[Footnote 1: Garbha Upani@sad, Atman Upani@sad, Pras’na Upani@sad, etc. There were however some exceptions such as the Ma@n@dukya, Jabala, Pai@ngala, S’aunaka, etc.]
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systems in astronomy. The direct translation of Vis’vakarman or Hira@nyagarbha into the atman and the Brahman of the Upani@sads seems to me to be very improbable, though I am quite willing to admit that these conceptions were swallowed up by the atman doctrine when it had developed to a proper extent. Throughout the earlier Upani@sads no mention is to be found of Vis’vakarman, Hira@nyagarbha or Brahma@naspati and no reference of such a nature is to be found as can justify us in connecting the Upani@sad ideas with those conceptions [Footnote ref l]. The word puru@sa no doubt occurs frequently in the Upani@sads, but the sense and the association that come along with it are widely different from that of the puru@sa of the Puru@sasukta of the @Rg-Veda.
When the @Rg-Veda describes Vis’vakarman it describes him as a creator from outside, a controller of mundane events, to whom they pray for worldly benefits. “What was the position, which and whence was the principle, from which the all-seeing Vis’vakarman produced the earth, and disclosed the sky by his might? The one god, who has on every side eyes, on every side a face, on every side arms, on every side feet, when producing the sky and earth, shapes them with his arms and with his wings….Do thou, Vis’vakarman, grant to thy friends those thy abodes which are the highest, and the lowest, and the middle…may a generous son remain here to us [Footnote ref 2]”; again in R.V.X. 82 we find “Vis’vakarman is wise, energetic, the creator, the disposer, and the highest object of intuition….He who is our father, our creator, disposer, who knows all spheres and creatures, who alone assigns to the gods their names, to him the other creatures resort for instruction [Footnote ref 3].” Again about Hira@nyagarbha we find in R.V.I. 121, “Hira@nyagarbha arose in the beginning; born, he was the one lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky; to what god shall we offer our oblation?… May he not injure us, he who is the generator of the earth, who ruling by fixed ordinances, produced the heavens, who produced the great and brilliant waters!–to what god, etc.? Prajapati, no other than thou is lord over all these created things: may we obtain that, through desire of which we have invoked thee; may we become masters of riches [Footnote ref 4].” Speaking of the puru@sa the @Rg-Veda
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[Footnote 1: The name Vis’vakarma appears in S’vet. IV. 17. Hira@nyagarbha appears in S’vet. III. 4 and IV. 12, but only as the first created being. The phrase Sarvahammani Hira@nyagarbha which Deussen refers to occurs only in the later N@rsi@m@h. 9. The word Brahma@naspati does not occur at all in the Upani@sads.]
[Footnote 2: Muir’s _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. IV. pp. 6, 7.]
[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p, 7.]
[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 16, 17.]
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says “Purusha has a thousand heads…a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. On every side enveloping the earth he transcended [it] by a space of ten fingers….He formed those aerial creatures, and the animals, both wild and tame [Footnote ref 1],” etc. Even that famous hymn (R.V.x. 129) which begins with “There was then neither being nor non-being, there was no air nor sky above” ends with saying “From whence this creation came into being, whether it was created or not–he who is in the highest sky, its ruler, probably knows or does not know.”
In the Upani@sads however, the position is entirely changed, and the centre of interest there is not in a creator from outside but in the self: the natural development of the monotheistic position of the Vedas could have grown into some form of developed theism, but not into the doctrine that the self was the only reality and that everything else was far below it. There is no relation here of the worshipper and the worshipped and no prayers are offered to it, but the whole quest is of the highest truth, and the true self of man is discovered as the greatest reality. This change of philosophical position seems to me to be a matter of great interest. This change of the mind from the objective to the subjective does not carry with it in the Upani@sads any elaborate philosophical discussions, or subtle analysis of mind. It comes there as a matter of direct perception, and the conviction with which the truth has been grasped cannot fail to impress the readers. That out of the apparently meaningless speculations of the Brahma@nas this doctrine could have developed, might indeed appear to be too improbable to be believed.
On the strength of the stories of Balaki Ga’rgya and Ajatas’atru (B@rh. II. i), S’vetaketu and Pravaha@na Jaibali (Cha. V. 3 and B@rh. VI. 2) and Aru@ni and As’vapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. 11) Garbe thinks “that it can be proven that the Brahman’s profoundest wisdom, the doctrine of All-one, which has exercised an unmistakable influence on the intellectual life even of our time, did not have its origin in the circle of Brahmans at all [Footnote ref 2]” and that “it took its rise in the ranks of the warrior caste [Footnote ref 3].” This if true would of course lead the development of the Upani@sads away from the influence of the Veda, Brahma@nas and the Ara@nyakas. But do the facts prove this? Let us briefly examine the evidences that Garbe himself
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[Footnote 1: Muir’s _Sanskrit Texts_, vol. v. pp. 368, 371.]
[Footnote 2: Garbe’s article, “_Hindu Monism_,” p. 68.]
[Footnote 3: _Ibid._ p. 78.
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self has produced. In the story of Balaki Gargya and Ajatas’atru (B@rh. II. 1) referred to by him, Balaki Gargya is a boastful man who wants to teach the K@sattriya Ajatas’atru the true Brahman, but fails and then wants it to be taught by him. To this Ajatas’atru replies (following Garbe’s own translation) “it is contrary to the natural order that a Brahman receive instruction from a warrior and expect the latter to declare the Brahman to him [Footnote ref l].” Does this not imply that in the natural order of things a Brahmin always taught the knowledge of Brahman to the K@sattriyas, and that it was unusual to find a Brahmin asking a K@sattriya about the true knowledge of Brahman? At the beginning of the conversation, Ajatas’atru had promised to pay Balaki one thousand coins if he could tell him about Brahman, since all people used to run to Janaka to speak about Brahman [Footnote ref 2]. The second story of S’vetaketu and Pravaha@na Jaibali seems to be fairly conclusive with regard to the fact that the transmigration doctrines, the way of the gods (_devayana_) and the way of the fathers (_pit@ryana_) had originated among the K@sattriyas, but it is without any relevancy with regard to the origin of the superior knowledge of Brahman as the true self.
The third story of Aru@ni and As’vapati Kaikeya (Cha. V. 11) is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing to know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddalaka Aru@ni; but as he did not know sufficiently about it he accompanied them to the K@sattriya king As’vapati Kaikeya who was studying the subject. But As’vapati ends the conversation by giving them certain instructions about the fire doctrine (_vaisvanara agni_) and the import of its sacrifices. He does not say anything about the true self as Brahman. We ought also to consider that there are only the few exceptional cases where K@sattriya kings were instructing the Brahmins. But in all other cases the Brahmins were discussing and instructing the atman knowledge. I am thus led to think that Garbe owing to his bitterness of feeling against the Brahmins as expressed in the earlier part of the essay had been too hasty in his judgment. The opinion of Garbe seems to have been shared to some extent by Winternitz also, and the references given by him to the Upani@sad passages are also the same as we
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[Footnote 1: Garbe’s article, “_Hindu Monism_,” p. 74.]
[Footnote 2: B@rh. II., compare also B@rh. IV. 3, how Yajnavalkya speaks to Janaka about the _brahmavidya_.]
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just examined [Footnote ref 1]. The truth seems to me to be this, that the K@sattriyas and even some women took interest in the religio-philosophical quest manifested in the Upani@sads. The enquirers were so eager that either in receiving the instruction of Brahman or in imparting it to others, they had no considerations of sex and birth [Footnote ref 2]; and there seems to be no definite evidence for thinking that the Upani@sad philosophy originated among the K@sattriyas or that the germs of its growth could not be traced in the Brahma@nas and the Ara@nyakas which were the productions of the Brahmins.
The change of the Brahma@na into the Ara@nyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we find in the B@rhadara@nyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth [Footnote ref 3].
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[Footnote 1: Winternitz’s _Geschichte der indischen Litteratur_, I. pp. 197 ff.]
[Footnote 2: The story of Maitryi and Yajnavalikya (B@rh. II. 4) and that of Satyakama son of Jabala and his teacher (Cha. IV. 4).]
[Footnote 3: Cha. V. II.]
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The Uktha (verse) of @Rg-Veda was identified in the Aitareya Ara@nyaka under several allegorical forms with the Pra@na [Footnote ref 1], the Udgitha of the Samaveda was identified with Om, Pra@na, sun and eye; in Chandogya II. the Saman was identified with Om, rain, water, seasons, Pra@na, etc., in Chandogya III. 16-17 man was identified with sacrifice; his hunger, thirst, sorrow, with initiation; laughing, eating, etc., with the utterance of the Mantras; and asceticism, gift, sincerity, restraint from injury, truth, with sacrificial fees (_dak@si@na_). The gifted mind of these cultured Vedic Indians was anxious to come to some unity, but logical precision of thought had not developed, and as a result of that we find in the Ara@nyakas the most grotesque and fanciful unifications of things which to our eyes have little or no connection. Any kind of instrumentality in producing an effect was often considered as pure identity. Thus in Ait. Ara@n. II. 1. 3 we find “Then comes the origin of food. The seed of Prajapati are the gods. The seed of the gods is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done is this man the abode of Brahman [Footnote ref 2].”
