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enter through those channels. Thus they distinguish two kinds of asravas, bhavasrava and karmasrava. Bhavasrava means the thought activities of the soul through which or on account of which the karma particles enter the soul [Footnote ref 1]. Thus Nemicandra says that bhavasrava is that kind of change in the soul (which is the contrary to what can destroy the karmasrava), by which the karmas enter the soul [Footnote ref 2]. Karmasrava, however, means the actual entrance of the karma matter into the soul. These bhavasravas are in general of five kinds, namely delusion (_mithyatva_), want of control (_avirati_), inadvertence (_pramada_), the activities of body, mind and speech (_yoga_) and the passions (_ka@sayas_). Delusion again is of five kinds, namely _ekanta_ (a false belief unknowingly accepted and uncritically followed), _viparita_ (uncertainty as to the exact nature of truth), _vinaya_ (retention of a belief knowing it to be false, due to old habit), _sa@ms’aya_ (doubt as to right or wrong) and _ajnana_ (want of any belief due to the want of application of reasoning powers). Avirati is again of five kinds, injury (_hi@msa_), falsehood (_an@rta_), stealing (_cauryya_), incontinence (_abrahma_), and desire to have things which one does not already possess (_parigrahaka@nk@sa_). Pramada or inadvertence is again of five kinds, namely bad conversation (_vikatha_), passions (_ka@saya_), bad use of the five senses (_indriya_), sleep (_nidra_), attachment (_raga_) [Footnote ref 3].
Coming to dravyasrava we find that it means that actual influx of karma which affects the soul in eight different manners in accordance with which these karmas are classed into eight different kinds, namely jnanavara@niya, dars’anavara@niya, vedaniya, mohaniya, ayu, nama, gotra and antaraya. These actual influxes take place only as a result of the bhavasrava or the reprehensible thought activities, or changes (_pari@nama_) of the soul. The states of thought which condition the coming in of the karmas is called bhavabandha and the actual bondage of the soul by the actual impure connections of the karmas is technically called dravyabandha. It is on account of bhavabandha that the actual connection between the karmas and the soul can take place [Footnote ref 4]. The actual connections of the karmas with the soul are like the sticking
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[Footnote 1: _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S’I. 29.]
[Footnote 2: Nemicandra’s commentary on _Dravyasa@mgraha_, S’I. 29, edited by S.C. Ghoshal, Arrah, 1917.]
[Footnote 3: See Nemicandra’s commentary on S’I. 30.]
[Footnote 4: Nemicandra on 31, and _Vardhamanapura@na_ XVI. 44, quoted by Ghoshal.]
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of dust on the body of a person who is besmeared all over with oil. Thus Gunaratna says “The influx of karma means the contact of the particles of karma matter, in accordance with the particular kind of karma, with the soul just like the sticking of dust on the body of a person besmeared with oil. In all parts of the soul there being infinite number of karma atoms it becomes so completely covered with them that in some sense when looked at from that point of view the soul is sometimes regarded as a material body during its sa@msara stage [Footnote ref 1].” From one point of view the bondage of karma is only of _puf@nya_ and _papa_ (good and bad karmas) [Footnote ref 2]. From another this bondage is of four kinds, according to the nature of karma (_prak@rti_) duration of bondage (_sthiti_), intensity (_anubhaga_) and extension (_prades’a_). The nature of karma refers to the eight classes of karma already mentioned, namely the jnanavaraniya karma which obscures the infinite knowledge of the soul of all things in detail, dars’anavara@niya karma which obscures the infinite general knowledge of the soul, vedaniya karma which produces the feelings of pleasure and pain in the soul, mohaniya karma, which so infatuates souls that they fail to distinguish what is right from what is wrong, ayu karma, which determines the tenure of any particular life, nama karma which gives them personalities, gotra karma which brings about a particular kind of social surrounding for the soul and antaraya karma which tends to oppose the performance of right actions by the soul. The duration of the stay of any karma in the soul is called sthiti. Again a karma may be intense, middling or mild, and this indicates the third principle of division, anubhaga. Prades’a refers to the different parts of the soul to which the karma particles attach themselves. The duration of stay of any karma and its varying intensity are due to the nature of the kasayas or passions of the soul, whereas the different classification of karmas as jnanavaraniya, etc., are due to the nature of specific contact of the soul with karma matter [Footnote ref 3].
Corresponding to the two modes of inrush of karmas (bhavasrava and dravyasrava) are two kinds of control opposing this inrush, by actual thought modification of a contrary nature and by the actual stoppage of the inrush of karma particles, and these are respectively called bhavasa@mvara and dravyasa@mvara [Footnote ref 4].
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[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna, p. 181]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 3: Nemicandra, 33.]
[Footnote 4: _Varddhama@na_ XVI 67-68, and _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_ S’I. 35.]
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The bhavasa@mvaras are (1) the vows of non-injury, truthfulness, abstinence from stealing, sex-control, and non-acceptance of objects of desire, (2) samitis consisting of the use of trodden tracks in order to avoid injury to insects (_irya_), gentle and holy talk (_bha@sa_), receiving proper alms (_e@sa@na_), etc, (3) _guptis_ or restraints of body, speech and mind, (4) _dharmas_ consisting of habits of forgiveness, humility, straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss, and supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@sa_ consisting of meditation about the transient character of the world, about our helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our own responsibilities for our good and bad actions, about the difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness of our body and all that is associated with it, about the influx of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those karmas which have already entered the soul, about soul, matter and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining true knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles of the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the _pari@sahajaya_ consisting of the conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and of feelings of discomforts of various kinds, (7) _caritra_ or right conduct.
Next to this we come to nirjara or the purging off of the karmas or rather their destruction. This nirjara also is of two kinds bhavanirjara and dravyanirjara. Bhavanirjara means that change in the soul by virtue of which the karma particles are destroyed. Dravyanirjara means the actual destruction of these karma particles either by the reaping of their effects or by penances before their time of fruition, called savipaka and avipaka nirjaras respectively. When all the karmas are destroyed mok@sa or liberation is effected.
Pudgala.
