A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 by Surendranath Dasgupta (page 12)

[Footnote 1: S’a@nkara’s commentary, I.i. 2. See also Deussen’s _System of the Vedanta_.]

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There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause–a mere illusion of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and form (_namarupa_). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent (_vyavaharika_) as mere objects of name and form (_namarupa_), but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(_paramarthika_) [Footnote ref 1].

The main idea of the Vedanta philosophy.

The main idea of the advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy as taught by the @S’a@kara school is this, that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals. The world also as apart from us the individuals has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. All other events, mental or physical, are but passing appearances, while the only absolute and unchangeable truth underlying them all is the self. While other systems investigated the pramanas only to examine how far they could determine the objective truth of things or our attitude in practical life towards them, Vedanta sought to reach beneath the surface of appearances, and enquired after the final and ultimate truth underlying the microcosm and the macrocosm, the subject and the object. The famous instruction of @S’vetaketu, the most important Vedanta text (mahavakya) says, “That art thou, O S’vetaketu.” This comprehension of my self as the ultimate truth is the highest knowledge, for when this knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances will automatically cease. Unless the mind is chastened and purged of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this truth; but when this is once done, and the soul is anxious for salvation by a knowledge of the highest truth, the preceptor instructs him, “That art thou.” At once he becomes the truth itself, which is at once identical with pure bliss and pure intelligence; all ordinary notions and cognitions of diversity and of the

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[Footnote 1: All that is important in S’a@nkara’s commentary of the _Brahma-sutras_ has been excellently systematized by Deussen in his _System of the Vedanta_; it is therefore unnecessary for me to give any long account of this part. Most of what follows has been taken from the writings of his followers.]

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many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; the vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him, and he shines forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed that when man attained salvation, he became divested of all world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests, and was thus reduced to his own original purity untouched by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the idea was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire and attachment with the world and had known the nature of his self as absolutely free and unattached to the world and his own psychosis, he became emancipated from the world and all his connections with the world ceased, though the world continued as ever the same with others. The external world was a reality with them; the unreality or illusion consisted in want of true knowledge about the real nature of the self, on account of which the self foolishly identified itself with world-experiences, worldly joys and world-events, and performed good and bad works accordingly. The force of accumulated karmas led him to undergo the experiences brought about by them. While reaping the fruits of past karmas he, as ignorant as ever of his own self, worked again under the delusion of a false relationship between himself and the world, and so the world process ran on. Mufti (salvation) meant the dissociation of the self from the subjective psychosis and the world. This condition of the pure state of self was regarded as an unconscious one by Nyaya-Vais’e@sika and Mima@msa, and as a state of pure intelligence by Sa@mkhya and Yoga. But with Vedanta the case is different, for it held that the world as such has no real existence at all, but is only an illusory imagination which lasts till the moment when true knowledge is acquired. As soon as we come to know that the one truth is the self, the Brahman, all our illusory perceptions representing the world as a field of experience cease. This happens not because the connections of the self with the world cease, but because the appearance of the world process does not represent the ultimate and highest truth about it. All our notions about the abiding diversified world (lasting though they may be from beginningless time) are false in the sense that they do not represent the real truth about it. We not only do not know what we ourselves really are, but do not also know what the world about us is. We take our ordinary experiences of the world as representing

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it correctly, and proceed on our career of daily activity. It is no doubt true that these experiences show us an established order having its own laws, but this does not represent the real truth. They are true only in a relative sense, so long as they appear to be so; for the moment the real truth about them and the self is comprehended all world-appearances become unreal, and that one truth, the Brahman, pure being, bliss, intelligence, shines forth as the absolute–the only truth in world and man. The world-appearance as experienced by us is thus often likened to the illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell; for the moment the perception appears to be true and the man runs to pick it up, as if the conch-shell were a real piece of silver; but as soon as he finds out the truth that this is only a piece of conch-shell, he turns his back on it and is no longer deluded by the appearance or again attracted towards it. The illusion of silver is inexplicable in itself, for it was true for all purposes so long as it persisted, but when true knowledge was acquired, it forthwith vanished. This world-appearance will also vanish when the true knowledge of reality dawns. When false knowledge is once found to be false it cannot return again. The Upani@sads tell us that he who sees the many here is doomed. The one, the Brahman, alone is true; all else is but delusion of name and form. Other systems believed that even after emancipation, the world would continue as it is, that there was nothing illusory in it, but I could not have any knowledge of it because of the absence of the instruments by the processes of which knowledge was generated. The Sa@mkhya puru@sa cannot know the world when the buddhi-stuff is dissociated from it and merged in the prak@rti, the Mima@msa and the Nyaya soul is also incapable of knowing the world after emancipation, as it is then dissociated from manas. But the Vedanta position is quite distinct here. We cannot know the world, for when the right knowledge dawns, the perception of this world-appearance proves itself to be false to the person who has witnessed the truth, the Brahman. An illusion cannot last when the truth is known; what is truth is known to us, but what is illusion is undemonstrable, unspeakable, and indefinite. The illusion runs on from beginningless time; we do not know how it is related to truth, the Brahman, but we know that when the truth is once known the false knowledge of this

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world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of buddhi or manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell the illusory perception of silver is destroyed, so this illusory perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true knowledge of the reality, the Brahman. The Upani@sads held that reality or truth was one, and there was “no many” anywhere, and S’ankara explained it by adding that the “many” was merely an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was bound to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance is maya (illusion). This is what S’ankara emphasizes in expounding his constructive system of the Upani@sad doctrine. The question is sometimes asked, how the maya becomes associated with Brahman. But Vedanta thinks this question illegitimate, for this association did not begin in time either with reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons. In fact there is no real association, for the creation of illusion does not affect the unchangeable truth. Maya or illusion is no real entity, it is only false knowledge (_avidya_) that makes the appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found. Maya or avidya has an apparent existence only so long as it lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is not a real entity in association with which a real world-appearance has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has existence so long as we are deluded by it (_pratitika-satta_). Maya therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded middle. For the maya can neither be said to be “is” nor “is not” (_tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacaniya_). It cannot be said that such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent existence than the fact of their perception. If it has any creative function, that function is as illusive as its own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts. Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by association with maya, for there can be no association of the real with the empty, the maya, the illusory. It is no real association but a mere appearance.

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In what sense is the world-appearance false?

The world is said to be false–a mere product of maya. The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved in the category of the indefinite which is neither _sat_ “is” nor _asat_ “is not.” Here the opposition of the “is” and “is not” is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is “is not,” since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not therefore “is not” in the sense that a “castle in the air” or a hare’s horn is “is not,” for these are called _tuccha_, the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be “is” or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is _sat_ (is), but since it does not exist for all times it is _asat_ (is not). This is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (_jagat-prapanca_) that it is neither _sat_ nor _asat_ in an absolute sense. Or rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the being, _sat_, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist, and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-shell, we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of illusory perception to be what we saw before us as “this” (this is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of silver, the “this” (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (_sat_), the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when the “this” before us is found to be a piece of conch-shell, the silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the “this” before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no separate existence other than the comprehension of the identity of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the

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negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false (for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself, and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis, that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only thing left is the realized identity of the truth, the being. The peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (_sat_) though it is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance is an appearance which is different from what we know as real (_sadvilak@sa@na_); for the real is known to us as that which is proved by the prama@nas, and which will never again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof. A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted; but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded as real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary entities such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth. The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself is also contradicted.

Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous (_svaprakas’a_) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things, ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called _d@rs’ya_ (objects of consciousness), while it is the _dra@s@ta_ (the pure consciousness comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as an expression of a mental state (_v@rtti_), it is said to have a form and it becomes d@rs’ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.

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[Footnote 1: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithyatvanirukti_.]

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Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the Upani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svaprakas’a and dra@s@ta. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any form or mode. The notion of _d@rs’yatva_ (objectivity) carries with it also the notion of _ja@datva_ (materiality) or its nature as non-consciousness (_ajnanatva_) and non-selfness (_anatmatva_) which consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness. The relation of consciousness (_jnana_) to its objects cannot be regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the conch-shell is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence. In the state of emancipation when supreme bliss (_ananda_) shines forth, the ananda is not an object or form of the illuminating consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there is a form associated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all finite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, the abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever. The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is, the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the individual appearances, there is no other class (_jati_) such as cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different individual forms are illusorily imposed (_gha@tadikam sadarthekalpitam, pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@tiyamanatvat_). So this world-appearance which is essentially different from the Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it is imposed, is false
(_upadanani@s@thaiyaniabhavapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithyatvasiddhi@h –as Citsukha has it).

The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-shell, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called _pratibhasika,_ as they are contradicted by other

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later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called _vyavaharika_ (from _vyavahara_, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the accumulated experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true. It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedanta it is sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (_sattva_) before us, we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedanta answers that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge, for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and independence, which cannot be had directly from experience, as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth. Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is the being (_sat_) and not its forms. This being that is associated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events and appearances (_ekenaiva sarvanugatena sarvatra satpratiti@h_). Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being (_sat_) as Nyaya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis (_adhi@s@thana_) on which the illusions appear. This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances. Our perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

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could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s’ruti (scriptures) did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner. But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s’ruti are also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by inference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend (_upajivya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (_parik@sa_), which may convince us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality. But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedanta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedanta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us. The testimony of the Upani@sads also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness (_d@rs’ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

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connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samavaya_); and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the jnatata of Mima@msa is produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) associated with the object as Prabhakara thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_jnana-kara@na_) involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement? Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedanta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the assumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without? The answer that the Vedanta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

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flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have to pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its veil is removed by association with the v@rtti (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of ajnana (nescience). This veil is removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajnana which is removed by the action of the corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the v@rtti of the mind, and the v@rtti of the mind once formed, the corresponding ajnana veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the veil is removed by the action of the v@rtti the light of reality shows the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-shell) take place not because the do@sa consisting of the defect of the eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it generated a wrong v@rtti. It is because of the generation of the wrong v@rtti that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion “this is silver” as when we mistake the conch-shell for the silver, it is the _cit,_ consciousness or reality as underlying the object represented to us by “this” or “_idam_” that is the basis (_adhi@s@thana_) of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or non-cognition (_ajnana_) of it in the form of the conch-shell, whereas the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-shell. The

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basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my mental state (_v@rtti_), so that the illusion is not of the form that the “knowledge is silver” but of “this is silver.” Objective phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made through the _cit_ being manifested through the mental mould or states. Without the v@rtti there is no illuminating knowledge. Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification (_v@rtti_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other entity of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested through the states. This Vedanta does not admit, for it holds that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous consciousness that seems to assume diverse forms in connection with diverse kinds of associations or limitations (_upadhi_). It manifests _ajnana_ (nescience) and hence does not by itself remove the ajnana, except when it is reflected through any specific kind of v@rtti. There is of course no difference, no inner and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis of the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection through the mental states or v@rttis.

The phenomena or objects called the drs’ya can only be determined in their various forms and manifestations but not as to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an entity of any relation such as sa@myoga (contact) or samavaya (inherence)

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between them and the pure consciousness called the d@rk; for the truth is this, that the d@rk (perceiver) and the d@rs’ya (perceived) have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as “this is silver,” the knowledge of “this” as a thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-shell are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere “this” can be. The answer of Vedanta is that when the Brahman stands as the ground (_adhi@s@thana_) of the world-appearance its characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed to us in our objective consciousness; when I say “the jug is,” the “isness,” or “being,” does not shine in its purity, but only as a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion. In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines forth in association with the manifold objects, and therefore the Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and not illusory. But the Vedanta points out that even by illusory perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced in actual waking life account for the dream creations. According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies (_sa@mskara_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

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the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable state of existence (_svena adhyastasya sa@mskarasya viyadadyadhyasajanakatvopapatte@h tatpratityabhavepi tadadhyasasya purvam sattvat k@rtsnasyapi vyavaharikapadarthasya ajnatasattvabhyupagamat_). It is again sometimes objected that illusion is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground (_adhi@s@thana_) and the illusory notion as silver in “this is silver,” but no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance. To this Vedanta says that similarity is not an indispensable factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye through the influence of bile or _pitta_). Similarity helps the production of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be done by _ad@r@s@ta_–the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds. In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no other do@sa (defect) than the avidya (nescience) which constitutes the appearance. Here avidya is the only do@sa and Brahman is the only adhi@s@thana or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the self-luminous as the adhi@s@thana, the illusory creations could not have been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the adhi@s@thana. Hence where the adhi@s@thana is hidden by the veil of avidya, the association with mental states becomes necessary for removing the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous adhi@s@thana. As soon as the adhi@s@thana, the ground, the reality, the blissful self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear. The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.

The Definition of Ajnana (nescience).

Ajnana the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_anadibhavarupatve sati jnananivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is associated with the pure consciousness which

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is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive (_bhavarupa_) it can very well constitute the essence of negation (_abhava_) too, for the positivity (_bhavatva_) does not mean here the opposite of abhava (negation) but notes merely its difference from abhava (_abhava-vilak@sa@natvamatram vivak@sitam_). Ajnana is not a positive entity (_bhava_) like any other positive entity, but it is called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abhava_). It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes objected that ajnana is a mere illusory imagination of the moment caused by defect (_do@sa_) and hence it cannot be beginningless (_anadi_); but Vedanta holds that the fact that it is an imagination or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground as well as the illusory creation associated with it came into being for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajnana therefore being ever associated with it is also beginningless. The ajnana is the indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowledge comes the illusion is destroyed; it does not matter whether the cause which produced the illusion was beginningless or not. Some Vedantists however define ajnana as the substance constituting illusion, and say that though it is not a positive entity yet it may be regarded as forming the substance of the illusion; it is not necessary that only a positive entity should be the matter of any thing, for what is necessary for the notion of a material cause (_upadana_) is this, that it should continue or persist as the same in all changes of effects. It is not true that only what is positive can persist in and through the effects which are produced in the time process. Illusion is unreal and it is not unnatural that the ajnana which also is unreal should be the cause of it.

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Ajnana established by Perception and Inference.

Ajnana defined as the indefinite which is neither positive nor negative is also directly experienced by us in such perceptions as “I do not know, or I do not know myself or anybody else,” or “I do not know what you say,” or more particularly “I had been sleeping so long happily and did not know anything.” Such perceptions point to an object which has no definite characteristics, and which cannot properly be said to be either positive or negative. It may be objected that the perception “I do not know” is not the perception of the indefinite, the ajnana, but merely the negation of knowledge. To this Vedanta says that had it been the perception of a negation merely, then the negation must have been associated with the specific object to which it applied. A negation must imply the thing negatived; in fact negation generally appears as a substantive with the object of negation as a qualifying character specifying the nature of the negation. But the perception “I do not know or I had no knowledge” does not involve the negation of any particular knowledge of any specific object, but the knowledge of an indefinite objectless ignorance. Such an indefinite ajnana is positive in the sense that it is certainly not negative, but this positive indefinite is not positive in the same sense in which other definite entities are called positive, for it is merely the characterless, passive indefinite showing itself in our experience. If negation meant only a general negation, and if the perception of negation meant in each case the perception of a general negation, then even where there is a jug on the ground, one should perceive the negation of the jug on the ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there. Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception “I do not know” can persist, even though many individual objects be known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of “I do not know” is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category namely the indefinite, the ajnana. It is our common experience

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that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajnana_) of a specific type we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving consciousness (_sak@si_) is such that both the root ajnana as well as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented in mental states (_v@rtti-jnana_), are comprehended by it. Of course when the v@rttijnana about a thing as in ordinary perceptions of objects comes in, the ajnana with regard to it is temporarily removed, for the v@rttijnana is opposed to the ajnana. But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_sak@si-caitanya_) is conceived it can comprehend both the ajnana and the jnana (knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all positives either as indefinite ajnana or as states of knowledge or as specific kinds of ajnana or ignorance, but it is unable to comprehend a negation, for negation (_abhava_) is not a perception, but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from the Nyaya point of view that since without the knowledge of a qualification (_vis’e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis’i@s@ta_) cannot be known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness without the object being known first. To this Vedanta replies that the maxim that the qualification must be known before the qualified thing is known is groundless, for we can as well perceive the thing first and then its qualification. It is not out of place here to say that negation is not a separate entity, but is only a peculiar mode of the manifestation of the positive. Even the naiyayikas would agree that in the expression “there is no negation of a jug here,” no separate negation can be accepted, for the jug is already present before us. As there are distinctions and differences in positive entities by illusory impositions, so negations are also distinguished by similar illusory impositions and appear as the negation of jug, negation of cloth, etc.; so all distinctions between negations are unnecessary, and it may be accepted that negation like position is one which appears as many on account of illusory distinctions and impositions. Thus the

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content of negation being itself positive, there is no reason to object that such perceptions as “I do not know” refer to the perception of an indefinite ajnana in consciousness. So also the perception “I do not know what you say” is not the perception of negation, for this would require that the hearer should know first what was said by the speaker, and if this is so then it is impossible to say “I do not know what you say.”

So also the cognition “I was sleeping long and did not know anything” has to be admitted as referring to the perception of the indefinite during sleep. It is not true as some say that during sleep there is no perception, but what appears to the awakened man as “I did not know anything so long” is only an inference; for, it is not possible to infer from the pleasant and active state of the senses in the awakened state that the activity had ceased in the sleep state and that since he had no object of knowledge then, he could not know anything; for there is no invariable concomitance between the pleasant and active state of the senses and the absence of objects of knowledge in the immediately preceding state. During sleep there is a mental state of the form of the indefinite, and during the awakened state it is by the impression (_sa@mskara_) of the aforesaid mental state of ajnana that one remembers that state and says that “I did not perceive anything so long.” The indefinite (_ajnana_) perceived in consciousness is more fundamental and general than the mere negation of knowledge (_jnanabhava_) and the two are so connected that though the latter may not be felt, yet it can be inferred from the perception of the indefinite. The indefinite though not definite is thus a positive content different from negation and is perceived as such in direct and immediate consciousness both in the awakened state as well as in the sleeping state.

The presence of this ajnana may also be inferred from the manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness which was not known or rather known as indefinite before we say “I did not know it before, but I know it now.” My present knowledge of the thing thus involves the removal of an indefinite which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just as the first streak of light in utter darkness manifests itself by removing the darkness[Footnote ref 1]. Apart from such an inference its existence

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[Footnote 1: See _Pancapadikavivara@na, Tattvadipana_, and _Advaitasiddhi_.]

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is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there was no ajnana to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajnana there would have been no illusion. It is the ajnana that constitutes the substance of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it is unchangeable. This ajnana is manifested by the perceiving consciousness (_sak@si_) and not by the pure consciousness. The perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of avidya (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajnana, Aha@mkara, and Anta@hkara@na.

This ajnana rests on the pure _cit_ or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajnana or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajnana and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (_v@rtti_). The ajnana thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego “_aham_” or the individual soul. Vacaspati Mis’ra however holds that the ajnana does not rest on the pure cit but on the jiva (individual soul). Madhava reconciles this view of Vacaspati with the above view, and says that the ajnana may be regarded as resting on the jiva or individual soul from this point of view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jiva (_Cinmatras’ritam ajnanam jivapak@sapatitvat jivas’ritam ucyate_ Vivara@naprameya, p. 48). The feeling “I do not know” seems however to indicate that the ajnana is with reference to the perceiving self in association with its feeling as ego or “I”; but this is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of the close association of ajnana with anta@hkara@na (mind) both of which are in essence the same (see Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha, p. 48).