The word Brahman according to Saya@na meant mantras (magical verses), the ceremonies, the hot@r priest, the great. Hillebrandt points out that it is spoken of in R.V. as being new, “as not having hitherto existed,” and as “coming into being from the fathers.” It originates from the seat of the @Rta, springs forth at the sound of the sacrifice, begins really to exist when the soma juice is pressed and the hymns are recited at the savana rite, endures with the help of the gods even in battle, and soma is its guardian (R.V. VIII. 37. I, VIII. 69. 9, VI. 23. 5, 1. 47. 2, VII. 22. 9, VI. 52. 3, etc.). On the strength of these Hillebrandt justifies the conjecture of Haug that it signifies a mysterious power which can be called forth by various ceremonies, and his definition of it, as the magical force which is derived from the orderly cooperation of the hymns, the chants and the sacrificial gifts [Footnote ref 3]. I am disposed to think that this meaning is closely connected with the meaning as we find it in many passages in the Ara@nyakas and the Upani@sads. The meaning in many of these seems to be midway between
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[Footnote 1: Ait. Ara@n. II 1-3.]
[Footnote 2: Keith’s _Translation of Aitareya Aranyaka_.]
[Footnote 3: Hillebrandt’s article on Brahman, _E.R.E._.]
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“magical force” and “great,” transition between which is rather easy. Even when the sacrifices began to be replaced by meditations, the old belief in the power of the sacrifices still remained, and as a result of that we find that in many passages of the Upani@sads people are thinking of meditating upon this great force “Brahman” as being identified with diverse symbols, natural objects, parts and functions of the body.
When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its actual performance in the external world to certain forms of meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of bodily functions was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing could be obtained. The fact that these allegorical interpretations of the Pancagnividya are so much referred to in the Upani@sads as a secret doctrine, shows that some people came to think that the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. When the sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the gods were nourished by each man, and as it is unpleasant for a man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for the gods that men should know this great truth. [Footnote ref 1].
In the Kena we find it indicated that all the powers of the gods such as that of Agni (fire) to burn, Vayu (wind) to blow, depended upon Brahman, and that it is through Brahman that all the gods and all the senses of man could work. The whole process of Upani@sad thought shows that the magic power of sacrifices as associated with @Rta (unalterable law) was being abstracted from the sacrifices and conceived as the supreme power. There are many stories in the Upani@sads of the search after the nature of this great power the Brahman, which was at first only imperfectly realized. They identified it with the dominating power of the natural objects of wonder, the sun, the moon, etc. with bodily and mental functions and with various symbolical representations, and deluded themselves for a time with the idea that these were satisfactory. But as these were gradually found inadequate, they came to the final solution, and the doctrine of the inner self of man as being the highest truth the Brahman originated.
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[Footnote 1: B@rh. I. 4. 10.]
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The meaning of the word Upani@sad.
The word Upani@sad is derived from the root _sad_ with the prefix _ni_ (to sit), and Max Muller says that the word originally meant the act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to him. In his introduction to the Upani@sads he says, “The history and the genius of the Sanskrit language leave little doubt that Upani@sad meant originally session, particularly a session consisting of pupils, assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher [Footnote ref 1].” Deussen points out that the word means “secret” or “secret instruction,” and this is borne out by many of the passages of the Upani@sads themselves. Max Muller also agrees that the word was used in this sense in the Upani@sads [Footnote ref 2]. There we find that great injunctions of secrecy are to be observed for the communication of the doctrines, and it is said that it should only be given to a student or pupil who by his supreme moral restraint and noble desires proves himself deserving to hear them. S’ankara however, the great Indian exponent of the Upani@sads, derives the word from the root _sad_ to destroy and supposes that it is so called because it destroys inborn ignorance and leads to salvation by revealing the right knowledge. But if we compare the many texts in which the word Upani@sad occurs in the Upani@sads themselves it seems that Deussen’s meaning is fully justified [Footnote ref 3].
The composition and growth of diverse Upani@sads.
The oldest Upani@sads are written in prose. Next to these we have some in verses very similar to those that are to be found in classical Sanskrit. As is easy to see, the older the Upani@sad the more archaic is it in its language. The earliest Upani@sads have an almost mysterious forcefulness in their expressions at least to Indian ears. They are simple, pithy and penetrate to the heart. We can read and read them over again without getting tired. The lines are always as fresh as ever. As such they have a charm apart from the value of the ideas they intend to convey. The word Upani@sad was used, as we have seen, in the sense of “secret doctrine or instruction”; the Upani@sad teachings were also intended to be conveyed in strictest secrecy to earnest enquirers of high morals and superior self-restraint for the purpose of achieving
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[Footnote 1: Max Muller’s _Translation of the Upanishads, S.B.E._ vol. I.p. lxxxi.]
[Footnote 2: _S. B.E._ vol. I, p lxxxi.]
[Footnote 3: Deussen’s _Philosophy of the Upanishads,_ pp. 10-15.]
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emancipation. It was thus that the Upani@sad style of expression, when it once came into use, came to possess the greatest charm and attraction for earnest religious people; and as a result of that we find that even when other forms of prose and verse had been adapted for the Sanskrit language, the Upani@sad form of composition had not stopped. Thus though the earliest Upani@sads were compiled by 500 B C., they continued to be written even so late as the spread of Mahommedan influence in India. The earliest and most important are probably those that have been commented upon by S’ankara namely B@rhadara@nyaka, Chandogya, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Is’a, Kena, Katha, Pras’na, Mundaka and Mandukya [Footnote ref 1]. It is important to note in this connection that the separate Upani@sads differ much from one another with regard to their content and methods of exposition. Thus while some of them are busy laying great stress upon the monistic doctrine of the self as the only reality, there are others which lay stress upon the practice of Yoga, asceticism, the cult of S’iva, of Visnu and the philosophy or anatomy of the body, and may thus be respectively called the Yoga, S’aiva, Visnu and S’arira Upani@sads. These in all make up the number to one hundred and eight.
Revival of Upani@sad studies in modern times.
How the Upani@sads came to be introduced into Europe is an interesting story Dara Shiko the eldest son of the Emperor Shah Jahan heard of the Upani@sads during his stay in Kashmir in 1640. He invited several Pandits from Benares to Delhi, who undertook the work of translating them into Persian. In 1775 Anquetil Duperron, the discoverer of the Zend Avesta, received a manuscript of it presented to him by his friend Le Gentil, the French resident in Faizabad at the court of Shuja-uddaulah. Anquetil translated it into Latin which was published in 1801-1802. This translation though largely unintelligible was read by Schopenhauer with great enthusiasm. It had, as Schopenhauer himself admits, profoundly influenced his philosophy. Thus he
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[Footnote 1: Deussen supposes that Kausitaki is also one of the earliest. Max Mueller and Schroeder think that Maitray@ani also belongs to the earliest group, whereas Deussen counts it as a comparatively later production. Winternitz divides the Upani@sads into four periods. In the first period he includes B@rhadara@nyaka, Chandogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Kausitaki and Kena. In that second he includes Ka@thaka, Is’a, S’vetas’vatara, Mu@ndaka, Mahanarayana, and in the third period he includes Pras’na, Maitraya@ni and Man@dukya. The rest of the Upani@sads he includes in the fourth period.]
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writes in the preface to his _Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_ [Footnote ref 1], “And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him….I might express the opinion that each one of the individual and disconnected aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the thought I am going to impart, though the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads is by no means the case.” Again, “How does every line display its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every sentence deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit….In the whole world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]” Through Schopenhauer the study of the Upani@sads attracted much attention in Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study of Sanskrit, they found their way into other parts of Europe as well.
The study of the Upani@sads has however gained a great impetus by the earnest attempts of our Ram Mohan Roy who not only translated them into Bengali, Hindi and English and published them at his own expense, but founded the Brahma Samaj in Bengal, the main religious doctrines of which were derived directly from the Upani@sads.
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[Footnote 1: Translation by Haldane and Kemp, vol. I. pp. xii and xiii.]
[Footnote 2: Max Muller says in his introduction to the Upanishada (-_S.B.E._ I p. lxii; see also pp. lx, lxi) “that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as ‘products of the highest wisdom’…that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena, as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour.”]
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The Upani@sads and their interpretations.
Before entering into the philosophy of the Upani@sads it may be worth while to say a few words as to the reason why diverse and even contradictory explanations as to the real import of the Upani@sads had been offered by the great Indian scholars of past times. The Upani@sads, as we have seen, formed the concluding portion of the revealed Vedic literature, and were thus called the Vedanta. It was almost universally believed by the Hindus that the highest truths could only be found in the revelation of the Vedas. Reason was regarded generally as occupying a comparatively subservient place, and its proper use was to be found in its judicious employment in getting out the real meaning of the apparently conflicting ideas of the Vedas. The highest knowledge of ultimate truth and reality was thus regarded as having been once for all declared in the Upani@sads. Reason had only to unravel it in the light of experience. It is important that readers of Hindu philosophy should bear in mind the contrast that it presents to the ruling idea of the modern world that new truths are discovered by reason and experience every day, and even in those cases where the old truths remain, they change their hue and character every day, and that in matters of ultimate truths no finality can ever be achieved; we are to be content only with as much as comes before the purview of our reason and experience at the time. It was therefore thought to be extremely audacious that any person howsoever learned and brilliant he might be should have any right to say anything regarding the highest truths simply on the authority of his own opinion or the reasons that he might offer. In order to make himself heard it was necessary for him to show from the texts of the Upani@sads that they supported him, and that their purport was also the same. Thus it was that most schools of Hindu philosophy found it one of their principal duties to interpret the Upani@sads in order to show that they alone represented the true Vedanta doctrines. Any one who should feel himself persuaded by the interpretations of any particular school might say that in following that school he was following the Vedanta.