The _ajiva_ (non-living) is divided into _pudgalastikaya, dharmastikaya, adharmastikaya, akas’astikaya, kala, pu@nya, papa_. The word _pudgala_ means matter [Footnote ref 3], and it is called _astikaya_ in the sense that it occupies space. Pudgala is made up of atoms
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[Footnote 1: _Tattvarthadhigamasutra_.]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 3: This is entirely different from the Buddhist sense. With the Buddhists _pudgala_ means an individual or a person.]
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which are without size and eternal. Matter may exist in two states, gross (such as things we see around us), and subtle (such as the karma matter which sullies the soul). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. The smallest indivisible particle of matter is called an atom (_a@nu_). The atoms are all eternal and they all have touch, taste, smell, and colour. The formation of different substances is due to the different geometrical, spherical or cubical modes of the combination of the atoms, to the diverse modes of their inner arrangement and to the existence of different degrees of inter-atomic space (_ghanapratarabhedena_). Some combinations take place by simple mutual contact at two points (_yugmaprades’a_) whereas in others the atoms are only held together by the points of attractive force (_oja@hprades’a_) (_Prajnapanopa@ngasutra_, pp. 10-12). Two atoms form a compound (_skandha_), when the one is viscous and the other dry or both are of different degrees of viscosity or dryness. It must be noted that while the Buddhists thought that there was no actual contact between the atoms the Jains regarded the contact as essential and as testified by experience. These compounds combine with other compounds and thus produce the gross things of the world. There are, however, liable to constant change (_pari@nama_) by which they lose some of their old qualities (_gu@nas_) and acquire new ones. There are four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and the atoms of all these are alike in character. The perception of grossness however is not an error which is imposed upon the perception of the atoms by our mind (as the Buddhists think) nor is it due to the perception of atoms scattered spatially lengthwise and breadthwise (as the Sa@mkhya-Yoga supposes), but it is due to the accession of a similar property of grossness, blueness or hardness in the combined atoms, so that such knowledge is generated in us as is given in the perception of a gross, blue, or a hard thing. When a thing appears as blue, what happens is this, that the atoms there have all acquired the property of blueness and on the removal of the dars’anavara@niya and jnanavara@niya veil, there arises in the soul the perception and knowledge of that blue thing. This sameness (_samana-rupata_) of the accession of a quality in an aggregate of atoms by virtue of which it appears as one object (e.g. a cow) is technically called _tiryaksamanya_. This samanya or generality is thus neither an imposition of the mind nor an abstract entity
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(as maintained by the Naiyayikas) but represents only the accession of similar qualities by a similar development of qualities of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of qualities continues we perceive the thing to be the same and to continue for some length of time. When we think of a thing to be permanent, we do so by referring to this sameness in the developing tendencies of an aggregate of atoms resulting in the relative permanence of similar qualities in them. According to the Jains things are not momentary and in spite of the loss of some old qualities and the accession of other ones, the thing as a whole may remain more or less the same for some time. This sameness of qualities in time is technically called _urdhvasamanya_ [Footnote ref 1]. If the atoms are looked at from the point of view of the change and accession of new qualities, they may be regarded as liable to destruction, but if they are looked at from the point of view of substance (_dravya_) they are eternal.
Dharma, Adharma, Akas’a.
The conception of dharma and adharma in Jainism is absolutely different from what they mean in other systems of Indian philosophy. Dharma is devoid of taste, touch, smell, sound and colour; it is conterminous with the mundane universe (_lokakas’a_) and pervades every part of it. The term _astikaya_ is therefore applied to it. It is the principle of motion, the accompanying circumstance or cause which makes motion possible, like water to a moving fish. The water is a passive condition or circumstance of the movement of a fish, i.e. it is indifferent or passive (_udasina_) and not an active or solicitous (_preraka_) cause. The water cannot compel a fish at rest to move; but if the fish wants to move, water is then the necessary help to its motion. Dharma cannot make the soul or matter move; but if they are to move, they cannot do so without the presence of dharma. Hence at the extremity of the mundane world (_loka_) in the region of the liberated souls, there being no dharma, the liberated souls attain perfect rest. They cannot move there because there is not the necessary motion-element, dharma [Footnote ref 2]. Adharma is also regarded as a similar pervasive entity which
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[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamarta@n@da_, pp. 136-143; _Jainatarkavarttika_, p. 106.]
[Footnote 2: _Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_, 17-20.]
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helps jivas and pudgalas to keep themselves at rest. No substance could move if there were no dharma, or could remain at rest if there were no adharma. The necessity of admitting these two categories seems probably to have been felt by the Jains on account of their notion that the inner activity of the jiva or the atoms required for its exterior realization the help of some other extraneous entity, without which this could not have been transformed into actual exterior motion. Moreover since the jivas were regarded as having activity inherent in them they would be found to be moving even at the time of liberation (moksa), which was undesirable; thus it was conceived that actual motion required for its fulfilment the help of an extraneous entity which was absent in the region of the liberated souls.
The category of akas’a is that subtle entity which pervades the mundane universe (_loka_) and the transcendent region of liberated souls (_aloka_) which allows the subsistence of all other substances such as dharma, adharma, jiva, pudgala. It is not a mere negation and absence of veil or obstruction, or mere emptiness, but a positive entity which helps other things to interpenetrate it. On account of its pervasive character it is called _akas’astikaya_ [Footnote ref 1].
Kala and Samaya.
Time (_kala_) in reality consists of those innumerable particles which never mix with one another, but which help the happening of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change of qualities of the atoms. Kala does not bring about the changes of qualities, in things, but just as akas’a helps interpenetration and dharma motion, so also kala helps the action of the transformation of new qualities in things. Time perceived as moments, hours, days, etc., is called _samaya_. This is the appearance of the unchangeable kala in so many forms. Kala thus not only aids the modifications of other things, but also allows its own modifications as moments, hours, etc. It is thus a dravya (substance), and the moments, hours, etc., are its paryayas. The unit of samaya is the time required by an atom to traverse a unit of space by a slow movement.
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[Footnote 1: _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_, 19.]
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Jaina Cosmography.
