Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.
Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilization should cease within 12 hours.
Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her attitude in case of a Russo-German war.
English bankers confer with the Government about the financial situation.
Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of English ships at Hamburg.
Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.
Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.
Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.
Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet will protect the North Coast of France against the German fleet.
Germans enter French territory near Cirey.
Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members of the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war.
Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.
Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons.
Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.
Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by midnight.
The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practically announcing war against Germany and explaining the British position.
Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport.
Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.
Notes:
[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27. We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in this country) in Appendix IV.]
[Footnote 26: Full text _infra_ in Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23); more correctly in _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the differences between the two versions are immaterial for our present purpose.]
[Footnote 27: See the communication to England in _Correspondence_, No. 4.]
[Footnote 28: _Correspondence_, No. 9, Note communicated by the German Ambassador, July 24.]
[Footnote 29: _Correspondence_, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
[Footnote 30: _Correspondence_, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.]
[Footnote 31: _Correspondence_, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]
[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note see _infra_ Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there.]
[Footnote 33: _Correspondence_, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27; _ibid_. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
[Footnote 34: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (_infra_ in Appendix I). The Tsar to His Majesty, July 30.]
[Footnote 36: _Correspondence_, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.]
[Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28 (_Correspondence_, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 see _Correspondence_, No. III; of August I, see Appendix V.]
[Footnote 38: _Correspondence_, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.]
[Footnote 39: _Correspondence_, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, _infra_).]
[Footnote 41: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (_infra_, Appendix I).]
[Footnote 43: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.]
[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems to be July 27.]
[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II.]
[Footnote 46: _Ibid_. p. 9.]
[Footnote 47: _Ibid_. p. 10.]
[Footnote 48: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 49: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
[Footnote 50: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1.]
[Footnote 51: _Ibid_. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.]
[Footnote 52: _Ibid_. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
[Footnote 53: _Ibid_. No. 114, 120, 122.]
[Footnote 54: _Ibid_. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.]
[Footnote 55: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.]
[Footnote 56: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]
CHAPTER V
NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
For purposes of reference the following list of _dramatis personae_ may be useful:–
GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, _succ_. 1910. _Foreign Secretary_: Sir Edward Grey.
_Ambassadors from France_: M. Paul Cambon. _Russia_: Count Benckendorff.
_Germany_: Prince Lichnowsky.
_Austria_: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein. _Belgium_: Count A. de Lalaing (_Minister_).
RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, _succ_. 1894. _Foreign Secretary_: M. Sazonof.
_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir George Buchanan. _France_: M. Paleologue.
_Germany_: Count Pourtales.
_Austria_: Friedrich Count Szapary.
FRANCE: Raymond Poincare, _President, elected_ 1913. _Premier_: M. Viviani.
_Acting Foreign Secretary_: M. Doumergue. _Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Francis Bertie. _Russia_: M. Isvolsky.
M. Sevastopoulo (_Charge d’Affaires_). _Germany_: Baron von Schoen.
_Austria_: Count Scezsen.
GERMANY: Emperor William II, _succ_. 1888. _Imperial Chancellor_: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. _Foreign Secretary_: Herr von Jagow.
_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (_Councillor_).
_Russia:_ M. Swerbeiev.
M. Bronewsky (_Charge d’Affaires_). _France:_ M. Jules Cambon.
_Austria_: Count Ladislaus Szoegyeny-Marich.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, _succ_. 1848. _Foreign Secretary_: Count Berchtold.
_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Maurice de Bunsen. _Russia_: M. Schebesco.
M. Kondachev (_Charge d’Affaires_). _France_: M. Crozier.
_Germany_: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Boegendorff.
ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, _succ_. 1900. _Foreign Secretary_: Marquis di San Giuliano. _Ambassador from Great Britain_: Sir Rennell Rodd.
BELGIUM: King Albert, _succ_. 1909.
_Minister of Great Britain_: Sir Francis Villiers.
SERVIA: King Peter, _succ_. 1903.
_Minister of Great Britain_: C.L. des Graz. D.M. Crackanthorpe (_First Secretary_). _Russian Charge d’Affaires_: M. Strandtmann.