The difficulty of assuring oneself that any interpretation is absolutely the right one is enhanced by the fact that germs of diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upani@sads
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which are not worked out in a systematic manner. Thus each interpreter in his turn made the texts favourable to his own doctrines prominent and brought them to the forefront, and tried to repress others or explain them away. But comparing the various systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that the interpretation offered by S’a@nkara very largely represents the view of the general body of the earlier Upani@sad doctrines, though there are some which distinctly foreshadow the doctrines of other systems, but in a crude and germinal form. It is thus that Vedanta is generally associated with the interpretation of S’a@nkara and S’a@nkara’s system of thought is called the Vedanta system, though there are many other systems which put forth their claim as representing the true Vedanta doctrines.
Under these circumstances it is necessary that a modern interpreter of the Upani@sads should turn a deaf ear to the absolute claims of these exponents, and look upon the Upani@sads not as a systematic treatise but as a repository of diverse currents of thought–the melting pot in which all later philosophic ideas were still in a state of fusion, though the monistic doctrine of S’a@nkara, or rather an approach thereto, may be regarded as the purport of by far the largest majority of the texts. It will be better that a modern interpreter should not agree to the claims of the ancients that all the Upani@sads represent a connected system, but take the texts independently and separately and determine their meanings, though keeping an attentive eye on the context in which they appear. It is in this way alone that we can detect the germs of the thoughts of other Indian systems in the Upani@sads, and thus find in them the earliest records of those tendencies of thoughts.
The quest after Brahman: the struggle and the failures.
The fundamental idea which runs through the early Upani@sads is that underlying the exterior world of change there is an unchangeable reality which is identical with that which underlies the essence in man [Footnote ref 1]. If we look at Greek philosophy in Parmenides or Plato or at modern philosophy in Kant, we find the same tendency towards glorifying one unspeakable entity as the reality or the essence. I have said above that the Upani@sads are
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[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 4. 5. 22.
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no systematic treatises of a single hand, but are rather collations or compilations of floating monologues, dialogues or anecdotes. There are no doubt here and there simple discussions but there is no pedantry or gymnastics of logic. Even the most casual reader cannot but be struck with the earnestness and enthusiasm of the sages. They run from place to place with great eagerness in search of a teacher competent to instruct them about the nature of Brahman. Where is Brahman? What is his nature?
We have noticed that during the closing period of the Sa@mhita there were people who had risen to the conception of a single creator and controller of the universe, variously called Prajapati, Vis’vakarman, Puru@sa, Brahma@naspati and Brahman. But this divine controller was yet only a deity. The search as to the nature of this deity began in the Upani@sads. Many visible objects of nature such as the sun or the wind on one hand and the various psychological functions in man were tried, but none could render satisfaction to the great ideal that had been aroused. The sages in the Upani@sad had already started with the idea that there was a supreme controller or essence presiding over man and the universe. But what was its nature? Could it be identified with any of the deities of Nature, was it a new deity or was it no deity at all? The Upani@sads present to us the history of this quest and the results that were achieved.
When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not yet gone out of the Ara@nyaka ideas and of symbolic (_pratika_) forms of worship. _Pra@na_ (vital breath) was regarded as the most essential function for the life of man, and many anecdotes are related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the eye or ear, and that on it all other functions depend. This recognition of the superiority of pra@na brings us to the meditations on pra@na as Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting characters of omnipresence and eternality _akas’a_ (space) is meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and Aditya (sun) are meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading Vayu, or the sun and the immaterial representation as akas’a, manas or pra@na, we find also the various kinds of meditations as substitutes for actual sacrifice. Thus it is that there was an earnest quest after the discovery of Brahman. We find a stratum of thought
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which shows that the sages were still blinded by the old ritualistic associations, and though meditation had taken the place of sacrifice yet this was hardly adequate for the highest attainment of Brahman.
Next to the failure of the meditations we have to notice the history of the search after Brahman in which the sages sought to identify Brahman with the presiding deity of the sun, moon, lightning, ether, wind, fire, water, etc., and failed; for none of these could satisfy the ideal they cherished of Brahman. It is indeed needless here to multiply these examples, for they are tiresome not only in this summary treatment but in the original as well. They are of value only in this that they indicate how toilsome was the process by which the old ritualistic associations could be got rid of; what struggles and failures the sages had to undergo before they reached a knowledge of the true nature of Brahman.
Unknowability of Brahman and the Negative Method.
It is indeed true that the magical element involved in the discharge of sacrificial duties lingered for a while in the symbolic worship of Brahman in which He was conceived almost as a deity. The minds of the Vedic poets so long accustomed to worship deities of visible manifestation could not easily dispense with the idea of seeking after a positive and definite content of Brahman. They tried some of the sublime powers of nature and also many symbols, but these could not render ultimate satisfaction. They did not know what the Brahman was like, for they had only a dim and dreamy vision of it in the deep craving of their souls which could not be translated into permanent terms. But this was enough to lead them on to the goal, for they could not be satisfied with anything short of the highest.
They found that by whatever means they tried to give a positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, they failed. Positive definitions were impossible. They could not point out what the Brahman was like in order to give an utterance to that which was unutterable, they could only say that it was not like aught that we find in experience. Yajnavalkya said “He the atman is not this, nor this (_neti neti_). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke
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of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury [Footnote ref 1].” He is _asat_, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the unlimited, the basis of all. “That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (_mahat_), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death [Footnote ref 2].” Space, time and causality do not appertain to him, for he at once forms their essence and transcends them. He is the infinite and the vast, yet the smallest of the small, at once here as there, there as here; no characterisation of him is possible, otherwise than by the denial to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions. He is independent of all limitations of space, time, and cause which rules all that is objectively presented, and therefore the empirical universe. When Bahva was questioned by Va@skali, he expounded the nature of Brahman to him by maintaining silence–“Teach me,” said Va@skali, “most reverent sir, the nature of Brahman.” Bahva however remained silent. But when the question was put forth a second or third time he answered, “I teach you indeed but you do not understand; the Atman is silence [Footnote ref 3].” The way to indicate it is thus by _neti neti_, it is not this, it is not this. We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited by conceptual thought.
The Atman doctrine.
The sum and substance of the Upani@sad teaching is involved in the equation Atman=Brahman. We have already seen that the word Atman was used in the @Rg-Veda to denote on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other the vital breath in man. Later on in the Upani@sads we see that the word Brahman is generally used in the former sense, while the word Atman is reserved to denote the inmost essence in man, and the
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[Footnote 1: B@rh. IV. 5. 15. Deussen, Max Muller and Roer have all misinterpreted this passage; _asito_ has been interpreted as an adjective or participle, though no evidence has ever been adduced; it is evidently the ablative of _asi_, a sword.]
[Footnote 2: Ka@tha III. 15.]
[Footnote 3: Sa@nkara on _Brahmasutra_, III. 2. 17, and also Deussen, _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 156.]
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Upani@sads are emphatic in their declaration that the two are one and the same. But what is the inmost essence of man? The self of man involves an ambiguity, as it is used in a variety of senses. Thus so far as man consists of the essence of food (i.e. the physical parts of man) he is called _annamaya_. But behind the sheath of this body there is the other self consisting of the vital breath which is called the self as vital breath (_pra@namaya atman_). Behind this again there is the other self “consisting of will” called the _manomaya atman_. This again contains within it the self “consisting of consciousness” called the _vijnanamaya atman_. But behind it we come to the final essence the self as pure bliss (the _anandamaya atman_). The texts say: “Truly he is the rapture; for whoever gets this rapture becomes blissful. For who could live, who could breathe if this space (_akas’a_) was not bliss? For it is he who behaves as bliss. For whoever in that Invisible, Self-surpassing, Unspeakable, Supportless finds fearless support, he really becomes fearless. But whoever finds even a slight difference, between himself and this Atman there is fear for him [Footnote ref 1].”
Again in another place we find that Prajapati said: “The self (_atman_) which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations are true, that is to be searched for, that is to be enquired; he gets all his desires and all worlds who knows that self [Footnote ref 2].” The gods and the demons on hearing of this sent Indra and Virocana respectively as their representatives to enquire of this self from Prajapati. He agreed to teach them, and asked them to look into a vessel of water and tell him how much of self they could find. They answered: “We see, this our whole self, even to the hair, and to the nails.” And he said, “Well, that is the self, that is the deathless and the fearless, that is the Brahman.” They went away pleased, but Prajapati thought, “There they go away, without having discovered, without having realized the self.” Virocana came away with the conviction that the body was the self; but Indra did not return back to the gods, he was afraid and pestered with doubts and came back to Prajapati and said, “just as the self becomes decorated when the body is decorated, well-dressed when the body is well-dressed, well-cleaned when the body is well-cleaned, even so that image self will be blind when the body is blind, injured in one eye when the body is injured in one eye, and mutilated when the body is mutilated, and it perishes
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[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7.]