According to the Jains, the world is eternal, without beginning or end. Loka is that place in which happiness and misery are experienced as results of virtue and vice. It is composed of three parts, _urdhva_ (where the gods reside), _madhya_ (this world of ours), and _adho_ (where the denizens of hell reside). The mundane universe (_lokakas’a_) is pervaded with dharma which makes all movement possible. Beyond the lokakas’a there is no dharma and therefore no movement, but only space (_akas’a_). Surrounding this lokakas’a are three layers of air. The perfected soul rising straight over the urdhvaloka goes to the top of this lokakas’a and (there being no dharma) remains motionless there.
Jaina Yoga.
Yoga according to Jainism is the cause of moksa (salvation). This yoga consists of jnana (knowledge of reality as it is), s’raddha (faith in the teachings of the Jinas), and caritra (cessation from doing all that is evil). This caritra consists of _ahi@msa_ (not taking any life even by mistake or unmindfulness), _sun@rta_ (speaking in such a way as is true, good and pleasing), _asteya_ (not taking anything which has not been given), brahmacaryya (abandoning lust foi all kinds of objects, in mind, speech and body), and _aparigraha_ (abandoning attachment for all things) [Footnote ref 1].
These strict rules of conduct only apply to ascetics who are bent on attaining perfection. The standard proposed for the ordinary householders is fairly workable. Thus it is said by Hemacandra, that ordinary householders should earn money honestly, should follow the customs of good people, should marry a good girl from a good family, should follow the customs of the country and so forth. These are just what we should expect from any good and
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[Footnote 1: Certain external rules of conduct are also called caritra. These are: _Iryya_ (to go by the path already trodden by others and illuminated by the sun’s rays, so that proper precaution may be taken while walking to prevent oneself from treading on insects, etc., which may be lying on the way), _bhasa_ (to speak well and pleasantly to all beings), _isana_ (to beg alms in the proper monastic manner), _danasamiti_ (to inspect carefully the seats avoiding all transgressions when taking or giving anything), _utsargasamiti_ (to take care that bodily refuse may not be thrown in such a way as to injure any being), _manogupti_ (to remove all false thoughts, to remain satisfied within oneself, and hold all people to be the same in mind), _vaggupti_ (absolute silence), and _kayagupti_ (absolute steadiness and fixity of the body). Five other kinds of caritra are counted in _Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_ 35.]
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honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon the virtues of ahi@msa, sun@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya, but the root of all these is ahi@msa. The virtues of sun@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya are made to follow directly as secondary corrollaries of ahi@msa. Ahi@msa may thus be generalized as the fundamental ethical virtue of Jainism; judgment on all actions may be passed in accordance with the standard of ahi@msa; sun@rta, asteya and brahmacaryya are regarded as virtues as their transgression leads to hi@msa (injury to beings). A milder form of the practice of these virtues is expected from ordinary householders and this is called anubrata (small vows). But those who are struggling for the attainment of emancipation must practise these virtues according to the highest and strictest standard, and this is called mahabrata (great vows). Thus for example brahmacaryya for a householder according to the anubrata standard would be mere cessation from adultery, whereas according to mahabrata it would be absolute abstention from sex-thoughts, sex-words and sex-acts. Ahi@msa according to a householder, according to anubrata, would require abstinence from killing any animals, but according to mahavrata it would entail all the rigour and carefulness to prevent oneself from being the cause of any kind of injury to any living being in any way.
Many other minor duties are imposed upon householders, all of which are based upon the cardinal virtue of ahi@msa. These are (1) _digvirati_ (to carry out activities within a restricted area and thereby desist from injuring living beings in different places), (2) _bhogopabhogamana_ (to desist from drinking liquors, taking flesh, butter, honey, figs, certain other kinds of plants, fruits, and vegetables, to observe certain other kinds of restrictions regarding time and place of taking meals), (3) _anarthada@n@da_ consisting of (a) _apadhyana_ (cessation from inflicting any bodily injuries, killing of one’s enemies, etc.), (b) _papopades’a_ (desisting from advising people to take to agriculture which leads to the killing of so many insects), (c) _hi@msopakaridana_ (desisting from giving implements of agriculture to people which will lead to the injury of insects), (d) _pramadacara@na_ (to desist from attending musical parties, theatres, or reading sex-literature, gambling, etc.), (4) _s’ik@sapadabrata_ consisting of (a) _samayikabrata_ (to try to treat all beings equally), (b) des’avakas’ikabrata (gradually to practise the _digviratibrata_ more and more extensively), (c) _po@sadhabrata_
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(certain other kinds of restriction), (d) _atithisa@mvibhagabrata (to make gifts to guests). All transgressions of these virtues, called _aticara_, should be carefully avoided.
All perception, wisdom, and morals belong to the soul, and to know the soul as possessing these is the right knowledge of the soul. All sorrows proceeding out of want of self-knowledge can be removed only by true self-knowledge. The soul in itself is pure intelligence, and it becomes endowed with the body only on account of its karma. When by meditation, all the karmas are burnt (_dhyanagnidagdhakarma_) the self becomes purified. The soul is itself the sa@msara (the cycle of rebirths) when it is overpowered by the four ka@sayas (passions) and the senses. The four ka@sayas are _krodha_ (anger), _mana_ (vanity and pride), _maya_ (insincerity and the tendency to dupe others), and _lobha_ (greed). These ka@sayas cannot be removed except by a control of the senses; and self-control alone leads to the purity of the mind (_mana@hs’uddhi_). Without the control of the mind no one can proceed in the path of yoga. All our acts become controlled when the mind is controlled, so those who seek emancipation should make every effort to control the mind. No kind of asceticism (_tapas_) can be of any good until the mind is purified. All attachment and antipathy (_ragadvc@sa_) can be removed only by the purification of the mind. It is by attachment and antipathy that man loses his independence. It is thus necessary for the yogin (sage) that he should be free from them and become independent in the real sense of the term When a man learns to look upon all beings with equality (_samatva_) he can effect such a conquest over raga and dve@sa as one could never do even by the strictest asceticism through millions of years. In order to effect this samatva towards all, we should take to the following kinds of meditation (_bhavana_):
We should think of the transitoriness (_anityata_) of all things, that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-day, what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of pleasure, wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles in a whirlwind.
All, even the gods, are subject to death. All our relatives will by their works fall a prey to death. This world is thus full of misery and there is nothing which can support us in it. Thus in
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whatever way we look for anything, on which we can depend, we find that it fails us. This is called as’ara@nabhavana (the meditation of helplessness).