The ajnana however does not only rest on the cit, but it has the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajnana is noticed; the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the vi@saya,

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but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does not shine (_nasti na prakas’ate iti vyavahara@h_) or rather there is no appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is hidden by the ajnana means nothing more than this, that it is such {_tadyogyata_) that the ajnana can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajnana-consciousness in experience. Ajnana is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this ajn@ana is thus on the light of the reality which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure. The ajnana is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the ajnana has many states as constituting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajnana are technically called tulajnana or avasthajnana. Any state of consciousness (v@rttijnana) removes a manifestation of the ajnana as tulajnana and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajnana as obstructing the pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated in the notion of the ego or aha@mkara. This notion of aha@mkara is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations held up in the mind (_anta@hkara@na_) with the real, the false with

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the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the anta@hkara@na taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one, so, here also when I say “I perceive”, there are two distinct elements of the self, as consciousness and the mind or antahkarana fused into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the anta@hkara@na, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self. Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhakara sought to repudiate. Prabhakara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought (_tripu@ti_), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said, that the analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the anta@hkara@na are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different, and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (_anubhava_) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the fulfilment of its purpose. But the Vedanta objects to this saying that according to Prabhakara’s supposition, it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. Kumarila thinks this thought (_anubhava_), to be a movement, Nyaya and Prabhakara as a quality of the self [Footnote ref 1]. But if it was a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all pervasive, then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size, it would depend on its parts for its own

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[Footnote 1: According to Nyaya the _atman_ is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness(_cit_). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus, _Nyayamanjari_ in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity {_svaprakas’a_) says (p.432)

_sacetanas’cita yogattadyogena vina ja@da@h narthavabhasadanyaddhi caitanya@m nama manma@he.]

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constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the self, the atman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijnana, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous [Footnote ref 1].

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet aha@mkara is absent during deep sleep. It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels “I slept happily and did not know anything”; yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na and the aha@mkara are altogether submerged in the ajnana, and there are only the ajnana and the self; on waking, this aha@mkara as a state of anta@hkar@na is again generated, and then it associates the perception of the ajnana in the sleep and originates the perception “I did not know anything.” This aha@mkara which is a mode (_v@rtti_) of the anta@hkara@na is thus constituted by avidya, and is manifested as jnanas’akti (power of knowledge) and kriyas’akti (power of work). This kriyas’akti of the aha@mkara is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The aha@mkara itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or v@rtti of the anta@hkara@na, and as such the aha@mkara of a past period can now be associated; but even then the v@rtti of anta@hkara@na, aha@mkara, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the anta@hkara@na. The same anta@hkara@na is called manas in its capacity as doubt buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering [Footnote ref 2]. When the pure cit shines forth in association with this anta@hkara@na, it is called a jiva. It is clear from the above account that the ajnana is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (_as’raya_); its own nature as the ajnana or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as underlying

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamakaranda_, pp. 130-140, _Citshkha_ and _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_, pp. 53-58.]

[Footnote 2: See _Vedanta-paribha@sa_, p. 88, Bombay edition.]

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these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the anta@hkara@na, and the light of the real shines forth through these states. The anta@hkara@na of which aha@mkara is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajnana-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jiva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvacyavada and the Vedanta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajnana could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedanta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidya, ajnana or maya is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason. It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by S’rihar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality. I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference (_bheda_)from _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhadya_. Four explanations are possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience (_svarupa-bheda_) as Prabhakara thinks; (2) the difference between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other (_anyonyabhava_), as some Naiyayikas and Bha@t@tas think; (3) difference means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the Vais’e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyaya. Taking the first alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug? i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference from something else, it is expected that something else such as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if the perception of “difference” between two things has penetrated together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from something else, and if that thing from which the difference is perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug, then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that

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the jug only indicates a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any association of its difference from other things, and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and hence not difference but identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything might be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference. But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one thing to say that there are jug and cloth, and quite another thing to say that the jug is different from the cloth. Thus a jug cannot appear as difference, though it may be viewed with reference to cloth. The notion of a jug does not require the notions of other things for its manifestation. Moreover, when I say the jug is different from the cloth, I never mean that difference is an entity which is the same as the jug or the cloth; what I mean is that the difference of the cloth from the jug has its limits in the jug, and not merely that the notion of cloth has a reference to jug. This shows that difference cannot be the characteristic nature of the thing perceived.

Again, in the second alternative where difference of two

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things is defined as the absence of each thing in the other, we find that if difference in jug and cloth means that the jug is not in the cloth or that cloth is not in jug, then also the same difficulty arises; for when I say that the absence or negation of jug in the cloth is its difference from the jug, then also the residence of the absence of jug in the cloth would require that the jug also resides in the cloth, and this would reduce difference to identity. If it is said that the absence of jug in the cloth is not a separate thing, but is rather the identical cloth itself, then also their difference as mutual exclusion cannot be explained. If this mutual negation (_anyonyabhava_) is explained as the mere absence of jugness in the cloth and of clothness in the jug, then also a difficulty arises; for there is no such quality in jugness or clothness that they may be mutually excluded; and there is no such quality in them that they can be treated as identical, and so when it is said that there is no jugness in cloth we might as well say that there is no clothness in cloth, for clothness and jugness are one and the same, and hence absence of jugness in the cloth would amount to the absence of clothness in the cloth which is self-contradictory. Taking again the third alternative we see that if difference means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_), then the question arises whether the vaidharmya or divergence as existing in jug has such a divergence as can distinguish it from the divergence existing in the cloth; if the answer is in the affirmative then we require a series of endless vaidharmyas progressing _ad infinitum_. If the answer is in the negative then there being no divergence between the two divergences they become identical, and hence divergence of characteristics as such ceases to exist. If it is said that the natural forms of things are difference in themselves, for each of them excludes the other, then apart from the differences–the natural forms–the things are reduced to formlessness (_ni@hsvarupata_). If natural forms (_svarupa_) mean special natural forms (_svarupa-vis’e@sa_) then as the special natural forms or characteristics only represent difference, the natural forms of the things as apart from the special ones would appear to be identical. So also it may be proved that there is no such quality as p@rthaktva (separateness) which can explain differences of things, for there also the questions would arise as to whether separateness exists in different things or similar ones or whether separateness is identical with the thing in which it exists or not, and so forth.

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The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening chapters of _Kathavatthu_. In the great _Mahabha@sya_ on Pa@nini by Patanjali also we find some traces of it. But Nagarjuna was the man who took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all its subtle and abstruse issues and counter-issues in order to prove that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was non-existent, for all were unspeakable, indescribable and self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was only the void (_s’unya_). S’a@nkara partially utilized this method in his refutations of Nyaya and the Buddhist systems; but S’rihar@sa again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after having criticized the most important notions and concepts of our everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyaya system, sought to prove that nothing in the world can be defined, and that we cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of all possible definitions that the Nyaya could give necessarily led to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not exist though they appeared to do so; the Vedantic contention was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite ajnana produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show that no consistent notions of them can be formed, or in other words the world-appearance, the phenomena of maya or ajnana, are indefinable or anirvacaniya. This great work of S’rihar@sa was followed by _Tattvadipika_ of Citsukha, in which he generally followed S’rihar@sa and sometimes supplemented him with the addition of criticisms of certain new concepts. The method of Vedanta thus followed on one side the method of S’unyavada in annulling all the concepts of world-appearance and on the other Vijnanavada Buddhism in proving the self-illuminating character of knowledge and ultimately established the self as the only self-luminous ultimate reality.

The Theory of Causation.

The Vedanta philosophy looked at the constantly changing phenomena of the world-appearance and sought to discover the root whence proceeded the endless series of events and effects. The theory that effects were altogether new productions caused by the invariable unconditional and immediately preceding antecedents, as well as the theory that it was the cause which evolved

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and by its transformations produced the effect, are considered insufficient to explain the problem which the Vedanta had before it. Certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set. In fact the concept of causation and production had in it something quite undefinable and inexplicable. Our enquiry after the cause is an enquiry after a more fundamental and primary form of the truth of a thing than what appears at the present moment when we wished to know what was the cause of the jug, what we sought was a simpler form of which the effect was only a more complex form of manifestation, what is the ground, the root, out of which the effect has come forth? If apart from such an enquiry we take the pictorial representation of the causal phenomena in which some collocations being invariably present at an antecedent point of time, the effect springs forth into being, we find that we are just where we were before, and are unable to penetrate into the logic of the affair. The Nyaya definition of cause and effect may be of use to us in a general way in associating certain groups of things of a particular kind with certain other phenomena happening at a succeeding moment as being relevant pairs of which one being present the other also has a probability of being present, but can do nothing more than this. It does not answer our question as to the nature of cause. Antecedence in time is regarded in this view as an indispensable condition for the cause. But time, according to Nyaya, is one continuous entity; succession of time can only be conceived as antecedence and consequence of phenomena, and these again involve succession; thus the notions of succession of time and of the antecedence and consequence of time being mutually dependent upon each other (_anyonyas’raya_) neither of these can be conceived independently. Another important condition is invariability. But what does that mean? If it means invariable antecedence, then even an ass which is invariably present as an antecedent to the smoke rising from the washerman’s house, must be regarded as the cause of the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. If it means such an antecedence as contributes to the happening of the effect, it becomes again difficult to understand anything about its contributing

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[Footnote 1: Asses are used in carrying soiled linen in India. Asses are always present when water is boiled for washing in the laundry.]

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to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for the mere presence of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it is said that a cause can produce an effect only when it is associated with its accessory factors, then also the question remains the same, for we have not understood what is meant by cause. Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a plurality of causes, the cause cannot be defined as that which happening the effect happens and failing the effect fails. It cannot also be said that in spite of the plurality of causes, each particular cause is so associated with its own particular kind of effect that from a special kind of cause we can without fail get a special kind of effect (cf. Vatsyayana and _Nyayamanjari_), for out of the same clay different effects come forth namely the jug, the plate, etc. Again if cause is defined as the collocation of factors, then the question arises as to what is meant by this collocation; does it mean the factors themselves or something else above them? On the former supposition the scattered factors being always present in the universe there should always be the effect; if it means something else above the specific factors, then that something always existing, there should always be the effect. Nor can collocation (_samagri_) be defined as the last movement of the causes immediately succeeding which the effect comes into being, for the relation of movement with the collocating cause is incomprehensible. Moreover if movement is defined as that which produces the effect, the very conception of causation which was required to be proved is taken for granted. The idea of necessity involved in the causal conception that a cause is that which must produce its effect is also equally undefinable, inexplicable, and logically inconceivable. Thus in whatsoever way we may seek to find out the real nature of the causal principle from the interminable series of cause-effect phenomena we fail. All the characteristics of the effects are indescribable and indefinable ajnana of maya, and in whatever way we may try to conceive these phenomena in themselves or in relation to one another we fail, for they are all carved out of the indefinite and are illogical and illusory, and some day will vanish for ever. The true cause is thus the pure being, the reality which is unshakable in itself, the ground upon

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which all appearances being imposed they appear as real. The true cause is thus the unchangeable being which persists through all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon it of ajnana or avidya. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates, etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what is called the _satkaryavada_ or more properly the _satkara@navada_ of the Vedanta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing, and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called the _vivarttavada_ as distinguished from the _sa@mkhyayogapari@namavada_, in which the effect is regarded as the real development of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a different kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ but when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called _pari@nama (kara@nasvalak@sa@nanyathabhava@h pari@nama@h tadvilak@sa@no vivartta@h_ or _vastunastatsamattako’nyathabhava@h pari@nama@h tadvi@samasattaka@h vivartta@h)_. Vedanta has as much to object against the Nyaya as against the pari@nama theory of causation of the Sa@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality, and actuality–all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality however though phenomena are not identical with the cause, they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam karyyam vivartta@h)_.

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the world, the different followers of S’a@nkara Vedanta in explaining the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the maya, ajnana or avidya, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes on them both. Thus Sarvaj@natmamuni, the writer of _Sa@nk@sepa-s’ariraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahman should be regarded as the causal substance (_upadana_) of the world-appearance, whereas Prakas’atman Akhan@dananda, and

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Madhava hold that Brahman in association with maya, i.e. the maya-reflected form of Brahman as Is’vara should be regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or pari@nama of the maya as located in Is’vara, whereas Is’vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others however make a distinction between maya as the cosmical factor of illusion and avidya as the manifestation of the same entity in the individual or jiva. They hold that though the world-appearance may be said to be produced by the maya yet the mind etc. associated with the individual are produced by the avidya with the jiva or the individual as the causal matter (_upadana_). Others hold that since it is the individual to whom both Is’vara and the world-appearance are manifested, it is better rather to think that these are all manifestations of the jiva in association with his avidya or ajnana. Others however hold that since in the world-appearance we find in one aspect pure being and in another materiality etc., both Brahman and maya are to be regarded as the cause, Brahman as the permanent causal matter, upadana and maya as the entity evolving in pari@nama. Vacaspati Mis’ra thinks that Brahman is the permanent cause of the world-appearance through maya as associated with jiva. Maya is thus only a sahakari or instrument as it were, by which the one Brahman appears in the eye of the jiva as the manifold world of appearance. Prakas’ananda holds however in his _Siddhanta Muktavali_ that Brahman itself is pure and absolutely unaffected even as illusory appearance, and is not even the causal matter of the world-appearance. Everything that we see in the phenomenal world, the whole field of world-appearance, is the product of maya, which is both the instrumental and the upadana (causal matter) of the world-illusion. But whatever these divergences of view may be, it is clear that they do not in any way affect the principal Vedanta text that the only unchangeable cause is the Brahman, whereas all else, the effect-phenomena, have only a temporary existence as indefinable illusion. The word maya was used in the @Rg-Veda in the sense of supernatural power and wonderful skill, and the idea of an inherent mystery underlying it was gradually emphasized in the Atharva Veda, and it began to be used in the sense of magic or illusion. In the B@rhadara@nyaka, Pras’na, and Svetas’vatara Upani@sads the word means magic. It is not out of place here to mention that in the older Upani@sads

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the word maya occurs only once in the B@rhadara@nyaka and once only in the Pras’na. In early Pali Buddhist writings it occurs only in the sense of deception or deceitful conduct. Buddhagho@sa uses it in the sense of magical power. In Nagarjuna and the _Lankavatara_ it has acquired the sense of illusion. In S’a@nkara the word maya is used in the sense of illusion, both as a principle of creation as a s’akti (power) or accessory cause, and as the phenomenal creation itself, as the illusion of world-appearance.

It may also be mentioned here that Gau@dapada the teacher of S’a@nkara’s teacher Govinda worked out a system with the help of the maya doctrine. The Upani@sads are permeated with the spirit of an earnest enquiry after absolute truth. They do not pay any attention towards explaining the world-appearance or enquiring into its relations with absolute truth. Gau@dapada asserts clearly and probably for the first time among Hindu thinkers, that the world does not exist in reality, that it is maya, and not reality. When the highest truth is realized maya is not removed, for it is not a thing, but the whole world-illusion is dissolved into its own airy nothing never to recur again. It was Gau@dapada who compared the world-appearance with dream appearances, and held that objects seen in the waking world are unreal, because they are capable of being seen like objects seen in a dream, which are false and unreal. The atman says Gau@dapada is at once the cognizer and the cognized, the world subsists in the atman through maya. As atman alone is real and all duality an illusion, it necessarily follows that all experience is also illusory. S’a@nkara expounded this doctrine in his elaborate commentaries on the Upani@sads and the Brahma-sutra, but he seems to me to have done little more than making explicit the doctrine of maya. Some of his followers however examined and thought over the concept of maya and brought out in bold relief its character as the indefinable thereby substantially contributing to the development of the Vedanta philosophy.

Vedanta theory of Perception and Inference [Footnote ref 1].

Prama@na is the means that leads to right knowledge. If memory is intended to be excluded from the definition then

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[Footnote 1: Dharmarajadhvarindra and his son Ramak@r@s@na worked out a complete scheme of the theory of Vedantic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedanta metaphysics. The early Vedantists were more interested in demonstrating the illusory nature of the world of appearance, and did not work out a logical theory. It may be incidentally mentioned that in the theory of inference as worked out by Dharmarajadhvarindra he was largely indebted to the Mimam@sa school of thought. In recognizing arthapatti, upamana s’abda and anupalabdhi also Dharmarajadhvarindra accepted the Mimam@sa view. The Vedantins, previous to Dharmarajadhvarindra, had also tacitly followed the Mimam@sa in these matters.]

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prama@na is to be defined as the means that leads to such right knowledge as has not already been acquired. Right knowledge (_prama_) in Vedanta is the knowledge of an object which has not been found contradicted (_abadhitarthavi@sayajnanatva_). Except when specially expressed otherwise, prama is generally considered as being excludent of memory and applies to previously unacquired (_anadhigata_) and uncontradicted knowledge. Objections are sometimes raised that when we are looking at a thing for a few minutes, the perception of the thing in all the successive moments after the first refers to the image of the thing acquired in the previous moments. To this the reply is that the Vedanta considers that so long as a different mental state does not arise, any mental state is not to be considered as momentary but as remaining ever the same. So long as we continue to perceive one thing there is no reason to suppose that there has been a series of mental states. So there is no question as to the knowledge of the succeeding moments being referred to the knowledge of the preceding moments, for so long as any mental state has any one thing for its object it is to be considered as having remained unchanged all through the series of moments. There is of course this difference between the same percept of a previous and a later moment following in succession, that fresh elements of time are being perceived as prior and later, though the content of the mental state so far as the object is concerned remains unchanged. This time element is perceived by the senses though the content of the mental state may remain undisturbed. When I see the same book for two seconds, my mental state representing the book is not changed every second, and hence there can be no _such supposition_ that I am having separate mental states in succession each of which is a repetition of the previous one, for so long as the general content of the mental state remains the same there is no reason for supposing that there has been any change in the mental state. The mental state thus remains the same so long as the content is not changed, but though it remains the same it can note the change in the time elements as extraneous

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addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the absolute is realized.

When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as it were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has been transformed into a state (_v@rtti_) [Footnote 1]. As soon as the anta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the ignorance (_ajnana_) with reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness (_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object is thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes that by the action of ajnana, pure consciousness or being is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is but the transformation of ignorance (ajnana), the former cannot manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The diversified objects of the world are but transformations of the principle of ajnana which is neither real nor unreal. It is the nature of ajnana that it veils its own creations. Thus on each of the objects created by the ajnana by its creating (_vik@sepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (avara@na) capacity. But when any object comes in direct touch with anta@hkara@na through the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil on that particular ajnana form–the object, and as the self-shining cit is shining through the particular ajnana state, we have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the ajnana has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

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[Footnote 1: Vedanta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The same anta@hkara@na, according to its diverse functions, is called manas, buddhi, aha@mkara, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called manas, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness aha@mkara, and as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states (v@rtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of ajnana as anta@hkara@na).]

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etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajnana forms so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation (_abheda_) of the subjective consciousness with the objective consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the specific mental states
(_tattadindriyayogyavi@sayavacchinnacaitanyabhinnatvam tattadakaravi@sayavacchinnajnanasya tattadams’e pratyak@satvam_). This union in perception means that the objective has at that moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the anta@hkara@na is called jivasak@si.

Inference (_anumana_), according to Vedanta, is made by our notion of concomitance (_vyaptijnana_) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (_sa@mskara_). Thus when I see smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is generated by the perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known (_vyabhicarajnana_) regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Vedantist does not emphasize the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (_bhuyodars’anam sak@rddars’anam veti vis’e@so nadara@niya@h_). Vedanta is not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference, but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedanta whether this concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases. The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance (_anvayavyapti_) that the Vedanta allows. So the Vedanta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyaya supported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presence with agreement in absence), _kevalanvayi_ (by universal agreement where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

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_kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Vedanta advocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratijna_ (the hill is fiery); (2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@tanta_ (as in the kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyaya maintained [Footnote ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedanta as being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam sarvam mithya Brahmabhinnatvat yedevam tadevam yatha s’uktirupyam_). First premiss (_pratijna_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second premiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss (_dr@s@tanta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote ref 2].

Atman, Jiva, Is’vara, Ekajivavada and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivada.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous (_svayamprakas’a). But what does this mean? Vedanta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve sati aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another. This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug, the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness to manifest it, then that might again require another, and that another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavastha_). If consciousness did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation, then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness (_anubhuti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance

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[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijna, hetu and udaharana, or udahara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyaya, viz. pratijna, hetu, udahara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]

[Footnote 2: Vedantic notions of the pramana of upamana, arthapatti, s’abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mimam@sa view, do not require to be treated here separately.]

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of all our world experience. This goes directly against the jnatata theory of Kumarila that consciousness was not immediate but was only inferable from the manifesting quality (_jnatata_) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedanta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association comprehended under the term aha@mkara (ego). The real self is identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness. This real self called the atman is not the same as the jiva or individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences of worldly life. Is’vara also must be distinguished from this highest atman or Brahman. We have already seen that many Vedantists draw a distinction between maya and avidya. Maya is that aspect of ajnana by which only the best attributes are projected, whereas avidya is that aspect by which impure qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are more of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latter veiling (_avara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with maya and avidya (also called ajnana) was believed respectively to explain the phenomenal Is’vara and the phenomenal jiva or individual. This relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upadhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images possessing different characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception of the relation is that when we speak of akas’a (space) in the jug or of akas’a in the room. The akas’a in reality does not suffer

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any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (_avachinna_) within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the akas’a limited within it will remain as separate from the akas’a limited within the room.

Of the Vedantists who accept the reflection analogy the followers of N@rsi@mhas’rama think that when the pure cit is reflected in the maya, Is’vara is phenomenally produced, and when in the avidya the individual or jiva. Sarvajnatma however does not distinguish between the maya and the avidya, and thinks that when the cit is reflected in the avidya in its total aspect as cause, we get Is’vara, and when reflected in the anta@hkara@na–a product of the avidya–we have jiva or individual soul.

Jiva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jiva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the anta@hkara@na is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajnana and the jiva in this state is called prajna or anandamaya. In the dream-state the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called vis’va. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with maya it is called Is’vara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hira@nyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called vira@t puru@sa.

The jiva in itself as limited by its avidya is often spoken of as paramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and the ego in the waking states as vyavaharika (phenomenal), and when in the dream states as dream-self, pratibha@sika (illusory).

Prakas’atma and his followers think that since ajnana is one there cannot be two separate reflections such as jiva and Is’vara; but it is better to admit that jiva is the image of Is’vara in the ajnana. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with maya is Is’vara, and this when again reflected through the ajnana gives us the jiva. The manifestation of the jiva is in the anta@hkara@na as states of knowledge. The jiva thus in reality is Is’vara and apart from jiva and Is’vara there is no other separate existence of

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Brahma-caitanya. Jiva being the image of Is’vara is thus dependent on him, but when the limitations of jiva are removed by right knowledge, the jiva is the same Brahman it always was.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only possible of things which have colour, and therefore jiva is cit limited (avacchinna) by the anta@hkara@na (mind). Is’vara is that which is beyond it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity of the jivas. It is easy however to see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining or comprehending the relation of Is’vara and jiva. In the Vedanta system Is’vara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being; he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jiva and Is’vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedantists hold that there is but one jiva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jivas in it are merely his imaginings. These dream jivas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jiva continues to undergo his experiences; the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jivas. The cosmic jiva is alone the awakened jiva and all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekajiva (one-soul).

The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedantists that there are many individuals and the world-appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all people; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away, and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had his own illusion and there was no snake at all. According to this view the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground. This must be distinguished from the normal Vedanta view which holds that objectively phenomena are also happening, but that these

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are illusory only in the sense that they will not last permanently and have thus only a temporary and relative existence in comparison with the truth or reality which is ever the same constant and unchangeable entity in all our perceptions and in all world-appearance. According to the other view phenomena are not objectively existent but are only subjectively imagined; so that the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug illusion occurred to me I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is therefore called the theory of d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivada, i.e. the theory that the subjective perception is the creating of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions. In the normal Vedanta view however the objects of the world are existent as phenomena by the sense-contact with which the subjective perceptions are created. The objective phenomena in themselves are of course but modifications of ajnana, but still these phenomena of the ajnana are there as the common ground for the experience of all. This therefore has an objective epistemology whereas the d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivada has no proper epistemology, for the experiences of each person are determined by his own subjective avidya and previous impressions as modifications of the avidya. The d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivada theory approaches nearest to the Vijnanavada Buddhism, only with this difference that while Buddhism does not admit of any permanent being Vedanta admits the Brahman, the permanent unchangeable reality as the only truth, whereas the illusory and momentary perceptions are but impositions on it.

The mental and physical phenomena are alike in this, that both are modifications of ajnana. It is indeed difficult to comprehend the nature of ajnana, though its presence in consciousness can be perceived, and though by dialectic criticism all our most well-founded notions seem to vanish away and become self-contradictory and indefinable. Vedanta explains the reason of this difficulty as due to the fact that all these indefinable forms and names can only be experienced as modes of the real, the self-luminous. Our innate error which we continue from beginningless time consists in this, that the real in its full complete light is ever hidden from us, and the glimpse

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that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms and names; these phenomenal forms and names are undefinable, incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under certain conditions they are manifested by the self-luminous real, and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a positive being which is undeniable. This positive being is only the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms and names. A lump of clay may be moulded into a plate or a cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being apart from the being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have being in themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing the characteristics of the unreal forms–the modes of ajnana and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for us to conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajnana. Moreover such is the nature of ajnanas that they are knowable only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous Brahman or atman. Being as such is the highest truth, the Brahman. The ajnana states are not non-being in the sense of nothing of pure negation (_abhava_), but in the sense that they are not being. Being that is the self-luminous illuminates non-being, the ajnana, and this illumination means nothing more than a false identification of being with non-being. The forms of ajnana if they are to be known must be associated with pure consciousness, and this association means an illusion, superimposition, and mutual misattribution. But apart from pure consciousness these cannot be manifested or known, for it is pure consciousness alone that is self-luminous. Thus when we try to know the ajnana states in themselves as apart from the atman we fail in a dilemma, for knowledge means illusory superimposition or illusion, and when it is not knowledge they evidently cannot be known. Thus apart from its being a factor in our illusory experience no other kind of its existence is known to us. If ajnana had been a non-entity altogether it could never come at all, if it were a positive entity then it would never cease to be; the ajnana thus is a mysterious category midway between being and non-being and undefinable in every way; and it is on account of this that it is called _tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacya_ or undefinable and undeterminable either as real or unreal. It is real in the sense that it is

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a necessary postulate of our phenomenal experience and unreal in its own nature, for apart from its connection with consciousness it is incomprehensible and undefinable. Its forms even while they are manifested in consciousness are self-contradictory and incomprehensible as to their real nature or mutual relation, and comprehensible only so far as they are manifested in consciousness, but apart from these no rational conception of them can be formed. Thus it is impossible to say anything about the ajnana (for no knowledge of it is possible) save so far as manifested in consciousness and depending on this the D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivadins asserted that our experience was inexplicably produced under the influence of avidya and that beyond that no objective common ground could be admitted. But though this has the general assent of Vedanta and is irrefutable in itself, still for the sake of explaining our common sense view (_pratikarmavyavasatha_) we may think that we have an objective world before us as the common field of experience. We can also imagine a scheme of things and operations by which the phenomenon of our experience may be interpreted in the light of the Vedanta metaphysics.

The subject can be conceived in three forms: firstly as the atman, the one highest reality, secondly as jiva or the atman as limited by its psychosis, when the psychosis is not differentiated from the atman, but atman is regarded as identical with the psychosis thus appearing as a living and knowing being, as _jivasak@si_ or perceiving consciousness, or the aspect in which the jiva comprehends, knows, or experiences; thirdly the anta@hkara@na psychosis or mind which is an inner centre or bundle of avidya manifestations, just as the outer world objects are exterior centres of avidya phenomena or objective entities. The anta@hkara@na is not only the avidya capable of supplying all forms to our present experiences, but it also contains all the tendencies and modes of past impressions of experience in this life or in past lives. The anta@hkara@na is always turning the various avidya modes of it into the jivasak@si (jiva in its aspect as illuminating mental states), and these are also immediately manifested, made known, and transformed into experience. These avidya states of the anta@hkara@na are called its v@rttis or states. The specific peculiarity of the v@rttiajnanas is this that only in these forms can they be superimposed upon pure consciousness, and thus be interpreted as states of consciousness and have their indefiniteness or cover removed. The

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forms of ajnana remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only so long as they do not come into relation to these v@rttis of anta@hkara@na, for the ajnana can be destroyed by the cit only in the form of a v@rtti, while in all other forms the ajnana veils the cit from manifestation. The removal of ajnana-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@na or the manifestation of v@rtti-jnana is nothing but this, that the anta@hkara@na states of avidya are the only states of ajnana which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous atman (_adhyasa_, false attribution). The objective world consists of the avidya phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity consists in this that avidya in this form cannot be superimposed on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These avidya phenomena may be regarded as many and diverse, but in all these forms they serve only to veil the cit and are beyond consciousness. It is only when they come in contact with the avidya phenomena as anta@hkara@na states that they coalesce with the avidya states and render themselves objects of consciousness or have their veil of avara@na removed. It is thus assumed that in ordinary perceptions of objects such as jug, etc. the anta@hkara@na goes out of the man’s body (_s’ariramadhyat_) and coming in touch with the jug becomes transformed into the same form, and as soon as this transformation takes place the cit which is always steadily shining illuminates the jug-form or the jug. The jug phenomena in the objective world could not be manifested (though these were taking place on the background of the same self-luminous Brahman or atman as forms of the highest truth of my subjective consciousness) because the ajnana phenomena in these forms serve to veil their illuminator, the self-luminous. It was only by coming into contact with these phenomena that the anta@hkara@na could be transformed into corresponding states and that the illumination dawned which at once revealed the anta@hkara@na states and the objects with which these states or v@rttis had coalesced. The consciousness manifested through the v@rttis alone has the power of removing the ajnana veiling the cit. Of course there are no actual distinctions of inner or outer, or the cit within me and the cit without me. These are only of appearance and due to avidya. And it is only from the point of view of appearance that we suppose that knowledge of objects can only dawn when the inner cit and the outer cit unite together through the anta@hkara@nav@rtti, which makes the external objects

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translucent as it were by its own translucence, removes the ajnana which was veiling the external self-luminous cit and reveals the object phenomena by the very union of the cit as reflected through it and the cit as underlying the object phenomena. The pratyak@sa-prama or right knowledge by perception is the cit, the pure consciousness, reflected through the v@rtti and identical with the cit as the background of the object phenomena revealed by it. From the relative point of view we may thus distinguish three consciousnesses: (1) consciousness as the background of objective phenomena, (2) consciousness as the background of the jiva or pramata, the individual, (3) consciousness reflected in the v@rtti of the anta@hkara@na; when these three unite perception is effected.

Prama or right knowledge means in Vedanta the acquirement of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by experience (_abadhita_). There is thus no absolute definition of truth. A knowledge acquired can be said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted. Thus the world appearance though it is very true now, may be rendered false, when this is contradicted by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated by a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations as pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated the perceptions, “I am happy,” or “I am sorry.” In continuous perception of anything for a certain time as an object or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or v@rtti is said to last in the same way all the while so long as any other new form is not taken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any new knowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter of inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with the fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

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mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it to be odoriferous. Vedanta does not admit the existence of the relation called _samavaya_ (inherence) or _jati_ (class notion); and so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the other class called inference, and holds that both perception and