[Footnote 2: Cha. VIII. 7. 1.]
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when the body perishes, therefore I can see no good in this theory.” Prajapati then gave him a higher instruction about the self, and said, “He who goes about enjoying dreams, he is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman.” Indra departed but was again disturbed with doubts, and was afraid and came back and said “that though the dream self does not become blind when the body is blind, or injured in one eye when the body is so injured and is not affected by its defects, and is not killed by its destruction, but yet it is as if it was overwhelmed, as if it suffered and as if it wept–in this I see no good.” Prajapati gave a still higher instruction: “When a man, fast asleep, in total contentment, does not know any dreams, this is the self, this is the deathless, the fearless, this is Brahman.” Indra departed but was again filled with doubts on the way, and returned again and said “the self in deep sleep does not know himself, that I am this, nor does he know any other existing objects. He is destroyed and lost. I see no good in this.” And now Prajapati after having given a course of successively higher instructions as self as the body, as the self in dreams and as the self in deep dreamless sleep, and having found that the enquirer in each case could find out that this was not the ultimate truth about the self that he was seeking, ultimately gave him the ultimate and final instruction about the full truth about the self, and said “this body is the support of the deathless and the bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected by pleasure and pain, the self when associated with the body cannot get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless self [Footnote ref 1].”
As the anecdote shows, they sought such a constant and unchangeable essence in man as was beyond the limits of any change. This inmost essence has sometimes been described as pure subject-object-less consciousness, the reality, and the bliss. He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour; as in truth this Atman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than
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[Footnote 1: Cha. VIII. 7-12.]
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son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest _par excellence_, our inmost Atman. All limitation is fraught with pain; it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (_akas’a_)? It is he who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable one, then has he attained peace.
Place of Brahman in the Upani@sads.
There is the atman not in man alone but in all objects of the universe, the sun, the moon, the world; and Brahman is this atman. There is nothing outside the atman, and therefore there is no plurality at all. As from a lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, as from an ingot of black iron all that is made of black iron is known, so when this atman the Brahman is known everything else is known. The essence in man and the essence of the universe are one and the same, and it is Brahman.
Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and smell. But we must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent so much a conceptional system of philosophy as visions of the seers who are possessed by the spirit of this Brahman. They do not notice even the contradiction between the Brahman as unity and nature in its diversity. When the empirical aspect of diversity attracts their notice, they affirm it and yet declare that it is all Brahman. From Brahman it has come forth and to it will it return. He has himself created it out of himself and then entered into it as its inner controller (_antaryamin_). Here is thus a glaring dualistic trait of the world of matter and Brahman as its controller, though in other places we find it asserted most emphatically that these are but names and forms, and when Brahman is known everything else is known. No attempts at reconciliation are made for the sake of the consistency of conceptual utterance, as S’a@nkara the great professor of Vedanta does by explaining away the dualistic texts. The universe is said to be a reality, but the real in it is Brahman alone. It is on account of Brahman that the fire burns and the wind blows. He is the active principle in the entire universe, and yet the most passive and unmoved. The
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world is his body, yet he is the soul within. “He creates all, wills all, smells all, tastes all, he has pervaded all, silent and unaffected [Footnote ref 1].” He is below, above, in the back, in front, in the south and in the north, he is all this [Footnote ref 2].” These rivers in the east and in the west originating from the ocean, return back into it and become the ocean themselves, though they do not know that they are so. So also all these people coming into being from the Being do not know that they have come from the Being…That which is the subtlest that is the self, that is all this, the truth, that self thou art O S’vetaketu [Footnote ref 3].” “Brahman,” as Deussen points out, “was regarded as the cause antecedent in time, and the universe as the effect proceeding from it; the inner dependence of the universe on Brahman and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman.” Thus it is said in Mund. I.I. 7:
As a spider ejects and retracts (the threads), As the plants shoot forth on the earth, As the hairs on the head and body of the living man, So from the imperishable all that is here. As the sparks from the well-kindled fire, In nature akin to it, spring forth in their thousands, So, my dear sir, from the imperishable
Living beings of many kinds go forth, And again return into him [Footnote ref 4].
Yet this world principle is the dearest to us and the highest teaching of the Upani@sads is “That art thou.”
Again the growth of the doctrine that Brahman is the “inner controller” in all the parts and forces of nature and of mankind as the atman thereof, and that all the effects of the universe are the result of his commands which no one can outstep, gave rise to a theistic current of thought in which Brahman is held as standing aloof as God and controlling the world. It is by his ordaining, it is said, that the sun and moon are held together, and the sky and earth stand held together [Footnote ref 5]. God and soul are distinguished again in the famous verse of S’vetas’vatara [Footnote ref 6]:
Two bright-feathered bosom friends
Flit around one and the same tree; One of them tastes the sweet berries,
The other without eating merely gazes down.
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[Footnote 1: Cha. III. 14. 4.]
[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ VII. 25. i; also Mu@n@daka II. 2. ii.]
[Footnote 3: Cha. VI. 10.]
[Footnote 4: Deussen’s translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 164.]
[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. i.]
[Footnote 6: S’vetas’vatara IV. 6, and Mu@n@daka III. i, 1, also Deussen’s translation in _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 177.]
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But in spite of this apparent theistic tendency and the occasional use of the word _Is’a_ or _Is’ana_, there seems to be no doubt that theism in its true sense was never prominent, and this acknowledgement of a supreme Lord was also an offshoot of the exalted position of the atman as the supreme principle. Thus we read in Kau@sitaki Upani@sad 3. 9, “He is not great by good deeds nor low by evil deeds, but it is he makes one do good deeds whom he wants to raise, and makes him commit bad deeds whom he wants to lower down. He is the protector of the universe, he is the master of the world and the lord of all; he is my soul (_atman_).” Thus the lord in spite of his greatness is still my soul. There are again other passages which regard Brahman as being at once immanent and transcendent. Thus it is said that there is that eternally existing tree whose roots grow upward and whose branches grow downward. All the universes are supported in it and no one can transcend it. This is that, “…from its fear the fire burns, the sun shines, and from its fear Indra, Vayu and Death the fifth (with the other two) run on [Footnote ref 1].”
If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman in the Upani@sads and look to the main currents, we find that the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the Atman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that identifies the universe with the Atman or Brahman. The third current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord controlling the world. It is because these ideas were still in the melting pot, in which none of them were systematically worked out, that the later exponents of Vedanta, S’a@nkara, Ramanuja, and others quarrelled over the meanings of texts in order to develop a consistent systematic philosophy out of them. Thus it is that the doctrine of Maya which is slightly hinted at once in B@rhadara@nyaka and thrice in S’vetas’vatara, becomes the foundation of S’a@nkara’s philosophy of the Vedanta in which Brahman alone is real and all else beside him is unreal [Footnote ref 2].
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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. 6. 1 and 3.]
[Footnote 2: B@rh. II. 5. 19, S’vet. I. 10, IV. 9, 10.]
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The World.
We have already seen that the universe has come out of Brahman, has its essence in Brahman, and will also return back to it. But in spite of its existence as Brahman its character as represented to experience could not be denied. S’a@nkara held that the Upani@sads referred to the external world and accorded a reality to it consciously with the purpose of treating it as merely relatively real, which will eventually appear as unreal as soon as the ultimate truth, the Brahman, is known. This however remains to be modified to this extent that the sages had not probably any conscious purpose of according a relative reality to the phenomenal world, but in spite of regarding Brahman as the highest reality they could not ignore the claims of the exterior world, and had to accord a reality to it. The inconsistency of this reality of the phenomenal world with the ultimate and only reality of Brahman was attempted to be reconciled by holding that this world is not beside him but it has come out of him, it is maintained in him and it will return back to him.
The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether plants, animals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be many created fire (_tejas_), water (_ap_) and earth (_k@siti_). Then the self-existent Brahman entered into these three, and it is by their combination that all other bodies are formed [Footnote ref 2]. So all other things are produced as a result of an alloying or compounding of the parts of these three together. In this theory of the threefold division of the primitive elements lies the earliest germ of the later distinction (especially in the Sa@mkhya school) of pure infinitesimal substances (_tanmatra_) and gross elements, and the theory that each gross substance is composed of the atoms of the primary elements. And in Pras’na IV. 8 we find the gross elements distinguished from their subtler natures, e.g. earth (_p@rthivi_), and the subtler state of earth (_p@rthivimatra_). In the Taittiriya, II. 1, however, ether (_akas’a_) is also described as proceeding from Brahman, and the other elements, air, fire, water, and earth, are described as each proceeding directly from the one which directly preceded it.
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[Footnote 1: Cha. VI.11.]
[Footnote 2: _ibid._ VI.2,3,4.]
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The World-Soul.