Some are born in this world, some suffer, some reap the fruits of the karma done in another life. We are all different from one another by our surroundings, karma, by our separate bodies and by all other gifts which each of us severally enjoy. To meditate on these aspects is called ekatvabhavana and anyatvabhavana.
To think that the body is made up of defiled things, the flesh, blood, and bones, and is therefore impure is called as’ucibhavana (meditation of the impurity of the body).
To think that if the mind is purified by the thoughts of universal friendship and compassion and the passions are removed, then only will good {_s’ubha_) accrue to me, but if on the contrary I commit sinful deeds and transgress the virtues, then all evil will befall me, is called asravabhavana (meditation of the befalling of evil). By the control of the asrava (inrush of karma) comes the sa@mvara (cessation of the influx of karma) and the destruction of the karmas already accumulated leads to nirjara (decay and destruction of karma matter).
Again one should think that the practice of the ten dharmas (virtues) of self control (_sa@myama_), truthfulness (_sun@rta_), purity (_s’auca_), chastity (_brahma_), absolute want of greed (_akincanata_), asceticism (_tapas_), forbearance, patience (_ks’anti_), mildness (_mardava_), sincerity (_@rjuta_), and freedom or emancipation from all sins (_mukti_} can alone help us in the achievement of the highest goal. These are the only supports to which we can look. It is these which uphold the world-order. This is called dharmasvakhyatatabhavana.
Again one should think of the Jaina cosmology and also of the nature of the influence of karma in producing all the diverse conditions of men. These two are called _lokabhavana_ and _bodhibhavana_.
When by the continual practice of the above thoughts man becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a mind full of peace he gets rid of all passions, and then he should take to the performance of dhyana or meditation by deep concentration. The samatva or perfect equality of the mind and dhyana are interdependent, so that without dhyana there is no samatva
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and without samatva there is no dhyana. In order to make the mind steady by dhyana one should think of _maitri_ (universal friendship), _pramoda_ (the habit of emphasizing the good sides of men), _karu@na_ (universal compassion) and _madhyastha_ (indifference to the wickedness of people, i.e. the habit of not taking any note of sinners). The Jaina dhyana consists in concentrating the mind on the syllables of the Jaina prayer phrases. The dhyana however as we have seen is only practised as an aid to making the mind steady and perfectly equal and undisturbed towards all things. Emancipation comes only as the result of the final extinction of the karma materials. Jaina yoga is thus a complete course of moral discipline which leads to the purification of the mind and is hence different from the traditional Hindu yoga of Patanjali or even of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1].
Jaina Atheism [Footnote ref 2].
The Naiyayikas assert that as the world is of the nature of an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent agent and this agent is Is’vara (God). To this the Jain replies, “What does the Naiyayika mean when he says that the world is of the nature of an effect”? Does he mean by “effect,” (1) that which is made up of parts (_savayava_), or, (2) the coinherence of the causes of a non-existent thing, or, (3) that which is regarded by anyone as having been made, or, (4) that which is liable to change (_vikaritvam_). Again, what is meant by being “made up of parts”? If it means existence in parts, then the class-concepts (_samanya_) existing in the parts should also be regarded as effects, and hence destructible, but these the Naiyayikas regard as being partless and eternal. If it means “that which has parts,” then even “space” (_akas’a_) has to be regarded as “effect,” but the Naiyayika regards it as eternal.
Again “effect” cannot mean “coinherence of the causes of a thing which were previously non-existent,” for in that case one could not speak of the world as an effect, for the atoms of the elements of earth, etc., are regarded as eternal.
Again if “effect” means “that which is regarded by anyone as
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[Footnote 1:_Yogas’astra,_ by Hemacandra, edited by Windisch, in _Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morg. Gesellschaft_, Leipsig, 1874, and _Dravyasa@mgraha_, edited by Ghoshal, 1917.]
[Footnote 2: See Gu@naratna’s _Tarkarahasyadipika_.]
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having been made,” then it would apply even to space, for when a man digs the ground he thinks that he has made new space in the hollow which he dug.
If it means “that which is liable to change,” then one could suppose that God was also liable to change and he would require another creator to create him and he another, and so on _ad infinitum_. Moreover, if God creates he cannot but be liable to change with reference to his creative activity.
Moreover, we know that those things which happen at some time and do not happen at other times are regarded as “effects.” But the world as a whole exists always. If it is argued that things contained within it such as trees, plants, etc., are “effects,” then that would apply even to this hypothetical God, for, his will and thought must be diversely operating at diverse times and these are contained in him. He also becomes a created being by virtue of that. And even atoms would be “effects,” for they also undergo changes of colour by heat.
Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a whole is an “effect.” And every effect has a cause, and so the world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it is argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human causation then he might also be regarded as imperfect as human beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly an effect of the type of effects produced by human beings but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because water-vapour is similar to smoke, nobody will be justified in inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke. If it is said that this is so different an effect that from it the inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce such an effect, well then, one could also infer on seeing old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced by intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has been made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer the agency of God from this sense or infer the sense of its having been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have a vicious circle (_anyonyas’raya_).
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Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held that we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind of body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it is said that these are also made by God, then you have an argument in a circle (_cakraka_), for this was the very matter which you sought to prove.
Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that he can be all-creator.
Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such a blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He took to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of
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admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came into being out of its own nature.
It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create this world. This is against all experience.
Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense with the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1].
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[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars’anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124.]
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Mok@sa (emancipation).
The motive which leads a man to strive for release (_mok@sa_) is the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (_anantajnana_) and infinite perception (_anantadars’ana_). In the sa@msara state on account of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and that time as ordinary knowledge (_mati_), testimony (_s’ruta_), supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (_avadhi_), and direct knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (_mana@hparyaya_). In the state of release however there is omniscience (_kevala-jnana_) and all things are simultaneously known to the perfect (_kevalin_) as they are. In the sa@msara stage the soul always acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.
It may not be out of place to mention here that though the karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action (_anantavirya_), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. If man had not this anantavirya in him he might have been eternally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured his bondage (_bandha_). But since man is the repository of this indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his highest good.
