, as in the following (I. ix. 328):–
Twelve cities have I taken with my ships, Eleven more by land on Trojan soil,–
where the words “have I taken” are wanting in last line, but are supplied from the preceding one. This is said to be by Ellipse (I. xii. 243):–
One bird best to defend the fatherland,–
where the word “is” is lacking. And (I. xx. 293):–
Alas I the grief to me of great-hearted Aeneas,–
when the words “is present,” “comes,” or something of the kind, are understood.
There are many kinds of Ellipses in Homer; the effect of the figure is quickness.
Of this sort is Asyndeton when the conjunctions uniting sentences are removed. This is done not only for the sake of celerity, but also of the sake of emotional emphasis. Such as is the following (O. x. 251):–
We went on our way, noble Odysseus, up through the coppice even as thou didst command; we found within the forest glades the fair halls builded of polished stone of Circe.
In these the conjunction is dropped since the speaker seeks the quickest method of expressing his message. There is among the figures what is called the Incongruous or the Variation. It is used when the ordinary arrangement is made different. And the variety is due either to impressing grace and elegance to the words; the ordinary movements not seeming to be followed, but the alteration has an arrangement of its own.
It often takes place when the genders of nouns are changed as [Greek omitted] instead of [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted]. It was not unusual for the ancients, and especially among the people of Attica, to use masculine for feminine as superior and more vigorous. Nor did they do this without rhyme and reason, but when they made use of a word, as an epithet apart from the body which was spoken of. For the words concerned with the body are “great, beautiful,” those not connected with it, “glorious, fortunate.” Besides, they are ambiguous on account of their composition. For in general all compound things are common to either gender. And wherever a verb or participle is used with a masculine and feminine noun, the masculine prevails (I. vi. 567):–
The virgins and the youths minding childish things,–
where the participle is masculine.
Certain things, owing to the peculiarity of the dialect or the custom of that time, are said differently, [Greek omitted] feminine instead of [Greek omitted] (O. i. 53):–
And himself upholds the tall pillars which keep earth and sky asunder.
Often as the narrative proceeds he changes the genders, as in (O, xv. 125):–
I give to you the gift, my dear son.
Son is a neuter substantive to which the adjective agrees; the poet refers it to the person. Of the same kind is that which is said by Dione to Venus (I. v. 382):–
Have patience, dearest child; though much enforced.
Analogous to it is that (O. xi. 90):–
Anon came the soul of Theban Teiresias, with a golden sceptre in his hand,–
for he made the participle [Greek omitted] agree not with the gender of soul [Greek omitted], but the gender of the body, that is, Teiresias. For often he looks not to the word but to the sense, as in this passage (I. xvi. 280):–
In all their spirit stirred, and the phalanxes moved hoping for the idle son of Peleus from the ships,–
for the participle [Greek omitted] does not agree with the word “phalanxes,” but with the men composing them.
In another way he changes genders, as when he says (O. xii. 75):–
And a dark cloud encompasses it; this never streams away,–
since [Greek omitted] and [Greek omitted], “cloud,” are synonyms, using first [Greek omitted] he afterward makes his adjectives agree with [Greek omitted] understood. Like this are these verses (I. ii. 459):–
As various tribes of winged fowl or geese Or cranes or long necked swans
Besides Coysters stream, now here, now there, Disporting, ply their wings.
For having first set down generically the kinds of birds, which are neuter, then after speaking of the species in the masculine he comes back again to the neuter–settling down with a noise giving the proper agreement to the general word of the species.
The poet often changes the number as well as the gender (I. xv. 305):–
The crowd approach the ships of the Achaeans.
First comes a singular then a plural verb, plainly looking to the sense, for although the word “crowd” is called singular, yet it embraces many individuals.
Like it in the opposite way is when the plural precedes the singular follows (I. xvi. 264):–
They having a martial heart each one rushes on.