I
_Germany’s attitude to Austria and Russia_.
From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that it was a ‘matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57] Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out that ‘Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia’.[59]
After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold’s suggestion that ‘in taking military action in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia’.[60]
At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria in the Servian business:–
‘As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter…. Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61]
M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this policy of Germany pretty soon:–
‘My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally…. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62]
When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion thus:–
‘The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war.'[63]
And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his Russian colleague that
‘the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.'[64]
Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end. No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any lengths against Servia. Over and over again the German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused ‘to discuss the Servian note’, adding that ‘Austria’s standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do’.[65] Next day the German Ambassador at Vienna was continuing ‘to feign surprise that Servian affairs could be of such interest to Russia’.[66] But in their White Book, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark that they ‘were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field’.[67] Both stories cannot be true: the German Government have, not for the last time in the history of these negotiations, to choose between ineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that Russia was bound to come into the field.
When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he could to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia, and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria so that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. On the day of the presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately ‘for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications’.[68] The proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal, and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that the conference suggested
‘would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.’
Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that
‘the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation’.[69]
Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the German Secretary of State’s loudly expressed desire for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection must be to the ‘form of the proposal’. ‘Perhaps’, added Sir Edward Goschen, ‘he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:–
‘The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable.'[71]
But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country.
With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany. The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to misrepresent Sir Edward Grey’s proposal as a conference on the particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the general situation of Europe.
In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage, but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between the Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that Prince Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July 24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he told Sir Edward Grey ‘that a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria’.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation between them, on information received from Berlin, that ‘the difficulty was rather the “conference” than the principle’.[75] But we may ask whether Herr von Jagow’s reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing that he said that such a ‘conference was not practicable’, and that ‘it would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments’.[76] But, if it was not the principle that was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothing else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable. Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid at the door of the German Government.
The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there were great doubts ‘whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference’. Even if she had been willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77]
Now the German Secretary of State had argued that ‘if Russia mobilized against Germany, latter would have to follow suit’. On being asked what he meant by ‘mobilizing against Germany’, he said that
‘if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.'[78]
This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable. But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds for German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made about this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four southern districts: ‘He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, used such language to his home Government, for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatches appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly honest. The military attache says, ‘I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa’. He adds: ‘it is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere’.[81]
There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans themselves, no mobilization ‘against Germany’. The only thing that looks at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a ‘state of war’ (_Kriegszustand_) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July that Government did not consider _Kriegszustand_ in Kovno to be equivalent to ‘mobilization against Germany’.
Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war. Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive attitude, for many people believed that ‘Russia neither wanted, nor was in a position to make war’.[82] This attitude of mind was known and deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said ‘there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest’.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count Pourtales, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors ‘that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia–more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland’.[84]
After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, though under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July 30 to stop all military preparations if Austria ‘would eliminate from her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of Servia’.[85] ‘Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,’ wrote Sir George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.[87]
Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a proclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, ‘as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed’.[89]
Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made ‘even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in the south as well’.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment.
War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other’s demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position that ‘Russia’s mobilization had spoilt everything’.[94] This attitude is as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announced that under certain conditions ‘she would undertake to preserve her waiting attitude’.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one answer?
The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself, and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military preparations–an inexcusable step, which increased Russia’s apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?
II
_Germany’s attitude to France._
We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On the 27th of July we are told that the German Government received ‘the first intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison’.[98] Will it be believed that, except for the assertion ‘of rapidly progressing preparations of France, both on water and on land’,[99] this is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to prove the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth while to point out that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heard of the ‘rapidly progressing preparations of France’, the French Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that ‘they had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled the officers on leave’.[100]
The very next day the French Government had ‘reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war’,[101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into French territory.[102] With great forbearance the French Government withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, although German reservists had been recalled from abroad ‘by tens of thousands’, the French Government had not called out a single reservist. Well might the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say ‘Germany has done it’.[103]
Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Government presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the French intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that it would consult its own interests.[104]
III
_The Question of British Neutrality_.
Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel. If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were only involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France; and England would not have been dragged into war.[105] The question of British neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th, when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: ‘if war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it’.[106] Two days later he wrote again:–
‘I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside … This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet … not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But … my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.'[107]
On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him ‘he did not wish the Ambassador to be misled … into thinking we should stand aside’. Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassador that
‘there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid…. But … I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action.'[108]
Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor had made his notorious ‘bid for British neutrality’ on July 29:–
‘He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
‘I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland … so long as Germany’s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty’s Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.'[109]
This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British Government:–
‘His Majesty’s Government cannot for one moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
‘What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
‘From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy.
‘Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
‘The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.[110]
He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutely free and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression by the Powers of the Triple _Entente_:–
‘If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately … The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this crisis … be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.’
Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:–‘His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier … that he received your communication without a comment.'[111]
But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely complain that no warning had been given to him.
With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir Rennell Rodd that he had
‘good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.'[112]
As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it is not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to Sir Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlin sent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey’s warning.
Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France and Germany whether they were ‘prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it’,[113] the French gave an unequivocal promise the same day,[114] while the German answer is a striking contrast:–
‘I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.
‘It appears from what he said that German Government considers that certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.'[115]
It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was warned the next day that ‘the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country’, and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the German Government similar to that given by France:–
‘If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'[116]
The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and without authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise that Great Britain would remain neutral ‘if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality’, but Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse such an offer, seeing that it left out of account all question of an attack on France and her colonies, about which it had been stated already that there could be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity of France and her colonies was suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse, for the reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in rejecting what is now known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg’s ‘infamous proposal’, namely, that France without actually losing territory might be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. And if there should be still any doubt about Sir Edward Grey’s policy at this moment, we would refer to his statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[117] The important points are that the offers of August 1 were made on the sole responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, and without authority from his Government; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed the conditions on which we might remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so far was the German Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium that he actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey ‘not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions’. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky may have said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two days later the German Government were making no concessions on that point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a position we had taken up on July 30, four days before.
One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to have been made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an offer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and the German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations between the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such hopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever any idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the original proposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[118]
Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were still discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be an occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg. Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[119] that Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon in 1867 had agreed to a ‘collective guarantee’ by which it was not intended that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any Government which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by the Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the more cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. Against this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, she did not appeal to the Powers.[120]
Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to the King for ‘diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium’.[121] The German Government had issued an ultimatum to the Belgian, asking for
‘a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours’.[122]
Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with ourselves was a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian Government was told to resist German aggression by all the means in its power, as Great Britain was prepared to join France and Russia to maintain the independence and integrity of Belgium.[123] On receipt of the protest of Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: ‘Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory’: to pass through Belgium was necessary because the ‘German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information’. It was for Germany ‘a question of life and death to prevent French advance’.[124] But matters had gone too far: that day (August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at Gemmenich, and thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, issued earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum:–
‘We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.
‘We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.