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CHAPTER VII
THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SA@MKHYA (YOGA) [Footnote ref 1].
A Review.
The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certain practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some of the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nastika schools appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with the K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals at the sacrifices.
The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical power of producing the desired effect–a shower of rain, the birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our
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[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, published by the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works.]
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objects. Truth cannot be determined _a priori_ but depends upon the test of experience [Footnote ref l].
It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2]. Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an account of things that on proceeding according to its directions we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere _a priori_ abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary experience, could not satisfy our inner _a priori_ demands for finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism
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[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mima@msa of Kumarila and Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience.]
[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva._ But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva_.]
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would answer, “yes, this is true from this point of view, but untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such a point of view and untrue from another.” But such an answer cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment.
The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions were here considered bad or good according as they brought about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed only if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of karma (_karmaphala_) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.
Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads
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which had anticipated the new systems in all these directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the Upani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to harmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are indeed fulfilled in the Sa@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may be discovered in the Upani@sads.
The Germs of Sa@mkhya in the Upani@sads.
It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result [Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic Vedanta as explained by S’ankara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S’vetas’vatara and particularly in Maitraya@ni from which it appears that the Samkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the date of Maitraya@ni has not yet been definitely settled, and the details
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[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt’s article, “Brahman” (_E. R.E._).]
[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S’veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]
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found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion of the Sa@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sa@mkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.
Sa@mkhya and Yoga Literature.
The main exposition of the system of Sa@mkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the _Sa@mkhya karika_, the _Sa@mkhya sutras_, and the _Yoga sutras_ of Patanjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The _Sa@mkhya karika_ (about 200 A.D.) was written by Is’varak@r@s@na. The account of Sa@mkhya given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and this has been treated separately. Vacaspati Mis’ra (ninth century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudi_. But before him Gaudapada and Raja wrote commentaries on the _Sa@mkhya karika_ [Footnote ref 1]. Narayanatirtha wrote his _Candrika_ on Gaudapada’s commentary. The _Sa@mkhya sutras_ which have been commented on by Vijnana Bhik@su (called _Pravacanabha@sya_) of the sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the _Sa@mkhya sutras_. Vijnana Bhiksu wrote also another elementary work on Sa@mkhya known as _Sa@mkhyasara_. Another short work of late origin is _Tattvasamasa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two other works on Sam@khya, viz Simananda’s _Samkhyatattvavivecana_ and Bhavaga@nes’a’s _Sa@mkhyatattvayatharthyadipana_ (both later than Vijnanabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been freely consulted. Patanjali’s _Yoga sutra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.) was commented on by Vaysa (400 A.D.) and Vyasa’s bhasya commented on by Vacaspati Mis’ra is called _Tattvavais’aradi_, by Vijnana Bhik@su _Yogavarttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century _Bhojav@rtti_, and by Nages’a (seventeenth century) _Chayavyakhya_.
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[Footnote 1: I suppose that Raja’s commentary on the _Karika_ was the same as _Rajavarttika_ quoted by Vacaspati. Raja’s commentary on the _Karika_ has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyayamanjari_, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.]
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Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may mention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_ by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published by the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published, and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.
Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sa@mkhya works, viz. _Ma@tharabha@sya_ and _Atreyatantra_. Of these the second is probably the same as Caraka’s treatment of Sa@mkhya, for we know that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka’s work and for that it was called Atreyasa@mhita or Atreyatantra. Nothing is known of the Matharabhasya [Footnote ref 1].
An Early School of Sa@mkhya.
It is important for the history of Sa@mkhya philosophy that Caraka’s treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sa@mkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhatus_), viz. the five elements such as akas’a, vayu etc. and cetana, called also puru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold prak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkara and the five elements)[Footnote ref 2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate sensing (_uha_) and conceiving (_vicara_) before definite understanding (_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance
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[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sa@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.]
[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapa@ni, the commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatiriktancodasina@m puru@samavyaktatvasadharmyat avyaktayam prak@rtaveva prak@sipya avyaktas’avbdenaiva g@rh@nati._ Harinatha Vis’arada’s edition of _Caraka, S’arira_, p. 4.]
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of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmatras at all [Footnote ref 1]. The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyartha_) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhutas and prak@rti, mahat and aha@mkara taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the atman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also _paramatman_, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category. The vikara or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra, whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajna (_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajnam@r@sayo viduh_). This avyakta and cetana are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested prak@rti or cetana is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego (_aha@mkara_) and from the aha@mkara the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the time of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (_avyakta_), all the manifested forms–the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkara,
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[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as having eight elements in it _prak@rtis’ca@s@tadhatuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat, aha@mkara, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyartha, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]
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etc.–appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains are felt by the conglomeration (_ras’i_), and not by the atman presiding over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and pain comes desire (_t@r@s@na_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns that “all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do not belong to me the self,” the self transcends all. This is the last renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sa@mkhyas as their goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,
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[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakrapa@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prak@rti–the puru@sa–and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapa@ni on s’arira, I. 46.]
[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhuta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedanta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_), resembling Nagarjuna’s Nirva@na. Thus Caraka writes:–_tasmi@ms’caramasannyase samulah@hsarvavedana@h asa@mjnajnanavijnana niv@rtti@m yantyas’e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m brahmabhuto bhutatma nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhavebhya@h cihna@m yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavida@m brahma taccak@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka, S’arira_ 1. 98-100.]
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the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (_mok@se niv@rttirni@hs’e@sa_).
The main features of the Sa@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmatras are not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkara etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).
This account of Sa@mkhya agrees with the system of Sa@mkhya propounded by Pancas’ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of Asuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the Mahabharata XII. 219. Pancas’ikha of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sa@mkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pancas’ikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Sa@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa (_purusavasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Pancas’ikha also, and the proofs
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[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.]
[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pancas’ikha’s doctrine as a genuine Sa@mkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sa@mkhya doctrines sketched in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]
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for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again Pancas’ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,–and the element of “cetas.” They are mutually independent, and by such independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these phenomena. The gu@nas described by Pancas’ikha are the different kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose themselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any characteristic)–a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sa@mkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction (_samyagbadha_).
Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of _@Sa@ddars’anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sa@mkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Sa@mkhya is said to be that which believed that there was a separate pradhana for each atman (_maulikyasa@mkhya hyatmanamatmanam prati p@rthak pradhanam vadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sa@mkhya doctrine I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sa@mkhya.
In _Mahabharata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sa@mkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five (the well-known orthodox Sa@mkhya system) and those who admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a supreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the form of Sa@mkhya advocated in the _Mahabharata_. The schools of Sa@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of Sa@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the
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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna’s _Tarkarahasyadipika_, p. 99.]
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other chapters of the _Mahabharata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon day; it is said that as Rahu (the shadow on the sun during an eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be seen apart from the body. The selfs (_s’ariri@na@h_) are spoken of as manifesting from prak@rti.
We do not know anything about Asuri the direct disciple of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of Sa@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same form in the _Mahabharata_ and has been attributed there to Pancas’ikha is probably the earliest form of Sa@mkhya available to us in a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna’s reference to the school of Maulikya Sa@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka (78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sa@mkhya as described by Is’varak@r@s@na and referred to in other parts of _Mahabharata_ is a definite proof that Is’varak@r@s@na’s Sa@mkhya is a later modification, which was either non-existent in Caraka’s time or was not regarded as an authoritative old Sa@mkhya view.
Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavasin altered the Sa@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavasin was a title of Is’varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe holds that the date of Is’varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very plausible view that Is’varak@r@s@na was indebted for his karikas to another work, which was probably written in a style different from what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Karika_ seems to be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the
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[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Asuri is quoted by Gu@naratna (_Tarkarahasyadipika,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]
[Footnote 2: Vassilief’s _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]
[Footnote 3: Takakusu’s “A study of Paramartha’s life of Vasubandhu,” _J. R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Is’varak@r@s@na and Vindhyavasin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadipika,_ pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavasin (p. 104) in anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Is’varak@r@s@na. It appears that Is’varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _Sa@mkhya karika_ and another an independent work on Sa@mkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:
“_Pratiniyatadhyavasaya@h s’rotradisamuttha adhyak@sam_” (p. 108).
If Vacaspati’s interpretation of the classification of anumana in his _Tattvakaumudi_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sa@mkhya karika_ then Is’varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavasin whose views on anumana as referred to in _S’lokavarttika,_ p. 393, are altogether different. But Vacaspati’s own statement in the _Tatparyya@tika_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.]
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_Mahabhasya_ of Patanjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1]. The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with the strictly technical part of Sa@mkhya, and it is just possible that the book from which Patanjali quoted the passage, and which was probably paraphrased in the Arya metre by Is’varak@r@s@na was not a Sa@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sa@mkhya, yet since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard against certain objections against the Sa@mkhya doctrine of prak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the verse of a Sa@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Is’varak@r@s@na.
The earliest descriptions of a Sa@mkhya which agrees with Is’varak@r@s@na’s Sa@mkhya (but with an addition of Is’vara) are to be found in Patanjali’s _Yoga sutras_ and in the _Mahabharata;_ but we are pretty certain that the Sa@mkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in _Yoga sutra_ I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Sa@mkhya similar to this.
From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sa@mkhya of Caraka and Pancas’ikha is very important; for it shows a transitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas and the orthodox Sa@mkhya doctrine as represented by Is’varak@r@s@na. On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that the puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyaya, and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer than the orthodox Sa@mkhya.
We hear of a _Sa@s@titantras’astra_ as being one of the oldest Sa@mkhya works. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ as containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote ref 2]. A quotation from _Rajavarttika_ (a work about which there is no definite information) in Vacaspati Mis’ra’s commentary on the Sa@mkhya karika_(72) says that it was called the _@Sa@s@titantra because it dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its difference from puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity of puru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of
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[Footnote 1: Patanjali’s Mahabha@sya, IV. I. 3. _Atisannikar@sadativiprakar@sat murttyantaravyavadhanat tamasav@rtatvat indriyadaurvalyadatipramadat,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]
[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita,_ pp. 108, 110.]
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the categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five _viparyyayas_, nine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].
But the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sa@mkhya of the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ was of a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pancaratra Vai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ says that Kapila’s theory of Sa@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijnana Bhiksu, the greatest expounder of Sa@mkhya, says in many places of his work _Vijnanam@rta Bha@sya_ that Sa@mkhya was originally theistic, and that the atheistic Sa@mkhya is only a _prau@dhivada_ (an exaggerated attempt to show that no supposition of Is’vara is necessary to explain the world process) though the _Mahabharata_ points out that the difference between Sa@mkhya and Yoga is this, that the former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy between the two accounts of _@Sa@s@titantra_ suggests that the original _Sa@s@titantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ was subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention among the important Sa@mkhya works _@Sa@s@titantra_ but _@Sa@s@titantroddhara_
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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs, and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karika_ of Is’varakr@sna, but I have omitted them in my account of Samkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five, viz. avidya (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy), abhimives’a (self-love), which are also called _tamo, moha, mahamoha, tamisra_, and _andhatamisra_. These are of nine kinds of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder’s life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhagya_), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (_parapara_), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (_anuttamambhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others (_uttamambhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations with those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of scriptures (_tara_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutara_), (3) proper reasoning (_taratara_), (4) corroborating one’s own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field (_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (_sadamudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and modamana lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus’a. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of the Sa@mkhya goal.]
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(revised edition of _@Sa@s@titantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the earlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before Vacaspati’s time.
If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it has to be assumed that Kapila’s Sa@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It seems probable that his disciple Asuri tried to popularise it. But it seems that a great change occurred when Pancas’ikha the disciple of Asuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It is said in _Sa@mkhya karika_ (70) that the literature was divided by him into many parts (_tena bahudhak@rtam tantram_). The exact meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that the original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential parts as the Sa@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption that Kapila’s doctrine was probably theistic. But there are a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the Patanjala Sa@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may be ventured is that Pancas’ikha probably modified Kapila’s work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila’s work. If this supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of Sa@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Pancas’ikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sa@mkhya system. An important change in the Sa@mkhya doctrine seems to have been introduced by Vijnana Bhik@su (sixteenth century A.D.) by his treatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this interpretation of Sa@mkhya as the most rational and philosophical one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system of the accepted Kapila and the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya. But it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas was applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the
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[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadipika_, p. 109.]
