Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.
I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty’s Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.
No. 43.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received July 27.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 27, 1914.
Your telegram of 26th July.
Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.
In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by “mobilising against Germany.” He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.
Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.
No. 56.
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received July 28.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
No. 62.
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received July 28.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July 28_, 1914.
I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word “mediation,” but said that, as mentioned in your speech,[187] which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.
In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.
[Footnote 187: “Hansard,” Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.]
No. 85.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received July 29.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 29, 1914.
I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.
He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany’s obligations as Austria’s ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany’s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty’s Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.
In reply to his Excellency’s enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.
Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.
No. 87.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav–a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.
M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.
He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 89.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation–which I hoped would continue–into thinking that we should stand aside.
He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?
I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.
The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 98.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received July 30.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 30, 1914.
Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky’s telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved.
He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany’s position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave–a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday–Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.
His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.
He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.
No. 101.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, July_ 30, 1914.
Your telegram of 29th July.[188]
His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty’s Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
[Footnote 188: See No. 85.]
Enclosure 1 in No. 105.
_Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon_.
My dear Ambassador, _Foreign Office, November 22_, 1912.
From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.
Yours, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 119.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 31, 1914.
M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, it we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.
I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.
M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.
I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.
M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.
I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England’s interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.
I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
No. 122.
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received August 1.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914.
Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.
I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.
It appears from what he said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.
I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.
In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government.
No. 123.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
Sir, _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.
I am, &c.
E. GREY.
[Footnote 189: See No. 122.]
No. 133.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:–
“The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.
“M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.”
(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)
No. 134.
_Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.–(Received August 1.)_
(Telegraphic.) _Paris, August_ 1, 1914.
President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.
No. 148.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914.
After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:–
“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.
“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”
I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.
M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow–in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.
No. 153.
_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914.
The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:–
“Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”
His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.
We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.
His Majesty’s Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.
APPENDIX III
Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty’s Ambassador at Berlin respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government.
(Cd. 7445.)
_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_.
Sir, _London, August_ 8, 1914.
In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty’s Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be “No,” as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.
During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o’clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty’s Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o’clock as the time when His Majesty’s Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o’clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty’s Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.
I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty’s Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word–“neutrality,” a word which in war time had so often been disregarded–just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of “life and death” for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, “But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?” I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany’s enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.
After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.[190]
[Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.]
APPENDIX IV
THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME
The following document is contained in the German Version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge of the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it is omitted altogether in the official version in English of the German White Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the appearance of an extract from a German newspaper.
Aus dem oesterreich-ungarischen Material.
Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an die auswaertigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts erwaehnte Dossier wird heute veroeffentlicht.
In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die suedlichen Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurueckgreist. Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensitaet wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der Unnerionskrise ihren Hoehepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen hervor. Waehrend einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich–von anderen Propagandamitteln abgesehen–Ussoziationen, die diese Kaempfe vorbereiteten, unter denen die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionaeren Komitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader Auswaertigen Amte voellig abhaengige Organisation unter Leitung von Staatsmaennern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan Pribicevic gehoeren zu diesen Gruendern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausruestung von Freischaren fuer den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die oefterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In einer dem Memoire angefuegten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens veroeffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Taetigfelt und Ziele dieses Vereins ausfuehrlich dargelegt werden. Es heisst darin, dass zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren nahen und ferneren Bruedern jenseits der Grenze und unseren uebrigen Freunden in der Welt gehoeren.
_Oesterreich ist als erster und groesster Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das Schlusskapitel enthaelt einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln fuer den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die Annexion vorangezeigt hat.
Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Taetigkeit der Narodna Odbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmaessig inspiziert wurden. Weiter wurden die Komitatschis im _Schiessen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbruecken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen Erklaerung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber nicht nur nicht erfuellt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire fuehrt als Beispiel die Art und Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentaeter als serbischer Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blaetter wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt.
Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gruendung wurde die Narodna Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der _Schuetzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und verschiedene andere Vereine angehoerten_.
Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die fueoerperliche Entwickelung der Bevoelkerung Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kraeftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem Vereinsorgan, in welchem “die heilige Wahrheit” gepredigt wird, dass es eine unerlaessliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten groessten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu fuehren, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen unterjochter Brueder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und Reden aehnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswaertige Taetigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei denen offen Mitglieder fuer die erwaehnte serbische Vereinigung geworben wurden, besteht. Gegenwaertig ist noch die Untersuchung darueber im Zuge, dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmaenner und Missionaere wurde die Aufwiegelung in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umstaenden verleitet. In den Schulen der Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der gewuenschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militaerisch auch insofern vorbereitet, als serbische Emissaere im Falle des Ausbruchs der Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstoerung von Transportmitteln usw., der Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in einer besonderen Beilage belegt.
Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Taetigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den Attentaten gegen den Koeniglichen Kommissaer in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem missglueckten Attentat Schaefers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es verbreitet sich hierauf ueber den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, ueber die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie sich die Attentaeter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassen lieferte, wie auch die Rolle eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als Zoegling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte. Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darueber laesst, dass dies ein wohl voerberiteter und fuer die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.
Eine Beilage enthaelt einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in Serajewo ueber die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic gestaendig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem fluechtigen Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist gestaendig, die Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole ausgefuehrt zu haben. Beide Taeter gaben zu, bei der Veruebung der Tat die Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter ueber Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmaessig hergestellt wurden, fuer millitaerische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft ueber den Transport der drei Attentaeter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehoeriger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem Attentat dem oesterreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Veruebung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog waehrend dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gruenden verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein. Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt haetten. Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprueft sind, kann ueber deren Stichhaltigkeit vorlaeufig noch kein Urteil gefaellt werden. In der Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, waehrend das vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Suedungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenroete der serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller “noch zu befreienden Provinzen”: Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw. stehen.
APPENDIX V
Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty’s Ambassador at Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.
(Cd. 7596)
_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_.
_London, September_ 1, 1914.
Sir,
The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments.
The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.
So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight’s leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the “Neue Freie Presse” and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official “Fremdenblatt”, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications.
On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.
The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold’s peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty’s Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty’s Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty’s Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.
His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither “banged the door” on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.
Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days’ delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.
Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at Vienna that “the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia.”
M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold’s assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador’s departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.
The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor’s speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The “Neue Freie Presse” was violently insulting towards England. The “Fremdenblatt” was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty’s Government no alternative but to take part in the war.
The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.
On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty’s Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage.
On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.
After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty’s Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument…
[Footnote 191: “Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914).”]
[Footnote 192: See No. 137, “Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914).”]
APPENDIX VI
EXTRACTS FROM
THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
_Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_:
_Negociations ayant precede la guerre_
_10/23 Juillet–24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914_
PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI
This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp. 66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when friction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)
The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. This threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all precautions; ‘since we cannot accede to Germany’s desire, the only course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.’ (_Infra_, No. 58.) The reader will also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn; and that the German Government explained that the publication had been premature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in her attitude to Russia.
It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared war on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79.)
In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.
MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.
RECUEIL
DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.
Negociations ayant precede la guerre.
10/23 Juillet–24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914.
Petrograde,
Imprimerie de l’Etat.
1914.
No. 1.
Le Charge d’affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_).
Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
Le Ministre d’Autriche vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du soir, an Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un delai de 48 heures pour l’acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbalement que pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee integralement dans un delai de 48 heures, il avait l’ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournee electorale ont ete rappeles et sont attendus a Belgrade demain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m’a communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l’aide de la Russie et declare qu’aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de l’Autriche.
(Signe) Strandtman.
No. 2.
Le Charge d’affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._
Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
Texte de la note qui a ete transmise aujourd’hui par le Ministre d’Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:…
(_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in Appendix I._))
Un memoire concernant les resultats de l’instruction de Sarajevo a l’egard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a cette note’.[193]
(Signe) Strandtman.
[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3 (_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book.]
No. 3.
Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l’Ambassadeur d’Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le 11/24 Juillet 1914 a 10 heures du matin.
Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s’est trouve dans la necessite de remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l’entremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:
(Suit le texte de la note).
Voir document No. 2.
No. 4.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d’affaires en Autriche-Hongrie.
_(Telegramme)._
St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d’Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit….
(This communication is printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English.)
Communique a Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 5.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants de Sa Majeste l’Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.
_(Telegramme)._
St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Me refere a mon telegramme a Koudachew d’aujourd’hui; nous esperons que le Gouvernement aupres duquel. Vous etes accredite partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d’urgence a son Representant a Vienne de se prononcer dans le meme sens.
Communique a Belgrade.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 6.
Telegramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de Serbie a Sa Majeste l’Empereur.
Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l’attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie des les premiers jours de l’horrible crime a declare qu’elle le condamnait et qu’elle etait prete a ouvrir une enquete sur son territoire si la complicite de certains de ses sujets etait prouvee au cours du proces instruit par les autorites Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignite comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous demande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans l’officiel et un ordre du souverain a l’armee, ou nous reprimerions l’esprit hostile contre l’Autriche en nous faisant a nous memes des reproches d’une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides.–On nous impose ensuite l’admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les notres a l’instruction et pour surveiller l’execution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note. Nous avons recu un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Legation d’Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prets a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d’un Etat independant, ainsi que celles dont l’acception nous sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; toutes les personnes dont la participation a l’attentat sera demontree seront severement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient etre executees sans des changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l’expiration du delai par l’armee austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. Il nous est impossible de nous defendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Majeste qui s’est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard nous fait esperer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son genereux coeur slave.
En ces moments difficiles l’interprete les sentiments du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s’interesser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.
(Signe) Alexandre.
No. 7.
Le Charge d’Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._
Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Tous les journaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent l’impossibilite pour la Serbie d’accepter les conditions posees, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton energique adopte par l’Autriche. L’officieux “Local-Anzeiger” est particulierement agressif; il qualifie de superflus les recours eventuels de la Serbie a St. Petersbourg, a Paris, a Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la situation dans la peninsule Balcanique va enfin s’eclaircir.
(Signe) Bronewsky.
No. 8.
Le Charge d’Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
La copie de la note officiellement remise a Belgrade a ete communiquee par l’Ambassadeur d’Autriche an Gouvernement Francais. Plus tard l’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne a visite le Ministre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu’en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l’Autriche serait obligee de recourir a une pression et, en cas de besoin, a des mesures militaires; la communication se terminait par la remarque qu’a l’avis de l’Allemagne cette question devrait etre resolue directement entre l’Autriche et la Serbie et qu’il etait de l’interet des Puissances de circonscrire l’affaire en l’abandonnant aux Parties interessees. Le Gerant du Departement Politique, qui assistait a l’entretien, demanda a l’Ambassadeur s’il fallait considerer l’action autrichienne comme un ultimatum–en d’autres termes, si, dans le cas ou la Serbie ne se soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilites etaient inevitables? L’ambassadeur evita une reponse directe en alleguant l’absence d’instructions.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 9.
Le Charge d’Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
Pachitch est rentre a Belgrade. Il a l’intention de donner dans le delai fixe, c’est a dire demain Samedi a 6 heures du soir, une reponse a l’Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On adressera aujourd’hui meme aux Puissances la priere de defendre l’independance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inevitable–nous ferons la guerre.
(Signe) Strandtman.
No. 10.
Communique du Gouvernement Imperial.
St.-Petersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Les derniers evenements et l’envoi par l’Autriche-Hongrie d’un ultimatum a la Serbie preoccupent le Gouvernement Imperial an plus haut degre. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement l’evolution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifferente.
No. 11.
Le Charge d’Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Le comte Berchtold se trouve a Ischl. Vu l’impossibilite d’y arriver a temps, je lui ai telegraphie notre proposition de prolonger le delai de l’ultimatum et l’ai repetee verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m’a promis de la communiquer a temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, mais a ajoute qu’il pouvait predire avec assurance un refus categorique.
(Signe) Koudachew.
No. 12.
Le Charge d’Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Suite a mon telegramme d’aujourd’hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la reponse negative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a notre proposition de prolonger le delai de la note.
(Signe) Koudachew.
No. 13.
Le Charge d’Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Recu avec retard le 14–27 Juillet 1914.
Je transmets la reponse que le President du Conseil des Ministres Serbe a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois a Belgrade aujourd’hui avant l’expiration du delai de l’ultimatum….
(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, pp. 23-32 (supra, Appendix I.).)
No. 14.
Le Charge d’affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Ai recu Votre telegramme du 11/24 Juillet. Ai communique son contenu an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais l’a egalement prie de conseiller a Vienne la prolongation du delai de l’ultimatum; il a communique cette demarche telegraphiquement a Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre demarche, mais il craint qu’a la suite de l’absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses telegrammes ne restent sans resultats; il a, en outre, des doutes sur l’opportunite pour l’Autriche de ceder an dernier moment et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l’assurance de la Serbie. J’ai repondu qu’une grande Puissance comme l’Autriche pourrait ceder sans porter atteinte a son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments conformes, cependant je n’ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises. Meme lorsque je laissais entendre qu’il fallait agir a Vienne pour eviter la possibilite de consequences redoutables, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres repondait chaque fois negativement.
(Signe) Bronewsky.
No. 15.
Le Charge d’affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Ai recu le telegramme du 11/24 Juillet concernant la prolongation du delai de l’ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le Representant de France a Vienne a ete muni d’instructions conformes.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 16.
L’Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Recu telegramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit a l’Ambassadeur d’Angleterre a Vienne d’appuyer notre demarche concernant la prolongation du delai de l’ultimatum. Il m’a dit en meme temps que l’Ambassadeur d’Autriche etait venu le voir et avait explique qu’on ne devrait pas attribuer a la note autrichienne le caractere d’un ultimatum; il faudrait la considerer comme une demarche qui, en cas d’absence de reponse ou en cas de reponse insuffisante au terme fixe, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le depart immediat de Belgrade du Ministre d’Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant le commencement immediat des hostilites.–Grey a ajoute qu’a la suite de cette explication il a indique a l’Ambassadeur d’Angleterre a Vienne que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la question de la prolongation du delai de l’ultimatum, celle de l’arret des hostilites pourrait peut-etre servir de base a la discussion.
(Signe) Benckendorff.
No. 17.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l’Ambassadeur a Londres.
_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Dans le cas d’une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous comptons que l’Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du cote de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l’equilibre europeen, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passe et qui serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l’Autriche.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 18.
Note verbale remise par l’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle repandue par quelques journaux d’apres laquelle la demarche du Gouvernement d’Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a l’instigation de l’Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n’a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu’elle ait ete remise et n’a exerce aucune influence sur son contenu. C’est a tort qu’on attribue a l’Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.
L’Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allie de l’Autriche les revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.
Avant tout elle desire comme elle l’a deja declare des le commencement du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localise.
No. 19.
Le Charge d’affaires en France an Ministre des affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)_ Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Me refere a mon telegramme du 11/24 Juillet.
Aujourd’hui un journal du matin a publie, sous une forme pas entierement exacte, les declarations d’hier de l’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent a cette demarche le caractere d’une menace. L’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne, tres impressionne par ces divulgations, a visite aujourd’hui le Gerant du Departement Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n’avaient nullement eu le caractere de menace qu’on leur attribue. Il a declare que l’Autriche avait presente sa note a la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin, mais que cependant l’Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l’Autriche et que certainement ‘la fleche une fois partie’ (ce sont la ses propres paroles), l’Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs d’alliee.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 20.
L’ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Grey m’a dit que l’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne lui a declare que le Gouvernement Allemand n’avait pas ete informe du texte de la note autrichienne, mais qu’il soutenait entierement la demarche autrichienne. L’Ambassadeur a demande en meme temps si l’Angleterre pouvait consentir a agir a St. Petersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a repondu que cela etait completement impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant que les complications n’existaient qu’entre l’Autriche et la Serbie, les interets Anglais n’etaient engages qu’indirectement, mais qu’il devait prevoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce moment on se trouverait en presence d’une situation a laquelle seraient interessees toutes les Puissances. L’Angleterre se reservait pour ce cas une complete liberte d’action.
(Signe) Benckendorff.
No. 21.
Le Charge d’affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe a l’ultimatum, le Ministre d’Autriche vient d’informer, a 6-1/2 du soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n’ayant pas recu an delai fixe une reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoquee a Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la meme ville.
(Signe) Strandtman.
No. 22.
L’Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
Grey a dit a l’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne qu’a son avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la Russie, qu’alors surgirait le danger aigu d’une guerre generale et qu’il ne voyait qu’un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu’en presence des mobilisations autrichienne et russe, l’Allemagne, la France, l’Italie et l’Angleterre s’abstiennent d’une mobilisation immediate et proposent tout d’abord leurs bons offices. Grey m’a dit que ce plan necessitait avant tout l’agrement de l’Allemagne et l’engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas mobiliser. En consequence il a adresse tout d’abord a Berlin une question a ce sujet.
(Signe) Benckendorff.
No. 23.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l’Ambassadeur en Italie.
_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
L’Italie pourrait jouer un role de tout premier ordre en faveur du maintien de la paix, en exercant l’influence necessaire sur l’Autriche et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait etre localise. Il est desirable que vous exprimiez la conviction qu’il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide a la Serbie.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 24.
Le Gerant du Consulat a Prague au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Prague, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
La mobilisation a ete decretee.
(Signe) Kazansky.
No. 25.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l’Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie.
_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
J’ai eu aujourd’hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec l’Ambassadeur d’Autriche-Hongrie. Apres avoir examine avec lui les 10 demandes adressees a la Serbie, j’ai fait observer qu’a part la forme peu habile sous laquelle elles sont presentees, quelques-unes parmi elles sont absolument inexecutables, meme dans le cas ou le gouvernement Serbe declarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1 et 2 ne pourraient etre executes sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la Scoupchtina pourrait etre difficilement obtenu; quant a l’execution des points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des consequences fort dangereuses et meme faire naitre le danger d’actes de terrorisme diriges contre les membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrer dans les vues de l’Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me semble, qu’avec certains changements dans les details, il ne serait pas difficile de trouver un terrain d’entente si les accusations y contenues etaient confirmees par des preuves suffisantes.
Dans l’interet de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szapary, est precieuse a l’Autriche au meme degre qu’a toutes les Puissances, il serait necessaire de mettre au plus tot possible une fin a la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait tres desirable que l’Ambassadeur d’Autriche-Hongrie fut autorise d’entrer avec moi dans un echange de vues prive aux fins d’un remaniement en commun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 Juillet. Ce procede permettrait peut-etre de trouver une formule qui fut acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction a l’Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le sens de ce telegramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 26.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l’Ambassadeur en Allemagne.
_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet.
Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon telegramme a Vienne d’aujourd’hui au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Allemand et lui exprimer l’espoir, que de son cote il trouvera possible de conseiller a Vienne d’aller au-devant de notre proposition.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 27.
Le Charge d’Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
Le Directeur du Departement Politique m’informe, que lors de la communication qu’il a faite a l’Ambassadeur d’Autriche du contenu de la reponse serbe a l’ultimatum, l’Ambassadeur n’a pas cache son etonnement de ce qu’elle n’ait pas donne satisfaction a Giesl. L’attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l’avis du Directeur du Departement Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 28.
Le Charge d’Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
Aujourd’hui l’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et lui a fait les declarations suivantes:
“L’Autriche a declare a la Russie qu’elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu’elle ne menace pas l’integrite de la Serbie. Son but unique est d’assurer sa propre tranquillite. Par consequent il depend de la Russie d’eviter la guerre. L’Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le desir ardent de conserver la paix et espere fermement que la France usera de son influence a Petersbourg dans un sens moderateur”. Le Ministre fit observer que l’Allemagne pourrait de son cote entreprendre des demarches analogues a Vienne, surtout en presence de l’esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. L’Ambassadeur repondit que cela n’etait pas possible, vu la resolution prise de ne pas s’immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances–l’Angleterre, l’Allemagne, l’Italie et la France–ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des demarches a St. Petersbourg et a Vienne, puisque l’affaire se reduisait en somme a un conflit entre la Russie et l’Autriche. L’Ambassadeur allegua l’absence d’instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa d’adherer a la proposition allemande.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 29.
Le Charge d’Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet 1914.
Le Directeur du Departement Politique a declare qu’a son avis personnel, les demarches successives allemandes a Paris ont pour but d’intimider la France et d’amener son intervention a St. Petersbourg.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 30.
Le Charge d’Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
(_Telegramme_). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
Apres la reception a Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l’armee autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composee, aux dires des journaux, en partie d’elements autrichiens, se livra a une serie de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l’Autriche. A une heure avancee de la soiree les manifestants se masserent a plusieurs reprises devant le palais de l’Ambassade Imperiale en poussant des cris hostiles a la Russie; la police etait presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.
(Signe) Bronewsky.
No. 31.
L’Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)_.
Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Ai recu votre telegramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me telegraphier si, a Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s’accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la mediation des 4 Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l’Ambassadeur d’Angleterre a St. Petersbourg que Vous etiez dispose a accepter cette combinaison, Grey a decide de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu’il a faite hier soir a Berlin, a Paris et a Rome.
(Signe) Benckendorff.
No. 32.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en France et en Angleterre.
_(Telegramme)_.
St. Petersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 53.).)
No. 33.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.
_(Telegramme)_.
St. Petersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
Ai pris connaissance de la reponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbe au Baron Giesl. Elle depasse toutes nos previsions par sa moderation et son desir de donner la plus complete satisfaction a l’Autriche. Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient etre encore les demandes de l’Autriche, a moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un pretexte pour une guerre avec la Serbie.
(Signe) Sazonow.
No. 34.
Le Charge d’Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
_(Telegramme)_.
Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
L’Ambassadeur d’Allemagne a confere aujourd’hui de nouveau longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du Departement Politique. L’Ambassadeur a beaucoup insiste sur l’exclusion de toute possibilite d’une mediation ou d’une conference.
(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
No. 35.
L’Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.