‘In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o’clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty’s Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.'[125]
The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the ‘harangue’ of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment at the value laid by Great Britain upon the ‘scrap of paper’ of 1839 would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow’s desperate bid for neutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government had counted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeply disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour to bargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peace between Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their origin must be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom we believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the war broke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour of European peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German hierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that Sir Edward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on July 31, ‘I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.'[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sent out from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customs authorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detaining British ships,[127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar from British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was made twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominous statement that ‘no information was to be had’.[128]
This, however, is a digression from the main question. History will doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany to the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will judge that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by the German Government for this wanton outrage on international agreements are instructive. In conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the Chancellor urged that the French had violated the neutrality; the argument is purely and simply that the route by way of the Vosges is difficult, time is everything, and it is a matter of life and death to Germany to crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be able to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those who put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so vice paid homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky that he had ‘absolutely unimpeachable information’ that the German army was exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the other hand, the Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have known nothing of any such action by France; at any rate he made no mention of it in his speech to the Reichstag:–
‘We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong–I speak openly–that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought–how he is to hack his way through.'[129]
In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have an example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable folly. The violation of Belgium must have been designed either in order to bring us into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in spite of treaties and warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet the foolishness of such a calculation is as nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germany had to violate Belgian neutrality because the French were going to do so, or had done so. In such a case undoubtedly the wisest course for Germany would have been to allow the French to earn the reward of their own folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain, to whom not five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the side of Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put forward the plea that the French had already violated its neutrality before war was declared. This plea has been like a snowball. It began with the ineffective accusation that the French were at Givet, a town in French territory, and that this constituted an attack on Germany, though how the presence of the French in a town of their own could be called a violation of their neighbour’s neutrality it is difficult to see. From that it has gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French supplying a garrison to Liege. There can be little doubt that all these attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French violated Belgian neutrality are another illustration of Swift’s dictum to the effect that ‘as universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems’, it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, ‘even by those who are most celebrated in that faculty’.[130]
IV
_England and Servia_.
We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis which followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon the presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and to English readers at least more interesting, to realize what attitude was taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained the position, which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had no direct interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to prevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not see, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political and religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia to military action. For Russia had greater interests in the security of Servia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each case the Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfere to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia by racial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself, not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but to prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia which would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. He stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons on July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which he then explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he would concern himself
‘with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty’s Government[132].’
In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the German Ambassador:–
‘If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence[133].’
Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peace at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and tried to induce Servia to ‘express concern and regret’ and to ‘give Austria the fullest satisfaction’, ‘if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders at Serajevo[134].’ Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go; Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof when he laid stress on the need of the sanction of British public opinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:–
‘I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.'[136]
However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] was presented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff, withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet in London immediately ‘for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications’, and ‘that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference’.[138] This proposal failed, as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm to his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that ‘the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand’.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with Count Mensdorff ‘the merits of the question between Austria and Servia’.[140]
No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey’s attitude was diplomatically correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the ‘equivocal and double-faced’ policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that
‘a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of international relations.'[141]
V
_Great Britain declines ‘Solidarity’ with Russia and France_.
There is however another question which involves the whole foreign policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey’s credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof ‘hoped that His Majesty’s Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.[142]’ The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that
‘we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].’
On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his conviction that
‘peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty’s Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude[144].’
Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:–
‘As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect.'[145]
Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he
‘saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty’s Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms’.[146]
On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon that
‘even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav–a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question’.[148]
That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on Britain’s foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that
‘this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave’.[149]
The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward Grey said:–
‘I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.'[150]
It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey’s belief was justified. England’s attitude may have been an important factor in the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral under all circumstances.
Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany’s prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly–and even probably[152] with Germany’s knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt.
It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] ‘the _dossier_ elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of 28th June’, which it said it held at the disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff ‘admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory’.[155]
To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd. But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.
Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the horrors of war from Europe.
VI
_Italy’s comments on the situation_.
We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said, is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of Italy’s policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a conversation with Sir Edward Grey ‘made no secret of the fact that Italy was desirous to see war avoided’,[160] and he cordially approved the idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military operations, but made a further suggestion that
‘Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone’.[162]
Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in Servia’s reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany’s objection to the idea of a ‘Conference’ by suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the practical suggestion that
‘Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory…. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]
Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should
‘convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire Servian territory’.[166]
All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign Minister:–
‘The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.'[167]
The German White Book says ‘Russia began the war on us'[168] and ‘France opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.
NOTE
_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia’s reply_.
On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum which the _Temps_ next day described as ‘unprecedented in its arrogance and in the extravagance of its demands’. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:–
‘I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia’s independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]
It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[171] that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a _demarche_ with a time-limit.
In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded:–
A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its ‘Official Gazette’, and in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the Army, and should communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration
(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the propaganda;
(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations.
B. That Servia should undertake
(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary;
(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies and to confiscate their means of propaganda;
(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against Austria-Hungary;
(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of communicating;
(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian movement;
(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates;
(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo;
(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;
(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.
On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The Servian Government agreed
A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration
(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary;
(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in the propaganda;
(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who are guilty of such acts.
B. That Servia would undertake
(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution providing for the confiscation of such publications;
(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;
(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda;
(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;
(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations;
(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure;
(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways;
(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier;
(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passages and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials.
The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one sample may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed out[175] that it
‘would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia’s independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.’
Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated this as deliberate misrepresentation:–
‘The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.
…
‘If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between “enquete judiciaire” and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.'[176]
It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been a genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen’s impression
‘that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation’.[178]
Notes:
[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.]
[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.]
[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.]
[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]
[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See also German White Book, p. 5.]
[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July 15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).]
[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]
[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]
[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.]
[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, July 24.]
[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27.]
[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
[Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out that Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactory than the information of the German Imperial attache in Russia, whose account of the Russian military preparations supports only in part the allegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7; also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian Orange Book No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
[Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
[Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29.]
[Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914.]
[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]
[Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from the _Militaer-Wochenblatt_: ‘The fighting power of Russia is usually over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, the higher command, armaments…. All military preparations for war, of whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and that order which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, without exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events with complete calm, trusting to God and her own might.’]
[Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
[Footnote 85: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 88: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_ published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July 31, that ‘the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein’.]
[Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
[Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135.]
[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI).]
[Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that ‘The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.’]
[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8.]
[Footnote 99: _Ibid_. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17.]
[Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29: ‘His Excellency denied German Government had done this. Nevertheless it is true.’]
[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.]
[Footnote 103: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I).]
[Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 1.]
[Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]
[Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]
[Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
[Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 (received July 29).]
[Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
[Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
[Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
[Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia (Art. 2).]
[Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1.]
[Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]
[Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: ‘Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict…. We promise that the French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on Monday, August 3, if England’s consent is given in the meantime.’]
[Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 2.]
[Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, August 2.]
[Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]
[Footnote 122: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August 4.]
[Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, August 4.]
[Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]
[Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31.]
[Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145.]
[Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3.]
[Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1.]
[Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_ (October, 1706).]
[Footnote 131: p. 6.]
[Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]
[Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: ‘The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _demarche_ makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other.’]
[Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 24.]
[Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24: ‘I said … direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.’]
[Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]
[Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter.]
[Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 26.]
[Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
[Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 29.]
[Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Russian Ambassador, July 25.]
[Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
[Footnote 143: _Ibid_.]
[Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
[Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
[Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27: ‘Their (sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace.’]
[Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
[Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]
[Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
[Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
[Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30: ‘Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.’]
[Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV.]
[Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8.]
[Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 27.]
[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
[Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]
[Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy’s ignorance of the contents of the Austrian note, see App. V.]
[Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 25.]
[Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
[Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99.]
[Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.]
[Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
[Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]
[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_).]
[Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid._).]
[Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), which will be found in Appendix I.]
[Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]
[Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]
[Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ in Appendix I.]
[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix I.]
[Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]
[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix I.]
[Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
[Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
CHAPTER VI
THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a war between two different principles–that of _raison d’etat_, and that of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe in order to secure the ‘safety’ of its own state, while the other stands for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to which it has pledged its own word as ‘scraps of paper’ when they stand in the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of such covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation.
Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national historian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, the Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what they regard as the national German state.[179] ‘The state’, says Treitschke, ‘is the highest thing in the external society of man: above it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.’ There is here no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_; for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the exclusive state–_der geschlossene Staat_–and in another sense than that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign articles from its shores in order to found a real ‘national’ economy such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this exclusive state is, ‘as Machiavelli first clearly saw’, essentially power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as ‘the public might for defence and offence’. As the highest duty of the individual is self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and self-preservation means power. ‘To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the state.’ ‘Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of Politics.’ This may seem the mere worship of might, and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the _colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.
Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive. The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the glory of war.
_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international ‘law’ so called must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_ obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_. ‘A state cannot bind its will for the future over against other states.’ International treaties are no absolute limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge set over it, and any ‘legal’ obligation it may incur is in the last resort subject to its own decision–in other words, to its own repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the violation of an international obligation) ‘has a certain truth’. ‘It is ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states to start by taking the catechism into its hands.’ All these hints of his master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students. There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law. ‘Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can say that one nation has a better conception than another.’ ‘No self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right’ to any international rule: ‘by so doing it would renounce its own highest ideals.’ The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and foreign wares will reject international law as something ‘foreign’. Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; and this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no longer be binding. ‘When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality.'[181]
But it is the glorification of war–war aggressive as well as war defensive–which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to Treitschke’s _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the following headings–‘its sanctity’; ‘to be conceived as an ordinance set by God’; ‘is the most powerful maker of nations’; ‘is politics _par excellence_’. Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is politics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. ‘Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the state.’ War alone makes us realize the social organism to which we belong: ‘it is political idealism which demands war.’ And again, ‘what a perversion of morality it were, if one struck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)–as if _Heldentum_ could not exist in peace! ‘But the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.’
Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization of war. As we have seen that the state must be ‘power’ in order to preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to preserve itself from ‘sickness’. If it does not fight, individualism will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the world. Hence Bernhardi writes: ‘the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy’. War, war–the ‘strong medicine’, the teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture–war is the law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive– primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the watchwords–‘Colonies!’ ‘Sea-power to gain colonies!’ Treitschke already designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a World-power or perish. And besides, England was a ‘sick’ state–a sham, an hypocrisy.[183]
The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in such cases ‘might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war’, which gives a ‘biologically just decision’! And he expresses wonder and surprise at those who think that ‘the weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation’. In a word, then, might is right. The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer–the talk of war as the fruit of ‘political idealism’ and the expression of the ‘social organism’: the talk of ‘historical development’ as invalidating supposed ‘rights’ like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of power as ‘the vehicle of the highest culture’. Treitschke, a stern Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force disguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as political morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which ‘to maintain its state’, as Machiavelli said, ‘will go to work against faith and charity and humanity and religion’, and which will stride ruthlessly to war when ‘the day’ comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture goes. ‘Have a care’, Mommsen once said, ‘lest in this state, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state should remain.’ Mommsen’s warning has come true in August, 1914. By their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvain smoking in ashes to the sky.
It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, because it is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but also that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is the philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellor himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justify Germany in ‘hewing its way’ through Belgium. Let us only remember, in justice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine of Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tell us that Germany is ‘just merely an extended Prussia’). And let us remember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from two things–geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation, and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by her Hohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especially since Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing space, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his father’s guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been easier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to think in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in the East, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), of international obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England and Russia united in the common cause of Europe to-day–that sees both championing the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other in the West.[185]
But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and we fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness of the state–to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, or seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a European society, or at least a European comity of nations, within which all states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are ‘in the state and posture of gladiators’ in their relations one with another; we stand for the reign of law.
Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no new thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. When England and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on the side of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law of Europe, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did not fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed the public law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were ready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in _Punch_, of August, 1870, shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and shield, with the words–‘Trust me! Let us hope that they won’t trouble you, dear friend. But if they do—-‘ To-day they have; and England has drawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with those traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood–traditions as real and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England; traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public life all the world over? America once fought and beat England, in long-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law–that law-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts to-day as it is in any Britisher–is a bond of sympathy between the two in this great struggle of the nations.
To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, they feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for ‘world-empire’, with its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and death struggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians; but we have put on what Machiavelli called ‘the mantle of superstition’, the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that we are fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We are fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The new German political theory enunciates that ‘our interest is our right’. The old–the very old–English political theory is, ‘The Right is our interest’. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending the cause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending that cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence?
This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public law of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands for her own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, and the ‘ages’ slow-bought gain’ imperilled.
(Treitschke’s _Politik_, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years 1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi’s book, _Deutschland und der naechste Krieg_, was published in 1911, and has been translated into English under the title _Germany and the Next War_. See also J.A. Cramb, _England and Germany_, 1914.)