[Footnote 2: _eva@m sa@dvims’akam prahah s’ariramth manavah sa@mkhyam sa@mkhyatmakatvacca kapiladibhirucyate. Matsyapurana_, IV. 28.]
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totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijnana Bhik@su and the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga philosophy compiled by Patanjali and commented on by Vyasa, Vacaspati and Vijn@ana Bhik@su, agree with the Sa@mkhya doctrine as explained by Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhik@su in most points I have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Patanjala schools of Sa@mkhya and have treated them together–a principle which was followed by Haribhadra in his _@Sa@ddars’anasamuaccaya_.
The other important Sa@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapada are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanatana and Vo@dhu. Nothing is known about their historicity or doctrines.
Sa@mkhya karika, Sa@mkhya sutra, Vacaspati Mis’ra and Vijnana Bhik@su.
A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Sa@mkhya-Yoga system. The _Sa@mkhya karika_ is the oldest Sa@mkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. The _Sa@mkhya sutra_ was not referred to by any writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth century A.D.). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. who made allusions to a number of Sa@mkhya works, did not make any reference to the _Sa@mkhya sutra_, and no other writer who is known to have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made any reference to the _Sa@mkhya sutra_. The natural conclusion therefore is that these sutras were probably written some time after the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is said at the end of the _Sa@mkhya karika_ of Is’varak@r@s@na that the karikas give an exposition of the Sa@mkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sa@mkhya works–the _@Sa@s@titantras’astra_. The _Sa@mkhya sutras_ contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sa@mkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the _@Sa@s@titantras’astra_ (_@Sa@s@titantroddhara_ as mentioned by
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[Footnote 1: Venka@ta’s philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present work.]
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Gu@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to suppose that the Sa@mkhya doctrine found in the sutras differs in any important way from the Sa@mkhya doctrine as found in the _Sa@mkhya karika_. The only point of importance is this, that the _Sa@mkhya sutras_ hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolute pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved in the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class of the gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence, they were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all form the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in the _Sa@mkhya karika_. This is, however, a case of omission and not of difference. Vijnana Bhik@su, the commentator of the _Sa@mkhya sutra_, was more inclined to theistic Sa@mkhya or Yoga than to atheistic Sa@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his _Samkhyapravacanabha@sya, Yogavarttika_, and _Vijnanam@rtabhasya_ (an independent commentary on the Brahmasutras of Badarayana on theistic Sa@mkhya lines). Vijnana Bhiksu’s own view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he agreed more with the views of the Sa@mkhya doctrine of the Pura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are said to be merged in the end in Is’vara, by whose will the creative process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the _Sa@mkhya sutras_, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sa@mkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Is’vara it could explain all facts. Vijnana Bhik@su in his interpretation of Sa@mkhya differed on many points from those of Vacaspati, and it is difficult to say who is right. Vijnana Bhik@su has this advantage that he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points on which Vacaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the nature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the most important thing in Sa@mkhya. Vijnana Bhik@su described the gu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vacaspati and Gau@dapada (the other commentator of the _Sa@mkhya karika_) remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of Vijnana Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely
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came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature.
Since no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in any other work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this matter may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka nor the _Mahabharata_ explains the nature of the gu@nas. But Bhik@su’s interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all early documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@su in giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The _Karika_ speaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vacaspati merely paraphrases this statement of the _Karika_ but does not enter into any further explanations. Bhik@su’s interpretation fits in well with all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possible that this view might not have been known before, and when the original Sa@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness as to the conception of the gu@nas.
There are some other points in which Bhik@su’s interpretation differs from that of Vacaspati. The most important of these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vacaspati holds that there is no contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that a reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience (_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of Vacaspati Mis’ra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific kind of fitness (_yogyata_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijnana Bhik@su differs from Vacaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no
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reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in the buddhi for ever. Vijnana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a real contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive state. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between Vacaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual process. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vacaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.
It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vacaspati’s commentary on the _Sa@mkhya karika_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_aha@mkara_) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmatras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of _Vyasabha@sya_ and Vijnana Bhik@su etc. Vacaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkara and
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from aha@mkara the tanmatras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijnana Bhik@su however holds that both the separation of aha@mkara and the evolution of the tanmatras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vacaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical importance.
Yoga and Patanjali.
The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the S’atapatha Brahmana and the B@rhadara@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2]. The word has another derivative “yugya” in later Sanskrit literature [Footnote ref 3].
With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the @Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].
As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses [Footnote ref 5].
In Pa@nini’s time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished this root “_yuj samadhau_” (_yuj_ in the sense of concentration) from “_yujir yoge_” (root _yujir_ in the sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].
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[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]
[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114. 9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S’atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]
[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]
[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10; Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brah, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129; S’atap. Brah. XI. 5. 8. 1.]
[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriya@ni hayanahu@h vi@sayate@sugocaran_. The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriya@nyasya haya@h_ the conative senses are its horses.]
[Footnote 6: _Yugya@h_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from _yuja samadhau_. A consideration of Pa@nini’s rule “Tadasya brahmacaryam,” V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time (Pa@nini as Goldstucker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.]
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In the _Bhagavadgita_, we find that the word yoga has been used not only in conformity with the root “_yuj-samadhau_” but also with “_yujir yoge_” This has been the source of some confusion to the readers of the _Bhagavadgita._ “Yogin” in the sense of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of this word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgita_ tried to mark out a middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently from _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.
Kau@tilya in his _Arthas’astra_ when enumerating the philosophic sciences of study names Sa@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata. The oldest Buddhist sutras (e.g. the _Satipa@t@thana sutta_) are fully familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.