The word [Greek omitted] is singular, being applied to a multitude has the same effect as all ([Greek omitted]). The same kind of figure is the following (O. iii. 4):–
And they reached Pylas, the stablished castle of Neleus, and the people were doing sacrifice on the seashore.
The people of Pylas are meant.
He has changes of cases, the nominative and the vocative being interchanged in the following verse (I. ii. 107):–
To Agamemnon last Thyestis left it,–
and (I. i. 411):–
Cloud-compelling Zeus,–
and (0. xvii. 415):–
Friend [Greek omitted] give me for thou dost not seem to me to be the worst of the Greeks.
The genitive and dative are changed in the next example (I. iii. 16):–
Godlike Paris fights in front for the Trojans,–
instead of “in front of.” And the contrary in the next (O. v. 68):–
There about the hollow cave trailed a gadding vine.
Where in the original the Greek word “cave” is in the genitive case, not as it should be, dative. And the cause of the mutation is that the nominative accusative and vocative seem to have a certain relation to one another. On which account nouns of the neuter gender and many masculine and feminine ones have these three cases alike. Likewise the genitive has a certain affinity with the dative. This is found in the dual number of all words. Hence the cases are changed contrary to what is usual. Sometimes it is possible to discover the reason for the change, as in the expression (I. v. 222):–
Understanding of the field,–
and (I. ii. 785):–
They crossed the field,–
just as if he had used the preposition “through.”
A fine example of change of case is found in the beginning of both his poems:–
Sing, O Muse, the vengeance, etc., whence to Greece unnumbered ills arose.
Tell me, Muse, of that man, of many a shift and many the woes he suffered.
Sometimes after the genitive he brings in the nominative, as in this (I. i. 272):–
Of others who are now mortal.
He arranges many things in figures in various ways, as the following passage (I. ii. 350):–
For well I ween, that on the day when first We Grecians hitherward our course address’d To Troy the messengers of blood and death Th’ o’erruling son of Saturn, on our right His lightning flashing, with auspicious sign Assur’d us of his favor.
And the following is not unlike it (I. vi. 510):–
His bright arms flashing like the gorgeous sun Hasten’d with boastful mien and rapid step.
And these things, according to the ancient fashion, he exalts not unreasonably. If any one changes the participles into verbs, he will discover the sequence, for the word “lightning” has the same value as “when it was lightning,” and “relying” “since he relied.” Like these cases are the following (O. xii. 73):–
There are two crags, one reaches the broad sky,
and (I. vii. 306):–
They parted: Ajax to the Grecian camp And Hector to the ranks of Troy returned.
And others of the same kind. For it is reasonable when one is about to speak of two individuals to put first what is common to the two, keeping the nominative in both cases. It is plain that this common use displays much grace. Sometimes employing a common case he signifies only one, as in the following (I. iii. 211):–
Both sat down, Ulysses was the higher in honor.
The form of words he often changes, sometimes putting the comparative instead of the absolute (I. i. 32):–
That you may return a more sane being.
Sometimes the superlative for the positive, as (I. xi. 832);–
Most just of Centaurs.
Such is the change in nouns. But in verbs there is a change in moods, as when the infinitive is used for the imperative, as (I. v. 124):–
Go fearless onward, Diomed, to meet the Trojan darts,–
where the imperative “meet” might be expected.
Or the, indicative in place of the optative, as (I. ii. 488):–
The crowd I shall not relate nor name,–
where one would expect “I could not relate nor name.” And, on the contrary, the optative for the indicative, as (I. v. 388):–
Mars would then be lost,–
for “was lost.”
There is a variation of tenses when the present is used for the future (I. l. 29)–
Her I release not till her youth be fled,–
instead of “shall flee.” Or for the imperfect (O. vi. 86):–
Where truly were the unfailing cisterns, and bright water wells up free from beneath,–
instead of “welled up.” And the future for the present (O. i. 24):–
Abiding some, where Hyperion will sink; and some, where he rises.
Or in place of the past (O. v. 300):–
I fear that indeed the goddess may spake all things truly.
And the voices are often changed. Instead of the active, the passive and middle are often used, as (I. i. 194):–
A great sword is drawn from its sheath,–
instead of “he drew.” And (I. xiii. 4):–
His keen glance turning to view,–
instead of “seeing.”
And, on the other hand, the active instead of the passive:–
I shall give a tripod with a golden handle,–
instead of “shall be given.”
It can be seen how he changes numbers, putting the plural for the singular as often happens in common speech when one speaks of himself as if of several, as in the following (O. i. 10):–
Of these things, goddess daughter of Zeus, from whatsoever source thou wilt declare even to us,–
instead of “to me.”
We find with him a change of persons of one sort, as (I. v. 877):–
The other gods, who in Olympus dwell, Are to thee obedient and we are submissive.
For since there are many gods, among whom is the person speaking, both classes are well indicated by saying, “they are obedient” and “we are submissive.” In another way leaving the person who is spoken of, he changes from one to another. This is called specifically Apostrophe, and affects us by its emotional character and stimulates the hearer, as in the following stanza (I. xv. 346):–
While loudly Hector to the Trojans called To assail the ships and leave the bloody spoils Whom I elsewhere and from the ships aloof Shall find,–
changing from the narrative to direct discourse. In the narration itself he often uses Apostrophe (I. xx. 2.):
Round thee eager for the fray stood the sons of Greece.
But he makes use of direct narrative and change of persons, as in the following passage (I. ii. 337):–
Like children, Grecian warriors, ye debate Like babes to whom unknown are feats of arms. Atrides thou, as is thy wont, maintain Unchang’d thy counsel; for the stubborn fight Array the Greeks.
There is another kind of this Apostrophe (I. ii. 344):–
Thou wouldst not know to whom Tydides may join himself,–
instead of “no one can know.”
And again (O. ix. 210):–
And a marvellous sweet smell went up from the mixing bowl: then truly it was no pleasure to refrain.
58. He uses participles in the place of verbs, as in these words (I. viii. 306):–
Weighed down in a garden by this fruit,–
instead of “it is weighed,” and (O. xiii. 113):–
Thither they as having knowledge of that place drive their ships,–
instead of “before they knew.”
And articles he often changes, setting demonstrative instead of relatives (I. xvi. 150):–
Whom Podarge, swift of foot, to Zephyr bore,–
and the contrary (I. xvii. 460):–
And breastplate: for his own his faithful friend hath lost.
So he was wont to change prepositions (I. i. 424):–
Yesterday he went through the banquet,–
instead of “to the banquet.”
And (I. i. 10):–
And he stirred up an evil plague through the army.
Likewise he joins with a preposition a noun improperly, as in the verse (I. x. 101):–
Lest perchance they wish to decide the contest in the night,–
where the preposition is followed by, the accusative, not the genitive. And as to other prepositions, some he changes, some he omits (I. ii. 696):–
Of whom he lies lamenting,–
instead of “concerning whom.”
And (O. xxiii. 91):–
Expecting whether he would bespeak him,–
instead of “speak to him.” And other prepositions he in the same fashion changes or leaves out. And adverbs he changes, using indifferently motion towards, rest in, and motion from a place (I. xx. 151):–
His grandchildren were setting down from elsewhere,–
instead of “elsewhere” (I. vii. 219):–
And Ajax came from near,–
instead of “near.”
Finally he has changes of conjunctions, as (O. i. 433):–
He never lay with her and he shunned the wrath of his lady,–
instead of “for he shunned,” etc. And these are the figures of speech which not only all poets but the writers of prose have employed.
But significance is given by him in many ways. One of which is Proanaphonesis, which is used when any one in the midst of a narration uses an order proper to other things, as in the following line (O. xxi, 98):–
He was to be the first that should taste the arrow,–
and Epiphonesis (I. xvii. 32):–
After the event may e’en a fool be wise.
The use of Prosopopoiia is frequent and varied with him. For he introduces many different people speaking together, to whom he attributes various characteristics. Sometimes he re-creates characters no longer living, as when he says (I. vii. 125):–
What grief would fill the aged Pellus’s soul.
There is, too, Diatyposis, which is the working out of things coming into being or actually existent or that have come to pass, brought in to make what is said clearer, as in the following (I. ix. 593):–
The slaughtered men, the city burnt with fire, The helpless children and deep-bosomed dames.
Or, to produce pity (I. xxii. 60):–
Look, too, on me with pity: me on whom E’en on the threshold of mine age, hath Jove A bitter burthen cast, condemned to see My sons struck down, my daughters dragged away In servile bonds: our chamber’s sanctity Invaded; and our babes by hostile hands Dashed to the ground.
There is also to he found in him Irony, i.e. an expression revealing the opposite of what is said with a certain ethical artifice; as in the speech of Achilles (I. ix. 391):–
Let him choose among the Greeks a fitter King.
For he hints that he would not find one of more royal temper. And this is the same Trope used when one speaks about himself in extenuation and gives a judgment contrary to one’s own. There is another form when any one pretends to praise another and really censures him. As the verse in Homer, put in the mouth of Telemachus (O. xvii. 397):–
Antinous–verily thou hast good care of me, as it were a father for his son.
For he says to an enemy that he cares as a father for his son, and, again, when any one by way of jest extolls his neighbor, as the suitors (O. ii. 325):–
In my truth Telemachus planneth our destruction. He will bring a rescue either from sandy Pylos, or it may be from Sparta, so terribly is he set on slaying us.
Sarcasm is a species of Irony used when any one jibes at another with a pretence of smiling. As Achilles, in the following passage (I. ix. 335):–
He meted out
Their several portions, and they hold them still. From me, from me alone of all the Greeks, He bore away and keeps my cherished wife. Well! let him keep her, solace of his bed.
Like this in kind is Allegory, which exhibits one thing by another, as in the following (O. xxii. 195):–
Now in good truth Melanthiusi shalt thou watch all night, lying on, a soft bed as beseems thee.
For being in chains and hanging, he says he can rest on a soft bed.
Often, too, he makes use of Hyperbole, which, by exaggerating the truth, indicates emphasis, as (I. x. 437):–
These surpass in brilliancy the snow, in speed the eagle.
Homer used Tropes and figures of this sort and handed them down to posterity, and justly obtains glory beyond all others.
Since there are also Characters of speech called Forms, of which one is Copiousness, the other Gracefulness, and the third Restraint, let us see if Homer has all these separate classes, on which poets and orators have worked after him. There are examples of these–copiousness in Thucydides, gracefulness in Lysias, restraint in Demosthenes. That is copious which by combination of words and sentences has great emphasis. An example of this is (O. v. 291):–
With that he gathered the clouds and troubled the waters of the deep, rasping his trident in his hands: and he roused all storms of all manner of winds and shrouded in clouds the land and sea: and down sped night from heaven.
The graceful is delicate by the character of the matter. It is drawn out by the way it is expressed (I. vi. 466).–
Thus he spake, great Hector stretch’d his arms To take the child: but back the infant shrank, Crying, and sought his nurse’s sheltering breast, Scar’d by the brazen helm and horse-hair plume.
The restrained is between the two, the copious and the graceful, as (O. xxii. 291):–
Then Odysseus, rich in counsel, stripped him of his rags and leaped on the great threshold with his bow and quiver full of arrows, and poured forth all the swift shafts there before his feet, and spake among the wooers.
But the florid style of speech, which has beauty and capacity for creating delight and pleasure, like a flower, is frequent in our poet; his poetry is full of such examples. The kinds of phrasing have much novelty in Homer, as we shall go on to show, by giving a few examples from which the rest may be gathered.
Every type of style practised among men is either historical, theoretic, or political. Let us examine whether the beginnings of these are to be found in him. Historical style contains a narration of facts. The elements of such a narration are character, cause, place, time, instrument, action, feeling, manner. There is no historical narration without some of these. So it is with our poet, who relates many things in their development and happening. Sometimes in single passages can be found relations of this kind.
Of character, as the following (I. v. 9):–
There was one Dores ‘mid the Trojan host, The priest of Vulcan, rich, of blameless life; Two gallant sons he had, Idaeus named And Phegeus, skilled in all the points of war.
He describes features, also, as in the case of Thersites (I. ii. 217):–
With squinting eyes, and one distorted foot, His shoulders round, and buried in his breast His narrow head, with scanty growth of hair.
And many other things, in which he often pictures the type or appearance or character, or action or fortune of a person, as in this verse (I. xx. 215):–
Dardanus first, cloud-compelling
Zeus begot,–
and the rest.
There is in his poetry description of locality; where he speaks about the island near that of the Cyclops, in which he describes the look of the place, its size, its quality, and the things in it, and what is near it. Also, when he describes the things adjacent to the island of Calypso (O. v. 63):–
And round about the cave there was a wood-blossoming alder and poplar, and sweet-smelling cypress.
And what follows. And innumerable other things of the same kind.
Time narratives are found as follows (I. ii. 134):–
Already now nine weary years have passed.
And (I. ii. 303):–
Not long ago, when ships of Greece were met at Aulis charged with evil freight for Troy.
Then there are the causes, in which he shows why something is coming to pass or has come to pass. Such are the things said at the beginning of the “Iliad” (I. i. 8):–
Say then, what god the fatal strife provoked Jove’s and Latona’s son; he filled with wrath Against the King, with deadly pestilence The Camp afflicted–and the people died For Chryses’ sake, his priest, whom Atreus’ son With scorn dismissed,-
and the rest. In this passage he says the cause of the difference between Achilles and Agamemnon was the plague; but the plague was caused by Apollo, and his wrath was due to the insult put upon his priest.
Description of the instrument he gives, as when he tells of the shield made by Vulcan for Achilles. And there is a briefer one on the spear of Hector (I. viii. 493):–
In his hand
His massive spear he held twelve cubits long, Whose glittering point flash’d bright with hoop of gold Encircled round.
Narrations of fact are of several kinds, some like the following (I. vii. 60):–
When in the midst they met, together rush’d Bucklers and lances, and the furious might Of mail-clad warriors; bossy shield on shield Clattered in conflict; loud the clamor rose.
The emotional narrative is where the incident is connected with some personal cause or energy, as when he speaks about things arising from anger or fear or sorrow, or when people are wounded, killed, or any other such thing happens to them. As a specimen of cause, take the following (I. i. 103):–
His dark soul filled with fury, and his eyes Flashed like flames of fire.
Of an action (I. xvii. 51):–
Those locks, that with the Graces hair might vie, Those tresses bright, with gold and silver bound, Were dabbled all with blood.
A Trope is constructive of action, or experience, or form, according as one acts in a special way or is acted upon. He follows the whole scene in this sort of narrative. An example of it would be as follows (O. xxii. 15):–
But Odysseus aimed and smote him with the arrow in his throat, and the point passed clean out through his delicate neck and he fell back, and the cup dropped from his hand as he was smitten, and at once through his nostrils there came up a thick jet of slain man’s blood.
There is also in Homer narration which has for the most part copious expression, a method of working in full, fitting the subject. Sometimes, however, it is concise, as in the following (I. xviii. 20):–
Patroclus lies in death,
And o’er his body now the war is waged, His naked body, for his arms are now
The prize of Hector of the glancing helmet.
This type is often useful, for the quickness of the words make the reader and speaker more intent, and he immediately takes in the subject.
Sometimes he tells his story lightly; sometimes by an image or