The conception of a world-soul related to the universe as the soul of man to his body is found for the first time in R.V.X. 121. I, where he is said to have sprung forth as the firstborn of creation from the primeval waters. This being has twice been referred to in the S’vetas’vatara, in III. 4 and IV. 12. It is indeed very strange that this being is not referred to in any of the earlier Upani@sads. In the two passages in which he has been spoken of, his mythical character is apparent. He is regarded as one of the earlier products in the process of cosmic creation, but his importance from the point of view of the development of the theory of Brahman or Atman is almost nothing. The fact that neither the Puru@sa, nor the Vis’vakarma, nor the Hira@nyagarbha played an important part in the earlier development of the Upani@sads leads me to think that the Upani@sad doctrines were not directly developed from the monotheistic tendencies of the later @Rg-Veda speculations. The passages in S’vetas’vatara clearly show how from the supreme eminence that he had in R.V.X. 121, Hira@nyagarbha had been brought to the level of one of the created beings. Deussen in explaining the philosophical significance of the Hira@nyagarbha doctrine of the Upani@sads says that the “entire objective universe is possible only in so far as it is sustained by a knowing subject. This subject as a sustainer of the objective universe is manifested in all individual objects but is by no means identical with them. For the individual objects pass away but the objective universe continues to exist without them; there exists therefore the eternal knowing subject also (_hira@nyagarbha_) by whom it is sustained. Space and time are derived from this subject. It is itself accordingly not in space and does not belong to time, and therefore from an empirical point of view it is in general non-existent; it has no empirical but only a metaphysical reality [Footnote ref 1].” This however seems to me to be wholly irrelevant, since the Hira@nyagarbha doctrine cannot be supposed to have any philosophical importance in the Upani@sads.
The Theory of Causation.
There was practically no systematic theory of causation in the Upani@sads. S’a@nkara, the later exponent of Vedanta philosophy, always tried to show that the Upani@sads looked upon the cause
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[Footnote 1: Deussen’s _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 201.]
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as mere ground of change which though unchanged in itself in reality had only an appearance of suffering change. This he did on the strength of a series of examples in the Chandogya Upani@sad (VI. 1) in which the material cause, e.g. the clay, is spoken of as the only reality in all its transformations as the pot, the jug or the plate. It is said that though there are so many diversities of appearance that one is called the plate, the other the pot, and the other the jug, yet these are only empty distinctions of name and form, for the only thing real in them is the earth which in its essence remains ever the same whether you call it the pot, plate, or Jug. So it is that the ultimate cause, the unchangeable Brahman, remains ever constant, though it may appear to suffer change as the manifold world outside. This world is thus only an unsubstantial appearance, a mirage imposed upon Brahman, the real _par excellence_.
It seems however that though such a view may be regarded as having been expounded in the Upani@sads in an imperfect manner, there is also side by side the other view which looks upon the effect as the product of a real change wrought in the cause itself through the action and combination of the elements of diversity in it. Thus when the different objects of nature have been spoken of in one place as the product of the combination of the three elements fire, water and earth, the effect signifies a real change produced by their compounding. This is in germ (as we shall see hereafter) the Pari@nama theory of causation advocated by the Sa@mkhya school [Footnote ref 1].
Doctrine of Transmigration.
When the Vedic people witnessed the burning of a dead body they supposed that the eye of the man went to the sun, his breath to the wind, his speech to the fire, his limbs to the different parts of the universe. They also believed as we have already seen in the recompense of good and bad actions in worlds other than our own, and though we hear of such things as the passage of the human soul into trees, etc., the tendency towards transmigration had but little developed at the time.
In the Upani@sads however we find a clear development in the direction of transmigration in two distinct stages. In the one the Vedic idea of a recompense in the other world is combined with
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[Footnote 1: Cha. VI. 2-4.]
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the doctrine of transmigration, whereas in the other the doctrine of transmigration comes to the forefront in supersession of the idea of a recompense in the other world. Thus it is said that those who performed charitable deeds or such public works as the digging of wells, etc., follow after death the way of the fathers (_pit@ryana_), in which the soul after death enters first into smoke, then into night, the dark half of the month, etc., and at last reaches the moon; after a residence there as long as the remnant of his good deeds remains he descends again through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, herbage, food and seed, and through the assimilation of food by man he enters the womb of the mother and is born again. Here we see that the soul had not only a recompense in the world of the moon, but was re-born again in this world [Footnote ref 1].
The other way is the way of gods (_devayana_), meant for those who cultivate faith and asceticism (_tapas_). These souls at death enter successively into flame, day, bright half of the month, bright half of the year, sun, moon, lightning, and then finally into Brahman never to return. Deussen says that “the meaning of the whole is that the soul on the way of the gods reaches regions of ever-increasing light, in which is concentrated all that is bright and radiant as stations on the way to Brahman the ‘light of lights'” (_jyoti@sa@m jyoti@h_) [Footnote ref 2].
The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine of transmigration unmixed with the idea of reaping the fruits of his deeds (_karma_) by passing through the other worlds and without reference to the doctrine of the ways of the fathers and gods, the _Yanas_. Thus Yajnavalkya says, “when the soul becomes weak (apparent weakness owing to the weakness of the body with which it is associated) and falls into a swoon as it were, these senses go towards it. It (Soul) takes these light particles within itself and centres itself only in the heart. Thus when the person in the eye turns back, then the soul cannot know colour; (the senses) become one (with him); (people about him) say he does not see; (the senses) become one (with him), he does not smell, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not taste, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not speak, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not hear, (the senses) become one (with him), he does not think, (the senses) become one with him, he does not touch, (the senses) become one with him, he does not know, they say. The
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[Footnote 1: Cha. V. 10.]
[Footnote 2: Deussen’s _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 335.]
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tip of his heart shines and by that shining this soul goes out. When he goes out either through the eye, the head, or by any other part of the body, the vital function (_pra@na_) follows and all the senses follow the vital function (_pra@na_) in coming out. He is then with determinate consciousness and as such he comes out. Knowledge, the deeds as well as previous experience (_prajna_) accompany him. Just as a caterpillar going to the end of a blade of grass, by undertaking a separate movement collects itself, so this self after destroying this body, removing ignorance, by a separate movement collects itself. Just as a goldsmith taking a small bit of gold, gives to it a newer and fairer form, so the soul after destroying this body and removing ignorance fashions a newer and fairer form as of the Pit@rs, the Gandharvas, the gods, of Prajapati or Brahma or of any other being….As he acts and behaves so he becomes, good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds, virtuous by virtuous deeds and vicious by vice. The man is full of desires. As he desires so he wills, as he wills so he works, as the work is done so it happens. There is also a verse, being attached to that he wants to gain by karma that to which he was attached. Having reaped the full fruit (lit. gone to the end) of the karma that he does here, he returns back to this world for doing karma [Footnote ref 1]. So it is the case with those who have desires. He who has no desires, who had no desires, who has freed himself from all desires, is satisfied in his desires and in himself, his senses do not go out. He being Brahma attains Brahmahood. Thus the verse says, when all the desires that are in his heart are got rid of, the mortal becomes immortal and attains Brahma here” (B@rh. IV. iv. 1-7).
A close consideration of the above passage shows that the self itself destroyed the body and built up a newer and fairer frame by its own activity when it reached the end of the present life. At the time of death, the self collected within itself all senses and faculties and after death all its previous knowledge, work and experience accompanied him. The falling off of the body at the time of death is only for the building of a newer body either in this world or in the other worlds. The self which thus takes rebirth is regarded as an aggregation of diverse categories. Thus it is said that “he is of the essence of understanding,
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[Footnote 1: It is possible that there is a vague and obscure reference here to the doctrine that the fruits of our deeds are reaped in other worlds.]
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of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of the essence of the five elements (which would make up the physical body in accordance with its needs) or the essence of desires, of the essence of restraint of desires, of the essence of anger, of the essence of turning off from all anger, of the essence of dharma, of the essence of adharma, of the essence of all that is this (manifest) and that is that (unmanifest or latent)” (B@rh. IV. iv. 5). The self that undergoes rebirth is thus a unity not only of moral and psychological tendencies, but also of all the elements which compose the physical world. The whole process of his changes follows from this nature of his; for whatever he desires, he wills and whatever he wills he acts, and in accordance with his acts the fruit happens. The whole logic of the genesis of karma and its fruits is held up within him, for he is a unity of the moral and psychological tendencies on the one hand and elements of the physical world on the other.
The self that undergoes rebirth being a combination of diverse psychological and moral tendencies and the physical elements holds within itself the principle of all its transformations. The root of all this is the desire of the self and the consequent fruition of it through will and act. When the self continues to desire and act, it reaps the fruit and comes again to this world for performing acts. This world is generally regarded as the field for performing karma, whereas other worlds are regarded as places where the fruits of karma are reaped by those born as celestial beings. But there is no emphasis in the Upani@sads on this point. The Pit@ryana theory is not indeed given up, but it seems only to form a part in the larger scheme of rebirth in other worlds and sometimes in this world too. All the course of these rebirths is effected by the self itself by its own desires, and if it ceases to desire, it suffers no rebirth and becomes immortal. The most distinctive feature of this doctrine is this, that it refers to desires as the cause of rebirth and not karma. Karma only comes as the connecting link between desires and rebirth–for it is said that whatever a man desires he wills, and whatever he wills he acts.
Thus it is said in another place “he who knowingly desires is born by his desires in those places (accordingly), but for him whose desires have been fulfilled and who has realized himself, all his desires vanish here” (Mu@n@d III. 2. 2). This destruction of desires is effected by the right knowledge of the self. “He who knows
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his self as ‘I am the person’ for what wish and for what desire will he trouble the body,…even being here if we know it, well if we do not, what a great destruction” (B@rh. IV. iv. 12 and 14). “In former times the wise men did not desire sons, thinking what shall we do with sons since this our self is the universe” (B@rh. IV. iv. 22). None of the complexities of the karma doctrine which we find later on in more recent developments of Hindu thought can be found in the Upani@sads. The whole scheme is worked out on the principle of desire (_kama_) and karma only serves as the link between it and the actual effects desired and willed by the person.
It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently with the idea that desires (_kama_) led to rebirth, we find that in some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a woman as a result of desires is considered as the first birth of man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth elsewhere after death is regarded as the third birth. Thus it is said, “It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is but the semen which is produced as the essence of all parts of his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put in a woman, that is his first birth. That embryo then becomes part of the woman’s self like any part of her body; it therefore does not hurt her; she protects and develops the embryo within herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be protected. It is the woman who bears the embryo (before birth) but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he is taking care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This is his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his after realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going away he is born again that is his third birth” (Aitareya, II. 1-4) [Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads to the sex-desire or the desire for a son; for, being called kama, whatever was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the desire for money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh. IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as any other desire.
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[Footnote 1: See also Kau@sitaki, II. 15.]
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Emancipation.
The doctrine which next attracts our attention in this connection is that of emancipation (_mukti_). Already we know that the doctrine of Devayana held that those who were faithful and performed asceticism (_tapas_) went by the way of the gods through successive stages never to return to the world and suffer rebirth. This could be contrasted with the way of the fathers (_pit@ryana_) where the dead were for a time recompensed in another world and then had to suffer rebirth. Thus we find that those who are faithful and perform _s’raddha_ had a distinctly different type of goal from those who performed ordinary virtues, such as those of a general altruistic nature. This distinction attains its fullest development in the doctrine of emancipation. Emancipation or Mukti means in the Upani@sads the state of infiniteness that a man attains when he knows his own self and thus becomes Brahman. The ceaseless course of transmigration is only for those who are ignorant. The wise man however who has divested himself of all passions and knows himself to be Brahman, at once becomes Brahman and no bondage of any kind can ever affect him.
He who beholds that loftiest and deepest, For him the fetters of the heart break asunder, For him all doubts are solved,
And his works become nothingness [Footnote ref 1].
The knowledge of the self reveals the fact that all our passions and antipathies, all our limitations of experience, all that is ignoble and small in us, all that is transient and finite in us is false. We “do not know” but are “pure knowledge” ourselves. We are not limited by anything, for we are the infinite; we do not suffer death, for we are immortal. Emancipation thus is not a new acquisition, product, an effect, or result of any action, but it always exists as the Truth of our nature. We are always emancipated and always free. We do not seem to be so and seem to suffer rebirth and thousands of other troubles only because we do not know the true nature of our self. Thus it is that the true knowledge of self does not lead to emancipation but is emancipation itself. All sufferings and limitations are true only so long as we do not know our self. Emancipation is the natural and only goal of man simply because it represents the true nature and essence of man. It is the realization of our own nature that
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[Footnote 1: Deussen’s _Philosophy of the Upanishads_, p. 352.]
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is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha Upani@sad that Yama, the lord of death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his father Gautama was offended with him, said, “O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget his anger against me.” This being granted Naciketas asked the second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be made known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, “There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death of man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know instructed by thee. This is my third boon.” Yama said, “It was inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not compel me to this.” Naciketas said, “Even by the gods was it inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not easy to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like thee. There is no other boon like this.” Yama said, “Choose sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of cattle; choose elephants and gold and horses; choose the wide expanded earth, and live thyself as many years as thou wishest. Or if thou knowest a boon like this choose it together with wealth and far-extending life. Be a king on the wide earth. I will make thee the enjoyer of all desires. All those desires that are difficult to gain in the world of mortals, all those ask thou at thy pleasure; those fair nymphs with their chariots, with their musical instruments; the like of them are not to be gained by men. I will give them to thee, but do not ask the question regarding death.” Naciketas replied, “All those enjoyments are of to-morrow and they only weaken the senses. All life is short, with thee the dance and song. Man cannot be satisfied with wealth, we could obtain wealth, as long as we did not reach you we live only as long as thou pleasest. The boon which I choose I have said.” Yama said, “One thing is good, another is pleasant. Blessed is he who takes the good, but he who chooses the pleasant loses the object of man. But thou considering the objects of desire, hast abandoned them. These two, ignorance (whose object is
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what is pleasant) and knowledge (whose object is what is good), are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. Believing that this world exists and not the other, the careless youth is subject to my sway. That knowledge which thou hast asked is not to be obtained by argument. I know worldly happiness is transient for that firm one is not to be obtained by what is not firm. The wise by concentrating on the soul, knowing him whom it is hard to behold, leaves both grief and joy. Thee O Naciketas, I believe to be like a house whose door is open to Brahman. Brahman is deathless, whoever knows him obtains whatever he wishes. The wise man is not born; he does not die; he is not produced from anywhere. Unborn, eternal, the soul is not slain, though the body is slain; subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, sitting it goes far, lying it goes everywhere. Thinking the soul as unbodily among bodies, firm among fleeting things, the wise man casts off all grief. The soul cannot be gained by eloquence, by understanding, or by learning. It can be obtained by him alone whom it chooses. To him it reveals its own nature [Footnote ref 1].” So long as the Self identifies itself with its desires, he wills and acts according to them and reaps the fruits in the present and in future lives. But when he comes to know the highest truth about himself, that he is the highest essence and principle of the universe, the immortal and the infinite, he ceases to have desires, and receding from all desires realizes the ultimate truth of himself in his own infinitude. Man is as it were the epitome of the universe and he holds within himself the fine constituents of the gross body (_annamaya ko@sa_), the vital functions (_pra@namaya ko@sa_) of life, the will and desire (_manomaya_) and the thoughts and ideas (_vijnanamaya_), and so long as he keeps himself in these spheres and passes through a series of experiences in the present life and in other lives to come, these experiences are willed by him and in that sense created by him. He suffers pleasures and pains, disease and death. But if he retires from these into his true unchangeable being, he is in a state where he is one with his experience and there is no change and no movement. What this state is cannot be explained by the use of concepts. One could only indicate it by pointing out that it is not any of those concepts found in ordinary knowledge; it is not
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[Footnote 1: Ka@tha II. The translation is not continuous. There are some parts in the extract which may be differently interpreted.]
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whatever one knows as this and this (_neti neti_). In this infinite and true self there is no difference, no diversity, no _meum_ and _tuum_. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in water. “Just as a lump of salt when put in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately but in whatever portion of water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitreyi, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of pure intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal knowledge” (B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the processes of our phenomenal existences, but ultimately when it retires back to itself, it can no longer be found in them. It is a state of absolute infinitude of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS
OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
In what Sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?
It is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written. In Europe from the earliest times, thinkers came one after another and offered their independent speculations on philosophy. The work of a modern historian consists in chronologically arranging these views and in commenting upon the influence of one school upon another or upon the general change from time to time in the tides and currents of philosophy. Here in India, however, the principal systems of philosophy had their beginning in times of which we have but scanty record, and it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many divergent systems at so early a period, for in all probability these were formulated just after the earliest Upani@sads had been composed or arranged.
The systematic treatises were written in short and pregnant half-sentences (_sutras_) which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted. It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject. It is indeed difficult to guess from the sutras the extent of their significance, or how far the discussions which they gave rise to in later days were originally intended by them. The sutras of the Vedanta system, known as the S’ariraka-sutras or Brahma-sutras of Badaraya@na for example were of so ambiguous a nature that they gave rise to more than half a dozen divergent interpretations, each one of which claimed to be the only faithful one. Such was the high esteem and respect in which these writers of the sutras were held by later writers that whenever they had any new speculations to
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offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of the existing systems, and put down as faithful interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of these systems upon scholars that all the orthodox teachers since the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or other of these schools. Their pupils were thus naturally brought up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence of their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an example, the Nyaya system of philosophy consisting of a number of half-sentences or sutras is attributed to Gautama, also called Ak@sapada. The earliest commentary on these sutras, called the _Vatsyayana bha@sya_, was written by Vatsyayana. This work was sharply criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnaga, and to answer these criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this commentary called the _Bha@syavattika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original force of this work was lost, and it failed to maintain the old dignity of the school. At this Vacaspati Mis’ra wrote a commentary called _Varttika-tatparya@tika_ on this second commentary, where he tried to refute all objections against the Nyaya system made by other rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called _Nyaya-tatparya@tika_, had another commentary called _Nyaya-tatparya@tika-paris’uddhi_ written by the great Udayana. This commentary had another commentary called _Nyaya-nibandha-prakas’a_ written by Varddhamana the son of the illustrious Ga@nges’a. This again had another commentary called _Varddha-manendu_ upon it by Padmanabha Mis’ra, and this again had another named _Nyaya-tatparyama@n@dana_ by S’a@nkara Mis’ra. The names of Vatsyayana, Vacaspati, and Udayana are indeed very great, but even they contented themselves by writing commentaries on commentaries, and did not try to formulate any
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[Footnote 1: I have preferred to spell Di@nnaga after Vacaspati’s _Tatparyatika_ (p. I) and not Dignnaga as it is generally spelt.]
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original system. Even S’a@nkara, probably the greatest man of India after Buddha, spent his life in writing commentaries on the _Brahma-sutras_, the Upani@sads, and the _Bhagavadgita_.
As a system passed on it had to meet unexpected opponents and troublesome criticisms for which it was not in the least prepared. Its adherents had therefore to use all their ingenuity and subtlety in support of their own positions, and to discover the defects of the rival schools that attacked them. A system as it was originally formulated in the sutras had probably but few problems to solve, but as it fought its way in the teeth of opposition of other schools, it had to offer consistent opinions on other problems in which the original views were more or less involved but to which no attention had been given before.
The contributions of the successive commentators served to make each system more and more complete in all its parts, and stronger and stronger to enable it to hold its own successfully against the opposition and attacks of the rival schools. A system in the sutras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessity that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole [Footnote ref 1]. In the history of Indian philosophy we have no place for systems which had their importance only so long as they lived and were then forgotten or remembered only as targets of criticism. Each system grew and developed by the untiring energy of its adherents through all the successive ages of history, and a history of this growth is a history of its conflicts. No study of any Indian system is therefore adequate unless it is taken throughout all the growth it attained by the work of its champions, the commentators whose selfless toil for it had kept it living through the ages of history.
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[Footnote 1: In the case of some systems it is indeed possible to suggest one or two earlier phases of the system, but this principle cannot be carried all through, for the supplementary information and arguments given by the later commentators often appear as harmonious elaborations of the earlier writings and are very seldom in conflict with them.]
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Growth of the Philosophic Literature.
It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know that a spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the earliest Upani@sads. The spirit of that enquiry was that the final essence or truth was the atman, that a search after it was our highest duty, and that until we are ultimately merged in it we can only feel this truth and remain uncontented with everything else and say that it is not the truth we want, it is not the truth we want (_neti neti_). Philosophical enquires were however continuing in circles other than those of the Upani@sads. Thus the Buddha who closely followed the early Upani@sad period, spoke of and enumerated sixty-two kinds of heresies [Footnote ref 1], and these can hardly be traced in the Upani@sads. The Jaina activities were also probably going on contemporaneously but in the Upani@sads no reference to these can be found. We may thus reasonably suppose that there were different forms of philosophic enquiry in spheres other than those of the Upani@sad sages, of which we have but scanty records. It seems probable that the Hindu systems of thought originated among the sages who though attached chiefly to the Upani@sad circles used to take note of the discussions and views of the antagonistic and heretical philosophic circles. In the assemblies of these sages and their pupils, the views of the heretical circles were probably discussed and refuted. So it continued probably for some time when some illustrious member of the assembly such as Gautama or Kanada collected the purport of these discussions on various topics and problems, filled up many of the missing links, classified and arranged these in the form of a system of philosophy and recorded it in sutras. These sutras were intended probably for people who had attended the elaborate oral discussions and thus could easily follow the meaning of the suggestive phrases contained in the aphorisms. The sutras thus contain sometimes allusions to the views of the rival schools and indicate the way in which they could be refuted. The commentators were possessed of the general drift of the different discussions alluded to and conveyed from generation to generation through an unbroken chain of succession of teachers and pupils. They were however free to supplement these traditionary explanations with their own
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[Footnote 1: _Brahmajala-sutta, Digha_, 1. p. 12 ff.]
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views or to modify and even suppress such of the traditionary views with which they did not agree or which they found it difficult to maintain. Brilliant oppositions from the opposing schools often made it necessary for them to offer solutions to new problems unthought of before, but put forward by some illustrious adherent of a rival school. In order to reconcile these new solutions with the other parts of the system, the commentators never hesitated to offer such slight modifications of the doctrines as could harmonize them into a complete whole. These elaborations or modifications generally developed the traditionary system, but did not effect any serious change in the system as expounded by the older teachers, for the new exponents always bound themselves to the explanations of the older teachers and never contradicted them. They would only interpret them to suit their own ideas, or say new things only in those cases where the older teachers had remained silent. It is not therefore possible to describe the growth of any system by treating the contributions of the individual commentators separately. This would only mean unnecessary repetition. Except when there is a specially new development, the system is to be interpreted on the basis of the joint work of the commentators treating their contributions as forming one whole.
The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often impossible without the aid of an expert preceptor; it is difficult therefore for all who are not widely read in all the different systems to follow any advanced
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work of any particular system, as the deliberations of that particular system are expressed in such close interconnection with the views of other systems that these can hardly be understood without them. Each system of India has grown (at least in particular epochs) in relation to and in opposition to the growth of other systems of thought, and to be a thorough student of Indian philosophy one should study all the systems in their mutual opposition and relation from the earliest times to a period at which they ceased to grow and came to a stop–a purpose for which a work like the present one may only be regarded as forming a preliminary introduction.
Besides the sutras and their commentaries there are also independent treatises on the systems in verse called _karikas_, which try to summarize the important topics of any system in a succinct manner; the _Sa@mkhya karika_ may be mentioned as a work of this kind. In addition to these there were also long dissertations, commentaries, or general observations on any system written in verses called the varttikas; the _S’lokavarttika_, of Kumarila or the _Varttika_ of Sures’vara may be mentioned as examples. All these of course had their commentaries to explain them. In addition to these there were also advanced treatises on the systems in prose in which the writers either nominally followed some selected sutras or proceeded independently of them. Of the former class the _Nyayamanjari_ of Jayanta may be mentioned as an example and of the latter the _Pras’astapada bha@sya_, the _Advaitasiddhi_ of Madhusudana Sarasvati or the _Vedanta-paribha@sa_ of Dharmarajadhvarindra. The more remarkable of these treatises were of a masterly nature in which the writers represented the systems they adhered to in a highly forcible and logical manner by dint of their own great mental powers and genius. These also had their commentaries to explain and elaborate them. The period of the growth of the philosophic literatures of India begins from about 500 B.C. (about the time of the Buddha) and practically ends in the later half of the seventeenth century, though even now some minor publications are seen to come out.
The Indian Systems of Philosophy.
The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the _nastika_ and the _astika_. The nastika (_na asti_ “it is not”) views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible
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nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The astika-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Sa@mkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mima@msa, Nyaya and Vais’e@sika, generally known as the six systems (_@sa@ddars’ana_ [Footnote ref 1]).
The Sa@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kapila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga system is attributed to Patanjali and the original sutras are called the _Patanjala Yoga sutras_. The general metaphysical position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_Is’vara_) as distinct from Atman and lays much importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation, whereas the Sa@mkhya denies the existence of Is’vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system of Sa@mkhya associated with Kapila and the Yoga system associated with Patanjali are but two divergent modifications of an original Sa@mkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same Sa@mkhya system–one may be called the Kapila Sa@mkhya and the other Patanjala Sa@mkhya.
The Purva Mima@msa (from the root _man_ to think–rational conclusions) cannot properly be spoken of as a system of philosophy. It is a systematized code of principles in accordance with which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted for purposes of sacrifices.
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[Footnote 1: The word “_dars’ana_” in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the _Vais’e@sika sutras_ of Ka@nada (IX. ii. 13) which I consider as pre-Buddhistic. The Buddhist pi@takas (400 B.C.) called the heretical opinions “_ditthi_” (Sanskrit–dr@sti from the same root _d@rs’_ from which dars’ana is formed). Haribhadra (fifth century A.D.) uses the word Dars’ana in the sense of systems of philosophy (_sarvadars’anavacyo’ rtha@h–@Sa@ddars’anasamuccaya_ I.). Ratnakirtti (end of the tenth century A.D.) uses the word also in the same sense (“_Yadi nama dars’ane dars’ane nanaprakaram sattvatak-@sanam uktamasti._” _K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_ in _Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts_, p.20). Madhava (1331 A.D.) calls his Compendium of all systems of philosophy, _Sarvadars’anasa@mgra@na_. The word “_mata_” (opinion or view) was also freely used in quoting the views of other systems. But there is no word to denote ‘philosophers’ in the technical sense. The Buddhists used to call those who held heretical views “_tairthika._” The words “siddha,” “_jnanin_,” etc. do not denote philosophers, in the modern sense, they are used rather in the sense of “seers” or “perfects.”]
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The Vedic texts were used as mantras (incantations) for sacrifices, and people often disputed as to the relation of words in a sentence or their mutual relative importance with reference to the general drift of the sentence. There were also differences of view with regard to the meaning of a sentence, the use to which it may be applied as a mantra, its relative importance or the exact nature of its connection with other similar sentences in a complex Vedic context. The Mima@msa formulated some principles according to which one could arrive at rational and uniform solutions for all these difficulties. Preliminary to these its main objects, it indulges in speculations with regard to the external world, soul, perception, inference, the validity of the Vedas, or the like, for in order that a man might perform sacrifices with mantras, a definite order of the universe and its relation to man or the position and nature of the mantras of the Veda must be demonstrated and established. Though its interest in such abstract speculations is but secondary yet it briefly discusses these in order to prepare a rational ground for its doctrine of the mantras and their practical utility for man. It is only so far as there are these preliminary discussions in the Mima@msa that it may be called a system of philosophy. Its principles and maxims for the interpretation of the import of words and sentences have a legal value even to this day. The sutras of Mima@msa are attributed to Jaimini, and S’abara wrote a bha@sya upon it. The two great names in the history of Mima@msa literature after Jaimini and S’abara are Kumarila Bha@t@ta and his pupil Prabhakara, who criticized the opinions of his master so much, that the master used to call him guru (master) in sarcasm, and to this day his opinions pass as _guru-mata_, whereas the views of Kumarila Bha@t@ta pass as _bha@t@ta-mata_ [Footnote ref 1]. It may not be out of place to mention here that Hindu Law (_sm@rti_) accepts without any reservation the maxims and principles settled and formulated by the Mima@msa.
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[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumarila could not understand the meaning of a Sanskrit sentence “_Atra tunoktam tatrapinoktam iti paunaraktam_” (hence spoken twice). _Tunoktam_ phonetically admits of two combinations, _tu noktam_ (but not said) and _tunauktam_ (said by the particle _tu_) and _tatrapi noktam_ as _tatra api na uktam_ (not said also there) and _tatra apina uktam_ (said there by the particle _api_). Under the first interpretation the sentence would mean, “Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice.” This puzzled Kumarila, when Prabhakara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was “here it is indicated by _tu_ and there by _api,_ and so it is indicated twice.” Kumarila was so pleased that he called his pupil “Guru” (master) at this.]
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The _Vedanta sutras_, also called Uttara Mima@msa, written by Badaraya@na, otherwise known as the _Brahma-sutras_, form the original authoritative work of Vedanta. The word Vedanta means “end of the Veda,” i.e. the Upani@sads, and the _Vedanta sutras_ are so called as they are but a summarized statement of the general views of the Upani@sads. This work is divided into four books or adhyayas and each adhyaya is divided into four padas or chapters. The first four sutras of the work commonly known as _Catu@hsutri_ are (1) How to ask about Brahman, (2) From whom proceed birth and decay, (3) This is because from him the Vedas have come forth, (4) This is shown by the harmonious testimony of the Upani@sads. The whole of the first chapter of the second book is devoted to justifying the position of the Vedanta against the attacks of the rival schools. The second chapter of the second book is busy in dealing blows at rival systems. All the other parts of the book are devoted to settling the disputed interpretations of a number of individual Upani@sad texts. The really philosophical portion of the work is thus limited to the first four sutras and the first and second chapters of the second book. The other portions are like commentaries to the Upani@sads, which however contain many theological views of the system. The first commentary of the _Brahma-sutra_ was probably written by Baudhayana, which however is not available now. The earliest commentary that is now found is that of the great S’a@nkara. His interpretations of the _Brahma-sutras_ together with all the commentaries and other works that follow his views are popularly known as Vedanta philosophy, though this philosophy ought more properly to be called Vis’uddhadvaitavada school of Vedanta philosophy (i.e. the Vedanta philosophy of the school of absolute monism). Variant forms of dualistic philosophy as represented by the Vai@s@navas, S’aivas, Ramayatas, etc., also claim to express the original purport of the Brahma sutras. We thus find that apostles of dualistic creeds such as Ramanuja, Vallabha, Madhva, S’rika@n@tha, Baladeva, etc., have written independent commentaries on the _Brahma-sutra_ to show that the philosophy as elaborated by themselves is the view of the Upani@sads and as summarized in the _Brahma-sutras_. These differed largely and often vehemently attacked S’a@nkara’s interpretations of the same sutras. These systems as expounded by them also pass by the name of Vedanta as these are also claimed to be the real interpretations intended by the Vedanta (Upani@sads)
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and the _Vedanta sutras_. Of these the system of Ramanuja has great philosophical importance.
The _Nyaya sutras_ attributed to Gautama, called also Ak@sapada, and the _Vais’e@sika sutras_ attributed to Ka@nada, called also Uluka, represent the same system for all practical purposes. They are in later times considered to differ only in a few points of minor importance. So far as the sutras are concerned the _Nyaya sutras_ lay particular stress on the cultivation of logic as an art, while the _Vais’e@sika sutras_ deal mostly with metaphysics and physics. In addition to these six systems, the Tantras had also philosophies of their own, which however may generally be looked upon largely as modifications of the Sa@mkhya and Vedanta systems, though their own contributions are also noteworthy.
Some fundamental Points of Agreement.
I. _The Karma Theory._
It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Carvaka materialists all the other systems agree on some fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving after the realization of the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the postulates, aims and conditions for such a realization were found to be identical in all the conflicting systems. Whatever may be their differences of opinion in other matters, so far as the general postulates for the realization of the transcendent state, the _summum bonum_ of life, were concerned, all the systems were practically in thorough agreement. It may be worth while to note some of them at this stage.
First, the theory of Karma and rebirth. All the Indian systems agree in believing that whatever action is done by an individual leaves behind it some sort of potency which has the power to ordain for him joy or sorrow in the future according as it is good or bad. When the fruits of the actions are such that they cannot be enjoyed in the present life or in a human life, the individual has to take another birth as a man or any other being in order to suffer them.
The Vedic belief that the mantras uttered in the correct accent at the sacrifices with the proper observance of all ritualistic
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details, exactly according to the directions without the slightest error even in the smallest trifle, had something like a magical virtue automatically to produce the desired object immediately or after a lapse of time, was probably the earliest form of the Karma doctrine. It postulates a semi-conscious belief that certain mystical actions can produce at a distant time certain effects without the ordinary process of the instrumentality of visible agents of ordinary cause and effect. When the sacrifice is performed, the action leaves such an unseen magical virtue, called the _ad@r@s@ta_ (the unseen) or the _apurva_ (new), that by it the desired object will be achieved in a mysterious manner, for the _modus operandi_ of the _apurva_ is unknown. There is also the notion prevalent in the Sa@mhitas, as we have already noticed, that he who commits wicked deeds suffers in another world, whereas he who performs good deeds enjoys the highest material pleasures. These were probably associated with the conception of _@rta_, the inviolable order of things. Thus these are probably the elements which built up the Karma theory which we find pretty well established but not emphasized in the Upani@sads, where it is said that according to good or bad actions men will have good or bad births.
To notice other relevant points in connection with the Karma doctrine as established in the astika systems we find that it was believed that the unseen (_ad@r@s@ta_) potency of the action generally required some time before it could be fit for giving the doer the merited punishment or enjoyment. These would often accumulate and prepare the items of suffering and enjoyment for the doer in his next life. Only the fruits of those actions which are extremely wicked or particularly good could be reaped in this life. The nature of the next birth of a man is determined by the nature of pleasurable or painful experiences that have been made ready for him by his maturing actions of this life. If the experiences determined for him by his action are such that they are possible to be realized in the life of a goat, the man will die and be born as a goat. As there is no ultimate beginning in time of this world process, so there is no time at which any person first began his actions or experiences. Man has had an infinite number of past lives of the most varied nature, and the instincts of each kind of life exist dormant in the life of every individual, and thus whenever he has any particular birth as this or that animal or man,
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the special instincts of that life (technically called _vasana_) come forth. In accordance with these vasanas the person passes through the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by his action. The length of life is also determined by the number and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying actions of his past life. When once certain actions become fit for giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those actions which have not matured are uprooted once for all if the person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But even such an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass through the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds of actions, white or virtuous (_s’ukla_), black or wicked (_k@r@s@na_), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s’ukla-k@r@s@na_) as most of our actions are, neither black nor white (_as’uklak@r@s@na_), i.e. those acts of self-renunciation or meditation which are not associated with any desires for the fruit. It is only when a person can so restrain himself as to perform only the last kind of action that he ceases to accumulate any new karma for giving fresh fruits. He has thus only to enjoy the fruits of his previous karmas which have ripened for giving fruits. If in the meantime he attains true knowledge, all his past accumulated actions become destroyed, and as his acts are only of the as’uklak@r@s@na type no fresh karma for ripening is accumulated, and thus he becomes divested of all karma after enjoying the fruits of the ripened karmas alone.
The Jains think that through the actions of body, speech and mind a kind of subtle matter technically called karma is produced. The passions of a man act like a viscous substance that attracts this karma matter, which thus pours into the soul and sticks to it. The karma matter thus accumulated round the soul during the infinite number of past lives is technically called _karmas’arira_, which encircles the soul as it passes on from birth to birth. This karma matter sticking to the soul gradually ripens and exhausts itself in ordaining the sufferance of pains or the enjoyment of pleasures for the individual. While some karma matter is being expended in this way, other karma matters are accumulating by