As regards the connection of Yoga with Sa@mkhya, as we find it in the _Yoga sutras_ of Patanjali, it is indeed difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of pra@nayama (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we come to Maitraya@ni that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S’vetas’vatara and the Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to the Sa@mkhya tenets, though the Sa@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the Maitraya@ni in the conversation between S’akyayana and B@rhad ratha where we find that the Sa@mkhya metaphysics was offered
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in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the Sa@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently systematized by Patanjali. Thus S’akyayana says: “Here some say it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief–this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a verse: ‘When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'”
An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S’a@n@dilya, Yogatattva, Dhyanabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanada, Varaha, Ma@n@dala Brahma@na, Nadabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalu, shows that the Yoga practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Sa@mkhya. Thus the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the
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[Footnote 1: Vatsyayana, however, in his bha@sya on _Nyaya sutra_, I. i 29, distinguishes Sa@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sa@mkhya holds that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence (_niratis’aya@h cetana@h_). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa. Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of _Vyasabha@sya,_ It is closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Vatsyayana’s statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in creation was borrowed by Sa@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara’s remarks on the same sutra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sa@mkhya and Yoga on the doctrine of the _indriyas_ being “_abhautika._” Curiously enough Vatsyayana quotes a passage from _Vyasabha@sya,_ III. 13, in his bha@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (_viruddha_).]
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S’aivas and S’@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga; they grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga which was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The Yogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Rajayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedantism with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great, but we have to leave out these from our present consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as they are not connected with our present endeavour.
Of the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya, which forms the subject of the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patanjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all on the Sa@mkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which they have been handed down to us. Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhik@su, the two great commentators on the _Vyasabha@sya_, agree with us in holding that Patanjali was not the founder of Yoga, but an editor. Analytic study of the sutras brings the conviction that the sutras do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and classification shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patanjali systematized them. There was no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of other systems, except as far as they might come in by way of explaining the system. Patanjal is not even anxious to establish the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts as he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are
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[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigi@savya wrote “_Dharanas’astra_” which dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patanjali. He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory where concentration is to be made. See Vacaspati’s _Tatparya@tika_ or Vatsyayana’s bha@sya on _Nyaya sutra_, III. ii. 43.]
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criticized; the putting of an “_iti_” (the word to denote the conclusion of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course another “_iti_” at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patanjali who was anxious to supply some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a marked change (due either to its supplementary character or to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last chapter as compared with the style of the other three.
The sutras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what has already been said in the second chapter and some of the topics introduced are such that they could well have been dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sutras, whereas the average number of sutras in other chapters is between 51 to 55.
We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kapya Pata@mchala of S’atapatha Brahma@na [Footnote ref l]; in Katyayana’s _Varttika_ we get the name Patanjali which is explained by later commentators as _patanta@h anjalaya@h yasmai_ (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names. There is however another theory which identifies the writer of the great commentary on Pa@nini called the _Mahabha@sya_ with the Patanjali of the _Yoga sutra_. This theory has been accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of some Indian commentators who identified the two Patanjalis. Of these one is the writer of the _Patanjalicarita_ (Ramabhadra Dik@sita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth century. The other is that cited in S’ivarama’s commentary on _Vasavadatta_ which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. The other two are king Bhoja of Dhar and Cakrapa@nidatta,
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[Footnote 1: Weber’s _History of Indian Literature_, p. 223 n.]
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the commentator of _Caraka,_ who belonged to the eleventh century A.D. Thus Cakrapa@ni says that he adores the Ahipati (mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech and body by his _Patanjala mahabha@sya_ and the revision of _Caraka._ Bhoja says: “Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing his grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patanjala and by producing a treatise on medicine called _Rajam@rga@nka_ has like the lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, mind and body.” The adoration hymn of Vyasa (which is considered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion between the three Patanjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as _Patanjalatantra,_ and who has been quoted by S’ivadasa in his commentary on _Cakradatta_ in connection with the heating of metals.
Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great commentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta, Vamana, Jayaditya, Nages’a, etc. are silent on this point. This is indeed a point against the identification of the two Patanjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later age. And if other proofs are available which go against such an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the Yoga writer to be the same person.
Let us now see if Patanjali’s grammatical work contains anything which may lead us to think that he was not the same person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the philosophic concept of substance (_dravya_) of the two Patanjalis differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that dravya is described in _Vyasabha@sya_ in one place as being the unity of species and qualities (_samanyavis’e@satmaka_), whereas the _Mahabha@sya_ holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by
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Vya@di and Vajapyayana (Vya@di holding that words denoted qualities or dravya and Vajapyayana holding that words denoted species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pa@nini had these two different ideas in “_jatyakhyayamekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyam_” and “_sarupanamekas’e@samekavibhaktau_,” and Patanjali the writer of the _Mahabha@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not show that he opposes the view of _Vyasabha@sya_, though we must remember that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard to the writer of the sutras. Moreover, when we read that dravya is spoken of in the _Mahabha@sya_ as that object which is the specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.–“_yat
sasnala@ngulakakudakhuravi@sa@nyartharupam_,” we are reminded of its similarity with “_ayutasiddhavayavabhedanugata@h samuha@h dravyam_” (a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the _Vyasabhasya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahabha@sya_ I have not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us in holding that the two Patanjalis cannot be identified. There are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the writer of the _Mahabha@sya_ knew most of the important points of the Sa@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer to the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sa@mkhya dictum of ex nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of change _vikara_ as production of new qualities _gu@nantaradhana_ (5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the _Mahabha@sya_ agrees with the Yoga view as regards the Spho@tavada, which is not held in common by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin their works in a similar manner (_atha yoganus’asanam_ and _athas’abdanus’asanam_)–“now begins the compilation of the instructions on Yoga” (_Yoga sutra_)–and “now begins the compilation of the instructions of words” (_Mahabha@sya_).
It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments
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[Footnote 1: Patanjali’s _Mahabha@sya,_ 1. 2. 64.]
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which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the _Yoga sutra_ between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive, as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patanjalis cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijnana-vadi type, we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sutras had been developing long before the time of Nagarjuna.
Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two Patanjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative critical study of the _Yoga sutras_ and the text of the _Mahabha@sya,_ which can lead us to say that the writer of the _Yoga sutras_ flourished at a later date than the other Patanjali.
Postponing our views about the time of Patanjali the Yoga editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing the other work _Kitab Patanjal_, of which Alberuni speaks, for our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous one and he translates it along with another book called _Sanka_ (Sa@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that this book was not the present _Yoga sutra_ of Patanjali, though it had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation